The precise legal issue is not whether Kaunas Municipality may politically support Žalgiris, but whether the additional allocation of EUR 1 million to the public institution Žalgirio krepšinio centras complies with the municipality’s competence in sports financing, the purpose of budget appropriations, and the requirements applicable to agreements on the use of budget funds and related control.
The decision should primarily be assessed under Article 1 of the Law on Sport of the Republic of Lithuania, as it covers the sports system, municipal competence in the field of sport, and sports financing.
Under Article 8(1)(1)–(3) of the Law on Sport of the Republic of Lithuania, the municipal council determines the areas of sport to be financed from budget funds, the financing criteria and procedure, and finances, on the basis of programmes or projects, legal persons operating in the field of sport within the municipality’s territory.
The budgetary basis is assessed under Article 65(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which permits municipal budget funds to be used only for municipal functions, the implementation of planning documents, the maintenance of budgetary institutions, and the organisation of the provision of public services.
Article 29(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania is additionally relevant, as it links municipal budget appropriations to sports programmes implemented by local self-government institutions, while Article 29(6) permits the financing of other measures in accordance with laws and decisions of municipal councils.
Accordingly, the additional million would be lawful only as a sports financing measure established by the council and allocated on the basis of programmes or projects, and not as a merely declaratory reward for the club’s popularity or achievements.
According to the information provided, the recipient is the public institution Žalgirio krepšinio centras; therefore, under Article 8(1)(3) of the Law on Sport of the Republic of Lithuania, the essential condition is that it operates in the field of sport within the municipality’s territory and receives financing on the basis of a programme or project.
The municipal council must do more than merely approve the amount: it must also have a pre-established basis for the financing criteria and procedure under Article 8(1)(2) of the Law on Sport of the Republic of Lithuania.
Under Article 8(2)(1) and (4) of the Law on Sport of the Republic of Lithuania, the municipal executive institution implements sports policy objectives at the local level and prepares and implements measures for the development of physical activity and high-performance sport; therefore, the administrative implementation of financing cannot be separated from approved measures.
The obligations and procedural elements are as follows:
| Amount or term | Legal significance |
|---|---|
| EUR 2 million annually since 2020 | continuing municipal financing, which must be linked to budget appropriations and to a programme or project |
| additional EUR 1 million this year | the part of financing requiring a budget amendment or reallocation of appropriations |
| at least 1 monitoring indicator | a necessary element of the content of an agreement on the use of budget funds under paragraph 35.3 of the rules |
| 5 working days | applies to the registration of an initiative group for a residents’ poll under Article 41(4) of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government, if residents were to initiate a poll on such a matter |
If the financing is classified as an allocation of municipal budget funds to a sports programme or project, the right of control arises from Article 21(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Physical Education and Sport of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the institution that allocated the funds may inspect their use, and the recipient must submit a report on the use of the funds.
Article 21(3) of the same law gives the manager of appropriations the right to suspend, reduce, or terminate the allocation of funds if reports are not submitted or if conditions are not created for inspecting the use of budget funds.
Under Article 21(4), the recipient of financing is responsible for the use of funds in accordance with the procedure established by legal acts; therefore, sporting results do not in themselves alter the standard of financial accountability.
The risks of non-allocation of financing, insofar as they are apparent from the source provided, include suspension or restriction of the legal person’s activities, failure to comply with tax obligations, attachment of assets, liquidation, bankruptcy proceedings, or the submission of incorrect data or forged documents under Article 20(1)(1)–(4) of Law No. I-1151 Amending the Law on Physical Education and Sport of the Republic of Lithuania.
It is important that Article 20 of the Law on Sport of the Republic of Lithuania, as provided, concerns state budget funds; therefore, in an analysis of municipal financing, direct reliance may be placed only on those provisions provided that clearly cover municipal budget funds.
No case law is included among the sources provided; accordingly, this assessment is based solely on the regulatory framework and procedural conditions for financing.
In practical terms, the first scenario is straightforward: the municipal council approves, or has already approved, the area of sports financing, the criteria, the procedure, and the appropriations; the administration concludes or amends the agreement on the use of budget funds; and the club reports in accordance with the indicators set out in the agreement.
The second scenario is corrective: if the additional EUR 1 million is not clearly linked to a programme, project, purpose, or monitoring indicators, the municipality should regularise the budgetary and contractual documents in accordance with Article 8 of the Law on Sport, Article 29 of the Law on the Budget Structure, and paragraphs 35.1–35.5 of the rules.
The third scenario concerns control: if the recipient fails to submit a report or does not allow the use of funds to be inspected, the manager of appropriations may suspend, reduce, or terminate the financing under Article 21(3) of the Law Amending the Law on Physical Education and Sport.
The fourth scenario concerns the local community: residents may initiate a poll on a matter of importance to the municipality under Article 41 of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government by forming an initiative group of at least 10 residents who have the right to vote.
This financing decision is practically significant:
Thus, the additional million is not unlawful in itself; however, its lawfulness depends on whether it is framed by law as financing for a sports programme or project, approved by the competent municipal institution, included in the system of budget appropriations, and accompanied by contractual accountability and control.
Can the Palanga City Municipality Administration, having received the 21 July 2026 sampling data indicating a temporary deterioration in bathing water quality, confine itself to a sign stating “Bathing is not recommended”, or does Article 12 of the Law on Water already require a formal prohibition on bathing in specific places and at specific times?
Article 12(3) of the Law on Water provides that the use of bathing areas and bathing water quality indicators must comply with the requirements of the hygiene standards approved by the Minister of Health. Accordingly, the legally material issue is not the mere fact of heavy rainfall or currents, but the relationship between the test results and the hygiene standard. Article 12(4) of the same Law assigns municipal councils the task of approving rules of safe conduct and, where necessary, determining the places and times at which bathing is prohibited.
The news item provided indicates a softer measure: from 22 July 2026, information signs reading “Bathing is not recommended” are being installed, rather than a prohibition determined by the municipal council being announced. The stronger legal argument is therefore that, while the results of the repeat samples taken on 21 July 2026 are still awaited on 24 July 2026, the municipality is primarily performing a risk-management and public-information function, but that does not in itself amount to a formal prohibition on bathing.
In practice, the key point is not to recast a recommendation as a prohibition: “Bathing is not recommended” limits risk and warns the public, but under the text of the Law on Water provided, prohibited places and times must be determined by the municipal council. The municipality would face risk if the locations with deteriorated indicators were not marked, if the public were not informed in good time, or if the safely recommended bathing areas No. 6 and No.
1 were not clearly distinguished from the temporarily non-recommended zones. For professional purposes, the relevant citation is precisely the combination of Article 12(3) and Article 12(4) of the Law on Water: the hygiene standards determine the quality threshold, while the council’s decision determines when a recommendation becomes a legally clear prohibition.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether, after a temporary deterioration in the quality of Baltic Sea bathing waters was identified on Palanga beaches on 22 July 2026, the municipality’s actions should be limited to informing the public and recommending against bathing, or whether it must proceed to a formal prohibition on bathing in certain places or at certain times. This question is to be resolved under Article 1(1)-(2) and Article 12(3)-(4) of the Law on Water of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 8(1)-(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Water of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 26 of the Law Amending the Law on the Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases in Humans of the Republic of Lithuania, and points 5 and 7-14 of the Bathing Water Quality Monitoring Programme for 2006-2008. The key provision is Article 12(3) of the Law on Water, under which the use of bathing areas and bathing water quality indicators must comply with the hygiene standards established by the Minister of Health. Another central provision is Article 12(4) of the Law on Water, under which rules on safe conduct in surface water bodies are approved by municipal councils and, where necessary, they determine the places and times where bathing is prohibited. Accordingly, the legal axis is not the cause of the pollution itself, but the municipality’s duty, on the basis of testing data, to manage the use of the bathing area, ensure public information, and, if necessary, initiate a prohibition
Legal assessment. The Palanga situation falls within the scope of Article 1 of the Law on Water, as it concerns water in the natural environment, its recreational use, the prevention of deterioration in water quality, and the reduction of harmful effects of water. Under Article 12(1) of the Law on Water, bathing areas on the Baltic Sea coast may be used for recreation only in compliance with legal requirements governing water, spatial planning, tourism, and protected areas. Under Article 12(3) of the Law on Water, it is not sufficient to state that the deterioration is temporary: what is legally relevant is whether the specific bathing water quality indicators comply with the applicable hygiene standards. Point 7 of the Bathing Water Quality Monitoring Programme defines monitoring as the systematic observation and forecasting of bathing water quality, changes in that quality, and microbiological and chemical pollution. Point 8 of the Programme establishes the objective of ensuring that bathing water complies with Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 92:1999 “Beaches and Their Bathing Areas”, reducing microbiological and chemical pollution, and ensuring measures to improve the quality of waters used for recreation. Points 13 and 14 of the Programme show that what is legally relevant is not merely isolated observations, but the full set of tests: microbiological, chemical, and physical tests carried out in accordance with the requirements of the hygiene standard. Therefore, the repeated sampling on 21 July 2026 and the expected publication of results on 24 July 2026 are consistent with the procedural logic: first, a deviation in indicators is recorded; then the data are verified through repeat testing; and public information is adjusted in light of the new results. The installation of information signs stating “Bathing is not recommended” is consistent with points 5.4 and 9.6 of the Programme, under which the public must be provided with information on bathing water quality via the internet and other public information channels. However, under the cited provisions, such a sign is an informational measure of a recommendatory nature, not in itself a prohibition on bathing within the meaning of Article 12(4) of the Law on Water. If testing confirmed that the risk persists and that recommendations alone are insufficient, the relevant competence would shift to the level of the municipal council, since it is the municipal council that, where necessary, determines the places and times where bathing is prohibited. Continuous monitoring and publication of information by specialists of the municipal administration may be regarded as factual implementation, but formal competence to impose a prohibition is assigned to the municipal council under Article 12(4) of the Law on Water. Article 26(2)(3) of the Law Amending the Law on the Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases in Humans assigns to the municipal board the coordination of organisational, economic, and technical measures limiting microbial effects harmful to human health through water. Article 26(1) of the same law also permits the municipal council to approve sanitary control rules and, in coordination with the Ministry of Health, where necessary, to establish communicable disease prevention requirements stricter than hygiene standards. Article 8(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Water is also relevant if a specific water user or pollution source were identified: water users must not unlawfully deteriorate the condition of water bodies, must carry out environmental impact monitoring, and must implement measures for the protection of water bodies. Nevertheless, in the information provided, the pollution is linked to heavy rainfall, wind direction, currents, and other environmental factors. Therefore, on the basis of the sources provided, the principal analysis at this stage concerns not the issue of liability of a specific polluter, but the duties relating to the use of the bathing area, monitoring, and public information. Article 1 of the Law on Drinking Water applies directly to this situation only insofar as it distinguishes drinking water relations from other uses of water, because bathing in the sea is a recreational matter, not a matter of drinking water consumption
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is favourable: if the repeat test results received on 24 July 2026 show that the indicators have returned within the limits set by hygiene standards, the municipality may discontinue the recommendation against bathing and update the information through public information channels. The second scenario is continuing: if the indicators remain worse, the recommendatory signs should remain in place, and monitoring under points 7, 9.1, and 9.2 of the Programme should continue until the data allow a reasonable assessment of the change in quality. The third scenario is stricter: if the pollution gives rise to a real need not only to warn but also to restrict bathing, the municipal council instrument provided for in Article 12(4) of the Law on Water should be used to determine the places and times where bathing is prohibited. The practical significance for holidaymakers is that the recommendation “Bathing is not recommended” legally signals an assessment of non-compliance or risk, but is not equivalent to a formal prohibition unless such a prohibition has been imposed by the competent authority. The practical significance for the municipality is the duty to act on data, not merely by issuing general notices: to test, assess, forecast, publish information, and, where necessary, apply a stricter regime. The practical significance for potential water users or pollution sources would arise if testing linked the deterioration to an activity, because Article 8(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Water prohibits unlawfully deteriorating the condition of water bodies and requires the use of measures reducing impact. Thus, the next legally significant point is not the notice of deterioration itself, but the decision to be taken on the basis of the test results of 24 July 2026: whether to maintain the informational recommendation, withdraw it, or raise the issue of a formal bathing prohibition in specific Palanga bathing areas
The excerpts provided do not identify a specific initiator; however, the regulation is linked to concerns raised by citizens and supervisory authorities regarding gaps in the use and protection of water bodies. The aim was to update the rules on the protection of waters and the marine environment, ensure the good status of surface waters, groundwater and marine waters, reduce pollution, and restrict activities that adversely affect the hydrological regime of water bodies. The principal arguments were that the regulatory framework was outdated or insufficient, that water resources had to be conserved during droughts, and that the impact of human activity on the marine environment had to be assessed. No clear objections are apparent from the excerpts provided.
Whether the Alytus Municipality inter-institutional meeting on drowning prevention should be regarded merely as an informational initiative, or as a stage in the implementation of the municipal administration director’s civil protection prevention function that ought to be formalised by binding organisational decisions.
Article 20(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Civil Protection of the Republic of Lithuania provides that the director of the municipal administration carries out prevention of emergencies within the municipal territory and issues orders on matters relating to emergency prevention in the municipality. Article 13(1) additionally obliges the administration director to organise preparedness for emergencies in the municipality and to coordinate that activity. Accordingly, the issues discussed at the meeting concerning signage, public information, educational activities and inter-institutional cooperation are not, in legal terms, merely communications matters: they fall within the sphere of organisation of the civil protection function delegated to the municipality.
However, the news item indicates only that a meeting took place and that there was agreement on a general direction, rather than referring to a specific order of the administration director or an approved action plan. The scope of any binding legal consequences would therefore depend on subsequent formalisation.
The stronger argument at this stage is not that the municipality has already discharged its prevention duty, but that it has identified the risk and begun the process of implementing that function. In practice, this means that after such a meeting the municipality itself faces a greater evidential risk: if signage near bodies of water remains unclear and preventive measures are not established through specific assignments, it would be more difficult to argue that the risk was not known. For a lawyer or journalist, the relevant request here should not be for general comments about “education”, but for specific documents: whether an order of the administration director has been adopted under Article 20(2), which institutions have been designated as responsible, what deadlines have been set for informational signage, and whether this has been linked to the municipality’s emergency prevention planning.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the inter-institutional meeting initiated by Alytus City Municipality on drowning prevention, public education, and signage falls within the competence of the municipality and the fire and rescue system. This issue is to be assessed under Articles 13 and 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, Articles 10 and 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water, and Articles 9 and 16 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Fire Safety. Since, on 23 July 2026, the allocation of competences that entered into force after 1 April 2023 applies, Article 2 of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Civil Protection No. VIII-971 is also relevant. The key provision for the safety of water bodies is Article 10(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water, under which rules on safe conduct in and on the ice of surface water bodies are approved by municipal councils in accordance with model rules approved by the Minister of the Interior. Under Article 10(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water, the organisation of rescue operations for drowning persons is allocated between the beach administrator and the Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior
Legal assessment. The content of the meeting legally corresponds to the municipality’s civil protection function, because Article 13(1)(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection assigns to the mayor the organisation of preparedness for emergencies in the municipality and the coordination of that activity. The emphasis on public education is directly consistent with the duty, expressly established in the previous version of the competence framework, of the director of the municipal administration to organise education of municipal residents on civil protection matters under Article 13(1)(5) of the Law Amending the Law on Civil Protection No. VIII-971. Under the institutional responsibility rule in force after 1 April 2023, the mayor and the director of the municipal administration ensure preparedness for emergencies and the performance of other civil protection system functions in the municipality. The participation of the Alytus Fire and Rescue Service is not merely advisory: Article 12(1)(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection assigns to the Fire and Rescue Department and its subordinate institutions the coordination of the implementation of civil protection throughout the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and the provision of methodological assistance. Article 12(1)(4) of the same law assigns to them nationwide coordination of public education on civil protection matters, while Article 12(1)(5) assigns them, within their competence, the function of informing residents and institutions on civil protection matters. Therefore, a meeting involving the municipality’s Public Order Division, health, education, public health, and fire and rescue institutions is precisely the form of coordination that enables local rules, education, and the competence of response forces to be brought together. The issue of informational signage near water bodies is connected with Article 10(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water, because local rules on safe conduct must be approved by the municipal council, and practical signage must reflect the safe bathing areas, risks, and visiting arrangements established in those rules. If the location is a beach and the incident occurs during the beach visiting hours established in the rules, rescue operations for drowning persons are organised by the beach administrator under Article 10(5)(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water. If the incident occurs in a surface water body outside a beach area, or on a beach after the established visiting hours, responsibility for organising the rescue operation transfers to the Fire and Rescue Department under Article 10(5)(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water. The use of watercraft is also relevant from a preventive perspective, because Article 12(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water requires persons to ensure that such craft do not endanger people or the environment. Municipal institutions may submit reasoned proposals concerning water bodies in which the use of certain types of watercraft is prohibited or restricted, as provided for in Article 12(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water. Article 16(2) of the Law on Fire Safety further shows that the State Fire and Rescue Service is part of the permanent-readiness civil protection and rescue system and performs rescue operations for people. Under Article 16(3) of the Law on Fire Safety, municipal fire services are also part of the permanent-readiness civil protection and rescue system and carry out initial rescue operations involving people and property. Article 9(1)(4) of the Law on Fire Safety assigns to municipal institutions the organisation of public education on fire safety matters, while Article 9(2) assigns to municipal fire services the implementation of public education in the field of fire prevention; these provisions do not directly regulate bathing, but they explain why entities within the rescue system are involved in preventive activities
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the meeting results in administrative action at municipal level: rules on safe conduct in water bodies are updated or implemented in practice, signage is refined, and educational campaigns are planned. The second scenario is that the municipality, relying on Article 12(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water, submits reasoned proposals concerning restrictions on watercraft in specific water bodies where this is necessary for the implementation of safe conduct rules. The third scenario is a clearer allocation of operational responsibilities between the beach administrator and the Fire and Rescue Department under Article 10(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water, so that residents understand who is responsible for rescue operations at different times and in different places. The practical significance for residents is that their right to use water bodies for recreation under Article 10(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water will be implemented through specific rules on safe conduct, information, and visible marking of risks. For the municipality, this is important as evidence of the performance of a delegated civil protection function, because the meeting is not in itself final regulation, but may serve as a basis for adopting or refining local measures. For entities within the fire and rescue system, it is important in relation to methodological assistance, information provision, and the potential limits of response established in Article 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection and Article 10 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Water
The specific question is whether, in the context of minors being poisoned by vaping substances of unclear composition, the most legally significant issue is a new prohibition or the actual application of Article 77 of the Code of Administrative Offences to every transfer of electronic cigarettes or refill containers to a minor.
Article 77(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences directly penalises, at the level of an administrative offence, not only the sale but also the “purchase, transfer or other disposal” of electronic cigarettes or their refill containers to a minor, providing for a fine of EUR 320 to EUR 580. A repeated offence of this kind, under Article 77(4), entails a fine of EUR 580 to EUR 820. The provision therefore covers a broader chain of conduct than a sale made at a retail checkout: legally relevant is any factual channel by which the product reaches a minor, provided it is established that the product was an electronic cigarette or refill container and that the recipient was a minor.
The stronger practical argument in this situation is not the abstract assertion that “there is a lack of laws”, but that the existing structure of Article 77 allows both intermediaries and sellers to be pursued, while the sanction range of EUR 320 to EUR 820 may be too weak for the commercial logic of illegal circulation. The circumstance mentioned in the article that doctors are sometimes unable to identify the specific synthetic substance does not alter the core application of Article 77: for an offence concerning disposal to a minor, what must primarily be proved is the fact of transfer of an electronic cigarette or refill container, not its full chemical composition. In practice, control authorities and journalists should distinguish between two evidential questions: the causal link between harm to health and a specific substance, and administrative liability for the product’s reaching a minor.
On the basis of the provision cited, it is the second route that is procedurally stronger and more readily enforceable.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether electronic cigarettes and refill containers placed on the market, in relation to which children experience symptoms of poisoning, comply with requirements concerning composition, quality, labelling and market surveillance. It is primarily assessed under Article 3(2), (5), (6), (7) and (9) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, which establish the reduction of accessibility to minors, the prohibition of advertising and promotion of consumption, awareness-raising and control. The substantive product safety criteria arise from Article 9²(1) and (2) of that Law: electronic cigarettes and refill containers placed on the market must comply with legal requirements, and the liquid is subject to requirements concerning volume, nicotine concentration, non-hazardous ingredients and consistent dosing. The issue of information for consumers and authorities is assessed under Article 9⁴(1)–(3) of the same Law, which require an information leaflet, a list of chemical substances, nicotine content, a batch number, and prohibit misleading effects of packaging. The chain of market response and liability is assessed under Article 9⁷(1)–(3) of the Law, which entrusts the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority with supervision of labelling, composition and quality, and imposes on manufacturers, importers and distributors duties to collect information on adverse effects, take corrective action, withdraw or recall products from the market, and provide information
Legal assessment. If a product contains vaping substances of unclear composition, the legal assessment does not begin with whether a medical investigation is possible, but with the obligation to have a composition compliant with legal requirements and clear labelling. Under Article 9²(2)(3) of the Law on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, only such ingredients may be used in the liquid as are not hazardous to human health, whether heated or unheated, except for nicotine in nicotine-containing liquid. Accordingly, the situation described in the report, where products may contain synthetic cannabinoids, opioids or other psychoactive substances, is legally relevant as a possible breach of composition and quality requirements. Under Article 9²(2)(1) and (2), it is also material whether the liquid is supplied in permitted containers and whether nicotine-containing liquid contains no more than 20 milligrams of nicotine per millilitre. If a consumer, minor or medical professional cannot determine what is in the product, this directly relates to the obligation under Article 9⁴(2) to indicate on the packaging a list of all chemical substances contained in the product in descending order by weight. The same provision requires indication of the nicotine content, the amount of nicotine delivered per dose, the production batch number, and a recommendation to keep the product out of the reach of children. Article 9⁴(1) additionally requires information on use, storage, contraindications, warnings for risk groups, possible adverse effects, addictive potential, toxicity, and the contact details of the manufacturer or importer. As regards colours, flavours or forms attractive to children, the relevant boundary is Article 9⁴(3)(1): the packaging must not contain elements or features that promote purchase or consumption by creating a misleading impression as to properties, health effects, risks or emissions. At the level of State policy, Article 3(2) permits and requires the use of State regulatory measures to reduce the accessibility of related products, particularly to minors. Article 3(6) prohibits the promotion, in any form and by any means, of the acquisition or consumption of tobacco products and related products; therefore, marketing appeal to children is not merely a communications issue, but also a matter of control policy. Institutional competence under Article 9⁷(1) is clearly concentrated in the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority, which supervises whether the labelling, composition and quality of electronic cigarettes and refill containers comply with legal requirements. Under Article 9⁷(2), manufacturers, importers and distributors must collect and retain information on any suspected adverse effects on human health; therefore, reports of poisoning are significant not only medically, but also from the perspective of post-market product surveillance. Under Article 9⁷(3), any of those entities must immediately take the corrective measures necessary to ensure compliance, withdraw or recall the product from the market, and inform the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority of the risk to health and safety and of the actions taken. The sources on implementation procedure indicate that the procedure for submitting notifications on the ingredients and emissions of electronic cigarettes and refill containers was approved by Government Resolution No. 74, as amended by Resolution No. 922 of 15 September 2016. The Law amending Article 9², which entered into force on 1 July 2022, and Article 2 thereof show that, as of today, 23 July 2026, the special regulation of the composition of electronic cigarettes is already in force and is not a future regulatory intention. The Government position set out in the sources concerning draft laws No. XIIIP-3849 and No. XIIIP-3903 emphasised that draft measures concerning a ban on flavourings and the licensing of related products should, before adoption, be notified to the European Commission and to the other Member States of the European Union. Thus, national measures aimed at flavours, licensing or restrictions on disposable products must be aligned not only with the domestic public health objective, but also with the indicated notification procedure
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a market surveillance case: the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority examines the composition, quality and labelling of specific products under Articles 9², 9⁴ and 9⁷. If non-compliance or a risk to health is established, the manufacturer, importer or distributor must, under Article 9⁷(3), immediately remedy the situation, withdraw or recall the product from the market, and inform the Authority. The second scenario is the strengthening of preventive regulation, since point 3.5.1 of the Implementation Plan of the Programme of the Nineteenth Government provides that, by the fourth quarter of 2027, the accessibility and attractiveness to children and young persons of tobacco products, electronic cigarettes, and narcotic and psychotropic substances are to be reduced, including through a ban on disposable electronic cigarettes. The third scenario is stricter enforcement of requirements already in force without introducing a new prohibition: the legal sources already provide a mechanism for composition safety, disclosure of chemical substances, warnings, batch traceability and corrective action. This is important for minors and their parents because Article 3(2) of the Law identifies the reduction of accessibility to minors as a specific objective of State policy. This is important for traders, importers and manufacturers because signals of poisoning may activate not only general reputational risk, but also the specific duties under Article 9⁷(2) and (3) to collect information, act and notify the supervisory authority. This is important for the supervisory authority because, according to the sources provided, the problem described in the report is not merely a burden on the health system: it falls within the field of control over the composition, labelling, quality and accessibility to children of electronic cigarettes
The regulation was initiated by the drafters of the legislative bills in response to the widespread use of electronic cigarettes among minors and the difficulties in imposing effective liability. The aim was to tighten control of tobacco and related products, reduce smoking among children and adolescents, and prevent the use of harmful, toxic vaping substances. The principal arguments were the growing prevalence of electronic cigarettes among young people, the mistaken belief that they are harmless, and WHO and student survey data concerning the early onset of smoking; no substantive objections are indicated in the excerpts of the documents provided.
Whether the Government’s declared commitment to allocate no less than 0.25% of GDP to Ukraine’s defence may be regarded as a legally binding funding obligation under the regulatory framework for development cooperation and humanitarian aid, or merely as a political benchmark for budget planning.
Article 8 of the Law on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid links funding to approved budget appropriations, Fund resources, and other lawfully obtained funds which, under the OECD methodology, are treated as official development assistance. This means that the Prime Minister’s political confirmation of 0.25% of GDP does not, in itself, create an autonomous legal basis for payment: a specific appropriation, Fund financing, or a separate programme is required. Article 13 likewise establishes not an automatic obligation as to amount, but a planning criterion: funds are allocated to the Fund having regard to development cooperation objectives and the aim that official development assistance should comply with international commitments.
The objectives set out in Article 3 allow measures relating to Ukraine’s stability, reconstruction, energy resilience, or institutional cooperation to be viewed as part of foreign policy and development cooperation, but defence funding must comply with the conditions of the specific financing instrument.
The stronger argument is that the 0.25% of GDP threshold referred to in this news item is a political commitment, not a right of claim arising directly from the Law on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid. In practice, it is important for lawyers to distinguish support for Ukraine’s energy resilience and economic reconstruction, which more readily fits within the logic of Articles 3 and 8, from defence support, whose classification under this regime will depend on the specific appropriation and the application of the OECD official development assistance methodology. Accordingly, when assessing future budgetary or programme decisions, the relevant materials to cite are not general political statements, but the specific appropriation documents, the Fund or programme description, and their connection with Articles 8 and 13.
The risk lies in treating “support for Ukraine” too broadly as a single legal category: sanctions, defence industry cooperation, energy resilience, and reconstruction may have different legal bases and different control logics.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the Prime Minister’s statement itself creates a new sanctions or funding obligation, but on what legal bases Lithuanian institutions may implement the stated policy direction: tightening sanctions against Russia, supporting Ukraine, and raising the issue of Ukraine’s integration into the EU. This direction should first be assessed under Article 135 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which requires foreign policy to be guided by the principles of international law, to pursue national security, and to contribute to the creation of an international order based on law and justice. The sanctions issue is governed by Article 1(2), Article 5, and Article 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions. Article 1(2) of that Law provides that it establishes the general conditions in Lithuania for submitting proposals concerning international sanctions, imposing restrictive measures, and implementing sanctions. Article 5 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions confers competence on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare and submit proposals to the European Union, the United Nations, and other organisations concerning the imposition, amendment, or revocation of sanctions. Article 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions establishes the implementation regime: sanctions imposed by EU legal acts are implemented in full, while sanctions under UN Security Council resolutions are implemented in Lithuania in full and directly
Legal assessment. The statement regarding the objective of strengthening sanctions against Russia legally amounts to the formation of Lithuania’s position and the submission of proposals in international organisations, rather than a unilateral amendment of EU sanctions by national decision. Under Article 5 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions, the relevant national institution at this stage is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may act on its own initiative, on a proposal from the commission, or on a proposal from competent institutions. If stricter sanctions were adopted by directly applicable EU legal acts, Lithuania would be required to implement them in full under Article 6(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions. If national legal acts were required for their implementation, the same Article 6(1) provides that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepares and submits the necessary draft legal acts to the Government. In the case of UN Security Council sanctions, the obligation would be even more direct under Article 6(2): they are implemented in Lithuania in full and directly. Sanctions of a recommendatory nature adopted by the UN General Assembly, the OSCE, or other organisations are implemented under Article 6(3) after assessing whether this is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Law. The sanctions concept notes that the application of sanctions may restrict economic freedom and human rights, and therefore such activity must be regulated by law; this is important when assessing any practical measures against persons, companies, or transactions. The same concept describes the sanctions regime as rapidly changing, and therefore envisages a role for Government resolutions in determining the scope of application where national implementation is necessary. The statement concerning at least 0.25 per cent of GDP for Ukraine’s defence has no independent budgetary procedural rule in the sources provided; accordingly, under those sources it is legally to be assessed as a foreign and security policy direction linked to Article 135 of the Constitution. Bilateral cooperation in the defence industry and the adoption of Ukraine’s military experience, according to the sources provided, are likewise based on foreign policy and security objectives; if treaties concerning political cooperation, mutual assistance, or defence-related matters were concluded, Article 138 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania on international treaties requiring ratification by the Seimas would become relevant. Raising the issue of Ukraine’s integration into the EU during Lithuania’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2027, according to the sources from Government activity reports provided, is consistent with Lithuania’s previous practice of preparing for the Presidency, mobilising institutions, and formulating priorities. The 2015 Government activity report stated that Lithuania sought to mobilise EU support for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and, in the context of Russian aggression in Ukraine, to preserve and extend sanctions against Russia; the current direction is therefore consistent with an already recorded line of state policy
Consequences. The first practical scenario is that Lithuania, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, submits or supports proposals within the EU for new or stricter sanctions against Russia, and, once directly applicable EU legal acts are adopted, those acts are implemented in Lithuania in full. The second scenario is that national implementing legislation is required to prevent circumvention of sanctions, in which case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions, prepares draft acts for the Government. The third scenario is that Lithuania seeks broader international isolation not only within the EU but also in the UN or other organisations; however, under the rules provided, the binding nature of the measures would depend on whether they are EU legal acts, UN Security Council resolutions, or decisions of a recommendatory nature. The fourth scenario is that, on the agenda of the 2027 Presidency of the Council of the EU, the issue of Ukraine’s integration becomes an object of institutional coordination, priority-setting, and diplomatic action by Lithuanian institutions, in a manner similar to how preparation for the 2013 Presidency was envisaged in earlier documents. The practical significance for business is that new or expanded sanctions may alter the boundaries of permissible transactions, payments, supply chains, and relationships with natural or legal persons. For state institutions, this means the need to align foreign policy positions with the sanctions implementation mechanism, because a political statement alone is not yet a sufficient basis for applying specific restrictions. For Ukraine, this direction is important as legal and political support for assistance, the EU integration agenda, and the continuity of sanctions pressure on Russia. From the perspective of Lithuanian law, the most important boundary remains clear: sanctions and restrictive measures must be based on the foreign policy principles enshrined in Article 135 of the Constitution and implemented according to the model of competences and procedures established in Articles 5 and 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions
The regulation was initiated by the Government, with its drafting based on an assessment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions of the practical application of sanctions. The aim was to establish a legal basis in Lithuania for applying national restrictions on funds and economic resources to Russian and Belarusian persons supporting the aggression against Ukraine, and to clarify the sanctions implementation mechanism. The main arguments were the protection of national security, the conduct of Lithuania’s foreign policy, more consistent application of EU and UN sanctions, and clarity regarding institutional competences. No fundamental objections to the direction of the regulation are apparent; however, the Legal Department and the committees proposed refining the wording so as to clearly distinguish between the procedure for imposing restrictive measures and the procedure for implementing them.
Is actual coordination of services between the primary health care centre and the hospital sufficient for the legality of the municipal health centre model, or must service accessibility be secured through a specific institutional structure or obligations under a cooperation agreement?
Article 39 of the Law on Health Care Institutions separately identifies primary health care centres, hospitals and health centres within the nomenclature of municipal institutions of the Lithuanian National Health System, meaning that the reform itself is not, legally, a single-model reform. Article 46-1 shows even more clearly that the law permits the provision of services to be ensured not only through institutional merger, but also through cooperation agreements with other institutions, irrespective of their form of ownership or subordination. However, the same provision requires the agreement to specify the object of ensuring service provision and the parties’ obligations.
Accordingly, a mere declaration of “functional cooperation” is not legally sufficient if it is unclear who is specifically obliged to ensure the service, to what extent and within what time limits. Article 1 of the Law frames this issue not as a managerial success story of the reform, but as a matter of regulating the classification, reorganisation, governance, financing and control of institutions, as well as their relations with patients.
The stronger legal argument in this situation is not that Klaipeda District’s merged model is inherently superior to the models in Kretinga or Skuodas, but that the merged model more readily demonstrates a single centre of responsibility for service accessibility. A functional cooperation model can be equivalent only where the object of the services and the obligations are formulated with sufficient specificity in the agreements under Article 46-1. Otherwise, patient satisfaction indicators, EUR 7 million projects, equipment purchases or the attraction of new specialists do not eliminate the legal risk arising from fragmented responsibility.
In practice, when assessing such a reform, one should request not only investment or staffing data, but also the founding, reorganisation and cooperation documents: these are what will show whether the planned recruitment of a geriatrician from 7 September 2026, mobile dental services and the “green corridor” constitute a legally binding guarantee of service provision, or merely an administrative promise.
Core issue. The legal issue is not which Western Lithuania model is more politically attractive, but whether the methods of integration and functional cooperation chosen by municipalities comply with the rules governing the network of healthcare institutions, the organisation of services and financing. It is to be assessed under Article 1(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Healthcare Institutions, as that provision covers the classification, establishment, reorganisation, activities, management and financing particularities of institutions. In the case of Klaipėda District, Article 39 of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Healthcare Institutions is relevant: paragraph 1, point 1 refers to primary healthcare centres, while point 10 refers to municipal hospitals of cities or districts. Paragraph 2 of the same Article 39 allows certain municipal institutions, by a reasoned decision of the municipal council, to be reorganised by merger into primary healthcare centres; accordingly, the integrated Gargždai PHC and hospital model must be assessed through the rules on reorganisation and nomenclature. In the case of the functional model of Plungė and Skuodas, the key provision is Article 46^1(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Healthcare Institutions, which permits the provision of services to be ensured by cooperation agreements with other institutions irrespective of their form of ownership or subordination. Under Article 46^1(2), the core of such an agreement consists of its subject matter and the parties’ obligations; therefore, merely declaratory “managerial cooperation” is legally sufficient only to the extent that it is specified through obligations to ensure services. From the financing perspective, the applicable principle is Article 26(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Health Insurance, namely that the costs of services provided to insured persons are paid under agreements between the National Health Insurance Fund and personal healthcare institutions. Accordingly, the legal measure of the reform is not only the number of specialists attracted or items of equipment acquired, but also whether the chosen structure ensures service provision, contractual obligations and a lawful payment mechanism
Legal assessment. The unified model of Klaipėda District legally corresponds to the direction of institutional integration insofar as the merger of municipal institutions is based on a reasoned decision of the municipal council and falls within the nomenclature of LNSS municipal institutions identified in Article 39. Article 39(3) entrusts the municipal executive institution with organising and managing nomenclature institutions within the municipal territory in accordance with minimum requirements for location and structure and with the need for services. This means that issues of premises, specialists and access to services are not merely matters of administrative convenience: they are linked to the municipality’s duty to organise the institutional network according to need. The Plungė District model, involving cooperation between the municipal bureau, hospital, municipal institutions and private institutions, most closely corresponds to the structure of Article 46^1(1), because that provision expressly permits cooperation irrespective of ownership form and subordination. However, under Article 46^1(2), each participating institution must be assigned a defined role in ensuring services; therefore, the appointment of Plungė Hospital as coordinator has legal significance only together with specific contractual obligations. Article 46^1(4) is important because a cooperation agreement neither replaces nor extinguishes agreements with territorial health insurance funds regarding payment for services from the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund budget. This means that the functional health centre model may integrate the organisation of services, but the legal basis for financing remains the agreements under Article 26 of the Law on Health Insurance. Under Article 26(2) of the Law on Health Insurance, standard agreements must set out essential terms, including the parties’ rights and obligations, settlement procedure, liability, dispute resolution, termination, validity, amendment and suspension. Consequently, the acquisition of equipment, electric vehicles, computers or rehabilitation measures does not in itself determine the scope of reimbursed services unless they are embedded in the relevant contractual and service nomenclature mechanisms. Point 24 of the Restructuring Strategy provides that decisions on the size, structure and location of institutions are based on the needs of regions and counties, morbidity indicators, material, financial and human resources, and efficiency. Accordingly, the differences between Telšiai, Klaipėda District and Plungė are not in themselves a legal problem: the law permits different models, provided they are justified by service needs and resources. Point 7.1 of the Restructuring Strategy gives priority to the development of outpatient services at a faster pace than the reduction of inpatient services; therefore, the expansion of PHCs and the attraction of family doctors are legally relevant criteria of the reform. Point 7.3 of the Strategy further emphasises the development of general practitioners’ activities in rural areas; therefore, staff shortages in district PHCs are directly linked to the restructuring priority. Point 25 of the Strategy provides that state and municipal investments are planned and allocated having regard to the institutional transformation perspective set out in restructuring plans. Accordingly, project investments in Plungė long-term care infrastructure or in the diagnostic and rehabilitation base of Klaipėda District must be assessed not in isolation, but as part of the transformation of the network. Point 12.7 of the Programme for the Third Stage of Restructuring permits other institutions to be transferred to, or left under, municipal authority; therefore, the municipal subordination of district institutions is consistent with the regulatory direction presented. Article 6(3) of the Law Amending Articles 15^1, 15^2, 15^3, 36 and 45 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Healthcare Institutions No. I-1367, which entered into force on 1 January 2025, is also relevant to the remuneration of heads of institutions and the evaluation of performance results in 2026 and subsequent years. Since today is 23 July 2026, the referenced start date of 7 September for a geriatrician’s work in Klaipėda District should be assessed as a future stage of strengthening human resources on 7 September 2026, not as an outcome that has already occurred
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that integrated health centres, such as those in Klaipėda District, will strengthen the advantage of a single legal or organisational model if the municipality can justify the structure by reference to service needs, resources and investment direction under Article 39(3) and points 24–25 of the Restructuring Strategy. The second scenario is that Plungė-type functional centres will remain legally appropriate if the cooperation agreements clearly define the service objects and the obligations of each institution under Article 46^1(2). The third scenario is that, even after infrastructure modernisation, the problem of access to services will persist if shortages of family doctors, nurses or other specialists prevent the actual implementation of the priority of expanding outpatient services under points 7.1 and 7.3 of the Restructuring Strategy. For patients, the most important practical issue is whether the chosen model will shorten the path to receiving services locally, because the legal sources focus not on the name of the model, but on ensuring services and aligning the network with need. For municipalities, it is important that their decisions on mergers, cooperation or investments must be justified not only by project financing, but also by the criteria of structure, location, need and efficiency specified in legislation. For institutions, it is important to distinguish between two levels: cooperation agreements under Article 46^1 of the Law on Healthcare Institutions organise the ensuring of services, while agreements under Article 26 of the Law on Health Insurance determine the legal basis for payment for services provided. Accordingly, the legal success of the reform will depend on whether municipalities are able to align the transformation of the institutional network, the contractual allocation of services, investment planning and the contractual regime for services paid from CHIF funds
The regulation was initiated by the Government and the Ministry of Health with a view to creating the legal preconditions for reform of the network of healthcare institutions. The objective was to improve the quality, safety and accessibility of services irrespective of place of residence, strengthen regional cooperation, optimise the management of institutions and address Lithuania’s poor health indicators. The principal arguments were based on uneven service quality, a fragmented network, shortages of specialists and the need to concentrate more complex services, while objections emphasised the diminishing influence of local self-government, insufficient consultation, risks to the accessibility of services for local residents and the potential weakening of regional or specialised institutions.
Is an internal prohibition on using personal AI accounts sufficient where Kaunas Municipality uses AI to process residents’ requests, complaints or service-related decisions, or does the GDPR require a separate information and notification mechanism addressed to the data subject?
Article 13 GDPR requires that, when personal data are collected, the data subject be provided with the identity of the controller, the contact details of the DPO, the purposes of processing, the legal basis, the recipients or categories of recipients and, where applicable, information on transfers to a third country or an international organisation. It follows that a public statement by the municipality concerning AI systems is not merely a matter of reputational transparency: where AI is used specifically in the examination of a request or complaint, the information provided must be linked to the specific purpose and legal basis of the data processing. Article 12 GDPR further requires that this information be provided in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form; accordingly, an internal register of AI systems or an order of the director would not, by itself, constitute a sufficient information channel for the resident.
Article 34 GDPR is relevant to incidents: if an error in the use of AI also constitutes a personal data breach and is likely to result in a high risk to the rights or freedoms of natural persons, the municipality must notify the data subjects without undue delay, and not merely inform internal managers within one hour.
The stronger practical argument is not the abstract proposition that “a human makes the final decision”, but whether the resident, for the purposes of Articles 13 and 12 GDPR, actually learns that his or her data will be processed by means of an AI tool, for what purpose, on what legal basis and to whom the data may be disclosed. It would therefore be most risky for the municipality to use AI to sort requests, identify the subject matter of a complaint or alter the provision of a service, while leaving only a general reference to “information systems” in its privacy notices. A prohibition on personal “ChatGPT”, “Gemini” or “Copilot” accounts is legally rational here not because those systems are inherently unlawful, but because an unapproved platform is difficult to reconcile with the identification of recipients, legal basis and possible transfers required by Article 13 GDPR.
For a professional, the point worth checking is not the AI policy declaration itself, but three documentary points: the privacy notice provided to the resident, the register of approved AI systems and the incident procedure under Article 34 GDPR.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the Administration of Kaunas City Municipality, as a municipal authority performing public functions, may restrict the use of unapproved AI systems by an internal act and impose duties on employees where AI is used in relation to the Administration’s data, services, and preparation of decisions. This question must be assessed under Article 1, Article 2(1)(1), and Article 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Right to Obtain Information and Re-use of Data, because municipal authorities fall within the scope of that law and hold data concerning their activities. Where the use of AI involves personal data, Articles 24 and 32 of the GDPR apply, establishing the controller’s responsibility and duty to implement appropriate technical and organisational security measures. The institution’s competence to adopt internal regulation must also be assessed under points 1, 2, 3, 25, 26, and 27 of the Model Rules of Internal Procedure for State Institutions and Agencies, since those provisions link internal procedure to employee conduct, the head’s responsibility for implementation, liability for breaches, and publication of internal rules. The place of AI regulation in the public sector is also connected with the Government’s position on Draft Law No. XVP-925 amending the Law on Public Administration, which states that the use of specific information technologies in public administration should be regulated within the field of the Law on the Management of State Information Resources
Legal assessment. Under Article 2(1)(1) of the Law on the Right to Obtain Information and Re-use of Data, Kaunas City Municipality Administration is to be regarded as an institution; therefore, its AI policy must be aligned with the duty to manage and provide institutional data under the conditions laid down by law. A prohibition on using personal, public, or unapproved AI accounts is legally explicable as an organisational measure under Article 24(1) of the GDPR, because the controller must not only comply with the Regulation but also be able to demonstrate such compliance. The same prohibition is consistent with the logic of Article 32(1) of the GDPR, because unapproved accounts are difficult to reconcile with the ongoing assurance of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and resilience. If an employee were to upload Administration data to a personal “ChatGPT”, “Google Gemini”, “Copilot”, or other public generative AI system, it would be difficult for the institution to substantiate that it controls the technical and organisational measures required by Articles 24 and 32 of the GDPR. The requirement to carry out an impact assessment before applying AI is consistent with the risk-based approach in Article 24 of the GDPR, because measures must depend on the nature, scope, context, and purposes of processing, as well as the risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Where personal data are processed, an additional data protection impact assessment in practice becomes a means of verifying whether the use of AI meets the security criteria identified in Article 32 of the GDPR. The human oversight rule is particularly important where AI is used for complaints, applications, enquiries, or the granting, modification, or termination of services, because under the sources provided, the accountable actor is the institution and its employees, not the system itself. An internal rule that the final decision is made by a human strengthens the accountability model under Article 24 of the GDPR: the institution must have an identifiable decision-maker capable of explaining why an AI output was used or rejected. The employee’s duty to verify AI-generated content is also an organisational control, because Article 32 of the GDPR requires not only technical measures but also a process for regularly testing and evaluating their effectiveness. The functions of an AI coordinator, such as maintaining a register of permitted systems, risk assessment, consultation, and training, correspond to the implementation of data protection policies referred to in Article 24(2) of the GDPR, where proportionate to the processing activities. However, if the AI coordinator were also to perform the functions of a data protection officer or tasks related to them, Article 38(6) of the GDPR would require ensuring that no conflict of interests arises. Recording incidents and informing managers within one hour is consistent with the requirement in Article 32(1) of the GDPR to ensure resilience, the ability to restore access to personal data, and the testing of security measures. If applications are wrongly rejected due to an AI error, suspension of the system and notification of affected persons is a practical way to reduce continuing risks to individuals’ rights and maintain the institution’s accountability under Article 24 of the GDPR. Public disclosure of general information on the AI systems used is consistent with the objective of Article 1 of the Law on the Right to Obtain Information and Re-use of Data, namely to ensure the right to obtain information about the activities of state and municipal institutions. Where AI systems are used to prepare, systematise, adapt, or process data at an applicant’s request, Article 12(2) of the Law on the Right to Obtain Information and Re-use of Data requires justification of the amount of remuneration and information on the appeal procedure. The requirement in procurement rules for the supplier to indicate the model’s origin, testing for bias and accuracy, and the prohibition on using municipal data for model training without written permission constitute a contractual mechanism for implementing the duties laid down in Articles 24 and 32 of the GDPR. The Government’s position on Draft Law No. XVP-925 shows that the use of AI in public administration is not regarded merely as a matter of rules of conduct: it is linked to the management of state information resources, information systems, technology platforms, and tools. The same position states that a separate draft law is being prepared concerning Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the Artificial Intelligence Act, the competence of implementing authorities, and the rights and duties of entities; therefore, the municipality’s internal procedure operates as an interim organisational regime. Since in 2026 the State Digital Solutions Agency is expected to have training, methodological, and expert assistance functions, the training and consultation functions of the municipality’s AI coordinator are consistent with the national model for the deployment of AI in the public sector
Consequences. In practice, the first scenario is controlled AI deployment: only approved systems are used, impact assessments are carried out, a register of permitted systems is maintained, and employees make decisions on the basis of verified, but not autonomous, AI output. The second scenario is breach management: where an employee uses an unapproved AI tool or uploads restricted-use data or personal data, official or disciplinary liability may arise under points 25 and 26 of the Model Rules of Internal Procedure. The third scenario concerns complaints by data subjects, because under Article 57 of the GDPR the supervisory authority promotes controllers’ awareness of their obligations and handles data subjects’ complaints concerning the application of the Regulation. For the municipality, this matters because the AI policy becomes evidence under Article 24 of the GDPR; however, its mere approval is insufficient if access control, logs, training, incident management, and procurement contract safeguards do not operate in practice. For residents, this matters because AI may accelerate the sorting of applications and complaints, but the basis for a legally significant outcome must remain an administrative act verified by a human, not an autonomous conclusion of the system. For suppliers, this means that in municipal AI procurement, what matters is not only functionality or price, but also demonstrable security, accuracy, bias control, model origin, and a contractual prohibition on using municipal data for training without permission
The regulation was initiated by the drafters of legislative amendments submitted to the Seimas; the excerpts provided do not identify specific individuals. The aim was to allow public administration entities to use AI for documents, inquiries and draft decisions, while ensuring employee oversight, transparency and GDPR compliance. The main objections concerned overly strict restrictions on the reuse of data from state information systems and the lack of a clear justification for them.
The specific question is whether the Seimas may initiate impeachment proceedings against R. Žemaitaitis after the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania, which upheld the conviction and increased the fine from EUR 5,000 to EUR 10,000, or whether it must await cassation review by the Supreme Court of Lithuania if the convicted person appeals the judgment. At present, the stronger argument is the argument for waiting: the report itself relies on the Constitutional Court’s clarification that impeachment proceedings are linked to a final court decision, not merely to a political view that the appellate court has already confirmed guilt sufficiently.
Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly enshrines the accused person’s right to appeal a court judgment and rulings, while Article 24 provides that the cassation instance is the Supreme Court of Lithuania, which hears appeals against final judgments or rulings. Article 346(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that final court judgments and rulings are binding on all state institutions and officials; accordingly, the outcome of criminal proceedings becomes a legally binding basis for institutional action only as a final procedural act. In this situation, it is not enough to state that the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld guilt for incitement to hatred and minimisation of the Holocaust: if a cassation appeal is lodged, the political course of impeachment will rest not only on the authority of the appellate judgment, but on the question whether removal from constitutional office may be based on a decision that can still be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Lithuania.
The report points to a practical precedent involving Petras Gražulis: impeachment proceedings based on a criminal case were initiated after a final and unappealable ruling of the Supreme Court had been delivered. Nevertheless, the basis for the loss of his mandate was a separate finding by the Constitutional Court that he had breached his oath and grossly violated the Constitution by voting for another member of the Seimas. The Gražulis example therefore supports a standard of procedural caution rather than an automatic rule that any criminal conviction in itself resolves the question of a mandate.
In practice, the safest course for the Seimas now is to cite not only the Court of Appeal’s conclusion concerning antisemitic statements, but also the procedural threshold: a cassation appeal shifts the decisive moment for commencing impeachment to the stage of a Supreme Court ruling or an unappealable appellate judgment. A rushed initiation of impeachment before the cassation process has concluded would create a procedural risk that the political process would be based on a criminal case outcome that has not yet become finally settled. As regards the proposal to tighten the law and temporarily prohibit a member of the Seimas who has received an adverse court judgment from standing in elections, the key practical issue will be the wording: whether the prohibition is linked to any adverse judgment, or only to a final conviction that has entered into force, since the first model would directly conflict with the right of appeal and the logic of finality.
Core issue. The precise question is whether R. Žemaitaitis’s conviction on appeal already constitutes a sufficient basis for the Seimas to initiate impeachment, or whether it is necessary to await the conclusion of the cassation proceedings. This question is to be resolved under Article 74 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that a Member of the Seimas who has grossly violated the Constitution or breached the oath, or where it becomes evident that a crime has been committed, may be deprived of his or her mandate by a three-fifths majority vote of all Members of the Seimas through impeachment proceedings. The issue of the continuation of criminal proceedings must be assessed under Articles 381 and 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: a cassation case may be adjourned, and the court hearing it may dismiss the appeal, quash, or amend the decisions of lower courts. Therefore, while cassation proceedings remain realistically possible and, according to available information, are intended to be initiated, the legal position is not the same as in the case of a final and unappealable ruling. Also relevant is the direction of the Constitutional Court’s case law cited in legislative materials: the bringing of suspicions or unsubstantiated accusations does not constitute the fact of commission of a criminal offence, as such a fact is established by a final court judgment, in connection with the presumption of innocence and the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 7 July 2011
Legal assessment. Article 74 of the Constitution grants the Seimas the competence to revoke the mandate of a Member of the Seimas not by an ordinary political decision, but only through impeachment proceedings and only on the grounds specified in that Article. If the ground for impeachment were considered to be that “it becomes evident that a crime has been committed,” decisive significance attaches not to the public accusation itself or to an adverse decision of a lower court, but to the fact confirmed by a final court judgment. Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that the cassation instance is not a mere formality: the Supreme Court of Lithuania may dismiss the cassation appeal, terminate the case, remit it for rehearing, uphold the decision of the court of first instance, or amend the judgment or ruling. Accordingly, a decision of the Court of Appeal, if challenged by cassation, is not yet a final basis for an impeachment ground linked to the fact of commission of a crime. Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure further shows that cassation proceedings may be prolonged if it is necessary to adjourn the hearing, apply to the Constitutional Court, or refer a matter to a judicial institution of the European Union. Article 56 of the Law on the Constitutional Court is important because a ruling of the Constitutional Court must indicate the actions of the Member of the Seimas under examination, the established circumstances, the arguments, the constitutional provision, and the operative part, as well as the fact that the ruling is final and unappealable. If impeachment proceedings raise the dimension of breach of the oath or gross violation of the Constitution, the conclusion or ruling of the Constitutional Court becomes an essential constitutional source of facts and their legal assessment. Article 32 of the Law on the Constitutional Court defines representation before that court, including representation of a group of Members of the Seimas where the representative indicated in the application is approved by all applying Members of the Seimas. The example of P. Gražulis mentioned in the information is consistent with this framework only insofar as it illustrates two different lines: the finality of a criminal case in one situation, and a breach of the oath and gross violation of the Constitution established by the Constitutional Court in another. From a legislative perspective, a proposal to tighten electoral restrictions should be assessed under Article 20 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Law-Making, because a normative legal act generally enters into force on the day following its official publication, whereas a law amending the Constitution enters into force no earlier than one month after its adoption. In addition, according to the Constitutional Court doctrine referred to in the legislative materials, legal regulation must be clear, comprehensible, consistent, and compatible with the coherence of the legal system, as emphasised in the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 December 2004, 16 January 2006, and 2 September 2020. In the context of electoral regulation, the sources provided also show that a final conviction may be relevant to the assessment of candidate data and electoral consequences, but such matters must be resolved in accordance with the clearly established boundary between the competences of the Constitutional Court and the Seimas
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that no cassation appeal is lodged; in that case, the decision of the Court of Appeal becomes the final outcome of the criminal case, and the Seimas may assess whether the ground under Article 74 of the Constitution is sufficient for impeachment. The second scenario is that a cassation appeal is lodged and the Supreme Court of Lithuania dismisses it; finality would then strengthen the premise for initiating impeachment actions. The third scenario is that, under Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court amends, quashes, or remits the case for rehearing; in that event, an impeachment strategy based on the fact of commission of a crime would have to be reconsidered in light of the final procedural outcome. The fourth scenario is that an amendment to electoral restrictions is prepared at the political level, but it would have to comply with the entry-into-force rules in Article 20 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Law-Making and with the requirement of clarity imposed by Constitutional Court doctrine. The practical significance lies primarily with the Seimas, because it is the Seimas that, under Article 74 of the Constitution, decides on revocation of the mandate by a three-fifths majority vote of all its Members. It is also directly relevant to R. Žemaitaitis, because the cassation proceedings may determine whether the criminal case becomes a final ground for impeachment. For voters and political organisations, the most important point is that the consequences of impeachment and possible electoral restrictions cannot be based solely on an adverse interim assessment where statutes and constitutional practice require a final legal basis
Whether the gas revolver “Reck Mod. 35 Chief Special” and five cartridges found in a BMW car in Kaunas should be classified as unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition under Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code, rather than as a breach of the rules governing a lawfully held weapon or possession of a non-firearm weapon.
Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code does not criminalise just any “dangerous object” in a car, but specifically the manufacture, acquisition, storage, carrying, transport or sale of a firearm or ammunition without a permit. Accordingly, the essential elements in this situation are not that the weapon was found during a vehicle inspection, but whether the “Reck Mod. 35 Chief Special” is legally regarded as a firearm and whether the driver, born in 1997, lacked a permit to keep or transport that revolver and the five cartridges.
Article 255 of the Criminal Code would be more relevant only if the weapon had been held lawfully, but the rules on its storage, carrying or transport had been breached and, as a result, another person used the weapon or it was lost. Article 258 of the Criminal Code illustrates the opposite boundary of qualification: if the object were a non-firearm weapon, its mere presence in a car would not, in itself, fall within the structure of Article 253.
The article’s statement that criminal liability “may be” applied where intoxication exceeds 1.50 per mille is not formulated with sufficient precision. According to the wording of Article 2811 of the Criminal Code as presented, the threshold for criminal liability is linked to intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more. It would be more accurate to state that criminal liability under this provision is tied not to an abstract level “above 1.50”, but to the statutory threshold of 1.51 per mille or more.
This matters because, in such cases, the legal qualification is determined not by a journalistic threshold, but by the specific measured and procedurally confirmed blood alcohol value.
The stronger qualification argument in this news item is not the general proposition that “gas or lower-powered weapons may be regulated”, but the structure of Article 253 of the Criminal Code: absence of a permit plus possession or transport of a firearm or ammunition. In practice, the critical point for the defence would be to challenge precisely the object’s status and the applicable permit regime, because if the revolver does not fall within the firearm category, the basis for Article 253 becomes weaker. For the prosecution, it is important not to confine itself to the fact that the item was found in the BMW, but to prove that the specific model and cartridges fall within the object of Article 253 and that the storage or transport took place without the required permit.
As regards the Alytus episode, the practical risk for a journalist or lawyer is inaccurately restating the per mille threshold: the wording “1.51 per mille or more” should be cited, rather than the approximate phrase “above 1.50”.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the gas revolver “Reck Mod. 35 Chief Special” and five cartridges found in a “BMW 3” vehicle in Kaunas constitute unlawful possession or control of a firearm and ammunition under Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who, without authorisation, manufactured, acquired, stored, carried, transported or disposed of a firearm or ammunition, and provides for arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. Also relevant is the amended wording of Article 253 of the Criminal Code set out in Article 39 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the list of acts is supplemented by sending and use, while the sanction also provides for a fine and restriction of liberty. In this situation, the principal dividing line lies between Article 253(1) and Article 255 of the Criminal Code: the former covers possession or control without authorisation, whereas the latter concerns a breach of the rules on storing, carrying or transporting a lawfully possessed firearm or ammunition. Since the report states that the revolver and cartridges were held unlawfully, the legal assessment focuses on the absence of authorisation rather than on a breach of rules governing a lawfully held weapon. Article 258 of the Criminal Code, concerning a non-firearm weapon, would be relevant only for a different legal classification, because the report states that the material is being collected specifically under Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code
Legal assessment. From the perspective of Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code, the essential elements are the object, the absence of authorisation and at least one form of possession or control. The object includes a firearm and ammunition, and the revolver and five cartridges identified in the report correspond precisely to the direction of legal classification on which the material collected by the police is based. A weapon found in the passenger compartment or elsewhere in a vehicle may legally be associated not only with storage but also with transportation, since Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code identifies these forms of possession or control separately. For the driver, as the person in whose vehicle the items were found, the practical procedural risk arises from the link to factual possession or control; however, criminal liability under the cited provision is based not merely on the fact of discovery, but on the elements specified in Article 253 of the Criminal Code. For the classification of this episode, it is not necessary to establish that the weapon was used, because Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises even the mere storage or transportation carried out without authorisation. Article 253(2) of the Criminal Code provides for stricter liability in respect of not fewer than three firearms, high-explosive power, or a large quantity of ammunition, explosives or explosive materials. However, the report refers to one revolver and five cartridges, and therefore the classification under paragraph 1 corresponds to the stated factual basis. Article 2532 of the Criminal Code, concerning smuggling, would apply where a firearm or ammunition is transported or sent across the state border of the Republic of Lithuania without presenting it for customs control, by evading such control, or without authorisation; no such state-border element is present in the Kaunas episode. Article 254 of the Criminal Code, concerning misappropriation, is likewise not the principal provision, because the report does not indicate that the revolver or cartridges were misappropriated. Article 255 of the Criminal Code is intended for situations in which a person breaches the rules on storing, carrying or transporting a lawfully possessed weapon and, as a result, another person unlawfully uses it or the weapon is lost; the Kaunas case is described as unlawful storage, and therefore this provision does not replace Article 253 of the Criminal Code. Procedurally, it is significant that the wording used in the report, “material has been collected,” is not equivalent to guilt established by a court. Under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, an indictment is a document adopted by the prosecutor by which the pre-trial investigation is completed, the criminal act is described, the evidence supporting the charge is indicated, and the criminal law is specified. If the case were to reach court, the accused, under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would have the right to know the charge against him, receive a copy of the indictment, have defence counsel, submit evidence, file requests, ask questions, and appeal the judgment and rulings. Article 78 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a person to be summoned as a witness where there is information that the person knows circumstances relevant to the case; therefore, persons who participated in the vehicle inspection or know the origin of the items could be important to the proceedings. Article 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also protects against self-incrimination, since a person who may give testimony about a criminal act committed by himself cannot be questioned as a witness
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the collected material substantiates the elements of Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code; in that case, the matter may be referred to the prosecutor, and the pre-trial investigation may be completed by an indictment under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such a case, the person would face the sanction specified in Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code: arrest or imprisonment for up to five years, while under the amended wording the alternatives of a fine and restriction of liberty would also be relevant. The second scenario is that the facts indicate not an absence of authorisation but a breach of the rules applicable to a lawfully possessed weapon; in that event, the legal analysis would move towards Article 255 of the Criminal Code, which covers negligent breaches of the rules on storing, carrying or transporting a weapon that result in another person’s unlawful use of it or in the loss of the weapon. The third scenario is that, if other facts were established, other provisions could become relevant, for example Article 254 of the Criminal Code concerning misappropriation or Article 2532 concerning smuggling, but the elements of those offences are not described in the report provided. In practical terms, this case is important because Article 253 of the Criminal Code links criminal liability to the absence of authorisation and to possession or control itself, and therefore does not require the consequences of a traffic accident, injury or use of the weapon. It also illustrates the distinction between road-traffic episodes and a weapons-control episode: Article 281 of the Criminal Code applies to breaches of road-traffic safety or vehicle-operation rules where the consequences specified therein arise, whereas the legal core of the BMW case is not traffic safety but unlawful possession or control of a weapon and ammunition. Institutionally, the sources provided make it possible to distinguish between the police’s commencement of material collection, the prosecutor’s role in completing the pre-trial investigation by indictment, and judicial control in examining the charge. If a conviction or acquittal were delivered, Article 16(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the corresponding change in the person’s procedural status to convicted person or acquitted person. At the final stage, Articles 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide for the possibility of cassation before the Supreme Court of Lithuania in respect of a final judgment or ruling
Does the driving of a Renault in Kėdainiai, on P. Lukšio Street, by a driver born in 1986, who was found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 2.43 per mille, in itself constitute the offence under Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code, even though no traffic accident or damage is mentioned in the news report?
Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the driving of a motor vehicle where the driver is found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Accordingly, the legally decisive point in this situation is not that the level was close to “severe intoxication”, but that 2.43 per mille substantially exceeds the threshold for criminal liability. Article 281 of the Criminal Code would be relevant if a breach of the Road Traffic Rules had resulted in a traffic accident, bodily injury, or substantial property damage, but no such consequences are indicated in the news report.
Article 19 of the Criminal Code further precludes a defence based solely on the fact that the act was committed while under the influence of alcohol.
The stronger prosecutorial argument here is formal: it is sufficient to prove the fact of driving, the vehicle, and a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or higher. The absence of damage therefore does not, in itself, shift the case into the realm of administrative liability. In practice, the defence should focus not on the argument that the intoxication was “not quite severe”, but on the legality of the check, the reliability of the measurement, and the fact of driving itself.
The risk under Article 72 of the Criminal Code should also be assessed separately: if the Renault belongs to the offender, the vehicle may be treated as an instrumentality of the criminal offence, and confiscable property belonging to the offender must, under the provision, be confiscated. If the vehicle belongs to another person, the risk of confiscation would depend on whether the owner knew, or ought and could have known, that the property would be used to commit a criminal offence.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the conduct of the person who drove a Renault vehicle in Kėdainiai on 22 July 2026 at approximately 18:15 falls within Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, since the established blood alcohol concentration of 2.43 per mille exceeds the threshold of 1.51 per mille. This question is assessed under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which criminalises the driving of a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or higher has been established, and also under Article 2(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning culpability and conformity of the act with the constituent elements of a criminal offence. Article 281¹(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is additionally relevant, as it establishes liability also where the act provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article is committed through negligence. The threshold for administrative liability under the wording of amendments to Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania is linked to intoxication from 0.41 to 1.5 per mille; therefore, a case involving 2.43 per mille, under the provisions provided, falls not within that administrative framework but within the criminal-law qualification framework
Legal assessment. The principal factual circumstance is not “near severe intoxication”, but the fact that the driver was found to have an alcohol concentration of 2.43 per mille and was driving a motor vehicle. The threshold set in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is 1.51 per mille or more; therefore, based on the information provided, the quantitative element of the criminal offence has been exceeded. Under Article 2(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, criminal liability is possible only where the act committed corresponds to the constituent elements provided for in criminal law; accordingly, the investigation should verify the fact of driving, the nature of the vehicle, and the data concerning the establishment of intoxication. Paragraph 1 of the Rules for Determining Intoxication or Impairment of Drivers of Vehicles and Other Persons, approved by resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, indicates that the rules apply to the determination of intoxication of persons driving vehicles, as well as to persons referred for medical examination by the police, pre-trial investigation authorities, the prosecutor’s office, or a court. This means that the determination of intoxication is not merely an everyday factual circumstance: it has procedural significance for qualification under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant to a different situation, where a breach of road traffic safety rules or rules on the operation of a vehicle causes a traffic accident and consequences, such as minor or serious impairment of another person’s health. No such consequences are indicated in the information provided; therefore, on the basis of the sources provided, the most accurate provision for qualification is Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, rather than Article 281(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The sanction under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Procedurally significant objects and documents may be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania; therefore, documents relating to the check, stop, driving of the vehicle, and other matters relevant to the investigation may be significant. If an expert examination is ordered in the proceedings, under the excerpt from Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provided, upon receiving the expert report, the prosecutor notifies the suspect, defence counsel, and other relevant participants in the proceedings in writing of where and when they may acquaint themselves with the expert report. Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania applies to the calculation of time limits: time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, and the hour and day on which the time limit begins are not included in the calculation. Preventive measures may be imposed only for procedural purposes under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: to ensure participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation, examination of the case, execution of the judgment, or to prevent new criminal offences. Under Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the range of such measures includes detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register periodically with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. A pre-trial investigation may be discontinued only on the grounds specified in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, including where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or where the grounds provided for in Articles 36, 37, 38, or 40 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania apply
Consequences. The most realistic scenario under the provisions provided is a pre-trial investigation concerning the act provided for in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If the fact of driving and intoxication of 2.43 per mille are confirmed by procedurally significant data, the case may result in a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If the investigation establishes that there is insufficient data concerning guilt, the pre-trial investigation could be discontinued on the basis of Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. For the driver, the most important practical point is that the 1.51 per mille threshold under Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is already the threshold for criminal liability; therefore, the level of 2.43 per mille does not change the type of liability from administrative to criminal, but confirms it. For the police and the prosecutor’s office, the most important point is to properly document the determination of intoxication, the driving, and other data, because under Article 2(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania liability depends on proof of all constituent elements. For other road users, the practical significance of this situation is that, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, objects and documents relevant to the investigation may be submitted not only by parties to the proceedings, but also by any natural or legal person
The regulation was initiated in the Seimas by Juozas Bernatonis, who proposed criminal liability for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 1.5 per mille and, correspondingly, narrowing administrative liability to cases of lesser intoxication. The aim was to reduce the danger posed by intoxicated drivers, relying on statistics on traffic accidents and violations and on the argument that such a level of intoxication cannot go unnoticed by the driver. The Legal Department essentially proposed that this conduct be more clearly distinguished in a separate article of the Criminal Code, but raised concerns about inconsistency where cases involving alcohol are criminalised, while analogous driving under the influence of narcotic or psychotropic substances remains regulated differently.
Whether a Member of the Seimas’s public Facebook posts and speech during a sitting of the Seimas, in which persons of Jewish nationality as a group are associated with historical crimes and tragedies, exceed the bounds of political expression and amount to public denigration or incitement to hatred under Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code.
Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code criminalises publicly mocking, denigrating, inciting hatred against, or inciting discrimination against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group, including on grounds of nationality, origin, ethnic origin, belief, or religion. The key point in this situation is that the provision criminalises not only direct calls for violence, but also public denigration and incitement to hatred. Accordingly, the defence argument should not be confined to the assertion that there was no direct call to act.
According to the facts reported in the news item, the courts considered seven social media posts and the speech delivered during a sitting of the Seimas to be material, because in them Jewish nationality as a group was blamed for historical crimes, Soviet repressions, and other twentieth-century tragedies on the basis of information that did not correspond to reality.
In this case, the Vilnius Regional Court found R. Žemaitaitis guilty in December 2025, and on 22 July 2026 the Court of Appeal of Lithuania upheld the conviction and increased the fine from EUR 5,000 to EUR 10,000. This indicates that, in the assessment of at least two instances, the status of a politician and the political context of the statement do not confer broader immunity on speech that collectively demeans a national group and normalises antisemitic ideas.
The stronger argument now is not Žemaitaitis’s asserted line of “political persecution”, but the boundary drawn by the courts between political criticism and the collective denigration of a protected group. In practice, a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of Lithuania should focus not on a renewed reassessment of the facts, but on whether the appellate court correctly applied the elements of Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code and the standard for restricting freedom of expression. For the Seimas, the significant point is that the Court of Appeal’s judgment has already entered into force; therefore, waiting for the Supreme Court’s decision is a matter of political and procedural tactics, not, on the information reported in the news item, a condition for the validity of the criminal conviction.
In cases involving public figures, the greatest risk lies in wrongly treating criticism of the actions of a state or foreign state as permission to attribute guilt to a national group; it was precisely that transition which became the axis of criminal liability in this case.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether R. Žemaitaitis’s public statements on a social network and at a sitting of the Seimas constituted incitement against a group of persons on the ground of nationality within the meaning of Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The principal provision is Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code, under which a person who publicly ridicules, expresses contempt for, incites hatred against, or incites discrimination against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group on the ground of nationality is punishable by community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years. If the assessment concerned not only contempt or incitement to hatred, but also public incitement to violence or physical reprisal, Article 170(3) of the Criminal Code would apply, providing for stricter liability of up to three years’ imprisonment. The aspect of trivialising the Holocaust is linked in the cited sources to Article 1702 of the Criminal Code, because the Action Plan for Combating Antisemitism, Xenophobia or Incitement to Discord of Any Other Form states that Article 1702 covers public approval of, denial of, or gross trivialisation of international crimes, crimes of the USSR, or crimes of Nazi Germany. Issues of criminal procedure are governed by Articles 98, 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: participants in proceedings may submit relevant objects and documents, while procedural time limits determine the commencement, performance or completion of procedural acts
Legal assessment. According to the circumstances described in the report, the core of the assessment by the courts of first instance and appeal was not the acceptability of political polemic, but whether public speech crossed the boundary protected by Article 170 of the Criminal Code between opinion and criminal hate speech. Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code does not require physical harm to a specific person: public ridicule, contempt, incitement to hatred or incitement to discrimination against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group on the ground of nationality is sufficient. In this case, the elements found by the court, as described in the report, directly correspond to the wording of the provision: publicity, identification of persons of Jewish nationality as a group, language degrading and contemptuous of human dignity, and statements inciting hostility on national grounds. The fact that some of the statements were published on a social network and some were made at a parliamentary sitting does not, under the structure of Article 170 of the Criminal Code as presented, in itself alter the assessment, since the provision covers public conduct. The source concerning paragraph 110 of the report on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination links the purpose of Article 170 of the Criminal Code to public statements made orally, in writing or through the mass media where persons are ridiculed, held in contempt or hatred is incited on grounds of race, nationality, language, origin or religion. Accordingly, the politician’s argument that the decision is allegedly not “constitutional” does not negate criminal liability under Article 170 of the Criminal Code, because the issue under consideration is the existence of the elements of a criminal offence, not the grounds for restricting a mandate or electoral rights. Article 60(1)(12) of the Criminal Code is relevant in the cited sources to the broader context of classification: expressing hatred towards a group of persons on grounds of nationality, origin, religion, convictions or views is identified as an aggravating circumstance. However, where the conduct itself is classified under Article 170 of the Criminal Code, the principal assessment focuses on the specific offence of incitement to hatred and on its elements of publicity, content and direction against a protected group. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means that the accused and defence counsel could, on their own initiative, submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal offence. Therefore, the arguments in the appeal concerning the assessment of evidence are, from a procedural perspective, linked to whether the court assessed the relevant case material, but the cited provisions do not provide a basis for rewriting the appellate court’s assessment of evidence. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that time limits in criminal proceedings define the commencement, performance or completion of acts having procedural significance. Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the rules for calculating time limits: the day on which the time limit begins is not included; a time limit calculated in days expires at twenty-four hundred hours on the final day; and if the expiry falls on a non-working day, the first following working day is deemed to be the final day. This is practically important for a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of Lithuania, because the intention stated in the report to appeal the decision must be implemented in compliance with the rules for calculating procedural time limits
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of Lithuania; according to the cited sources, its procedural significance is linked to the time-limit regime established in Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second scenario is that the final appellate judgment remains the practical basis for criminal liability: the fine of EUR 10,000 imposed is a type of sanction provided for in Article 170 of the Criminal Code. The third scenario concerns the supervision of public information and hate speech: according to paragraph 115 of the source, Article 20 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public prohibits the publication of information inciting national, racial or religious hatred. The same paragraph 115 states that the Ethics Commission of Journalists and Publishers supervises compliance in public information with prohibitions on incitement to national, racial, religious, social or gender-based hatred, while the Inspector of Journalist Ethics examines complaints within the scope of his or her competence. This report is practically significant for politicians and public figures because the application of Article 170 of the Criminal Code shows that public political status does not remove liability for expressing contempt for, or inciting hatred against, a group of persons on the ground of nationality. It is also significant for communication on social networks, because in the cited sources a public written statement is treated as a form through which the conduct provided for in Article 170 of the Criminal Code may be committed. The cited legal sources do not regulate issues concerning a Seimas mandate, impeachment proceedings or early elections; therefore, the legal assessment is limited to criminal liability, the general rules of criminal procedure and the framework for supervising public information
Whether the death of a 37-year-old man following an assault in Kėdainiai the previous evening should be classified as murder under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code, or whether, at this stage, the issue is merely the verification of a causal link between the death and the earlier violence.
Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code provides that “a person who murders another person” is punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to fifteen years. In this situation, the provision is relevant not only because a person has died, but because it is necessary to link the actions of specific individuals to the death: the news report states only that the man was beaten and that the injuries “may have been related to the death”. Article 135 of the Criminal Code covers grievous bodily harm where the consequence is serious injury or a life-threatening condition, but not death itself.
Therefore, reclassification under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code currently strengthens the direction of the investigation as one concerning murder, but it does not alter the evidential task: it remains necessary to establish the acts, the causal link, and culpability.
The article’s statement that the perpetrators “may face imprisonment of up to 15 years” is only partial. More precisely, it should be said that under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code, simple murder is punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to fifteen years. However, Article 129(2) of the Criminal Code provides for aggravated forms of murder, for example murder committed with particular cruelty, for hooligan motives, or by a method dangerous to the lives of other persons, which carry a penalty of eight to twenty years’ imprisonment or life imprisonment.
Since the news report states that the man was beaten in the street but provides no information about motive, cruelty, or other circumstances falling under Article 129(2) of the Criminal Code, the correct formulation should leave open the possibility of aggravated murder.
In practice, the key point of dispute will not be the fact of reclassification itself, but the conclusion of the medical expert examination as to whether the death of the man who died in an apartment on Chemikų Street on 20 July was caused specifically by the earlier assault. At this stage, the prosecution’s stronger argument is the investigative direction under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code, because death has occurred and the injuries are preliminarily linked to it; the defence’s strongest line would be to challenge the causal link between the assault in the street and the death in the apartment the following morning. In professional commentary on the case, it would be advisable to avoid stating that the case is already a “proven murder”: until individuals have been detained and a final expert conclusion has been issued, the legal classification is an investigative hypothesis, not procedurally established guilt.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the death of the 37-year-old man found in Kėdainiai on 20 July 2026 is legally attributable to violent acts by another person such that the conduct falls within Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who has killed another human being and provides for imprisonment for a term of seven to fifteen years. At the same time, the investigation must examine whether any qualifying circumstances listed in Article 129(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania are present, as their establishment would alter the scope of liability to imprisonment for a term of eight to twenty years or life imprisonment. A separate legal threshold is Article 130 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which liability is mitigated if the killing is committed in a state of sudden intense emotional disturbance caused by an unlawful or extremely insulting act of the victim. From a procedural perspective, it is significant that any reclassification of the investigation must be recorded under paragraphs 15.1.10-15.1.12 of the Regulations of the Register of Suspects, Accused Persons and Convicted Persons, which provide for data concerning a criminal act that has been initiated, is being reclassified, or has been reclassified
Legal assessment. The report states that an investigation was initially opened to determine the cause of death, and that it was later reclassified under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania because it emerged that the man had been beaten before his death and that the injuries may have been connected with the death. In such circumstances, the central evidentiary issue is not merely the fact of the beating itself, but the causal link between the injuries and the death. Paragraphs 14.23, 14.25, 14.26 and 14.30-14.32 of MN 141:2017 “Forensic Medical Doctor” indicate that the competence of a forensic medical doctor includes determining the causes of violent and sudden deaths, assessing the causal link between an injury and its consequences, examining deceased persons, collecting objects of biological origin, recording injuries, and inspecting the deceased at the place where the body is found. In its ruling of 11 October 2005 in case No. 2K-606/2005, cited in the overview of evidentiary practice under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court of Lithuania noted that the examination of a corpse and the determination of the cause of death may be carried out by a forensic medical doctor acting as a specialist, and that a specialist’s conclusion is not an inferior source of evidence compared with an expert report. This is directly relevant to the present situation because the determination of the cause of death and its connection with the injuries may be based on a forensic medical conclusion, and not necessarily solely on an expert report. If, however, an expert report were obtained, Article 139(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania would require the prosecutor to notify the suspect, defence counsel and other specified participants in the proceedings in writing of where and when they may examine it, and a record would have to be drawn up in respect of such examination. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania permits the suspect, defence counsel, victim, civil claimant, and any natural or legal person to submit, on their own initiative, objects and documents relevant to the investigation and adjudication of the criminal act. Time limits for procedural acts are calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: they determine the commencement, performance or completion of procedural acts and are calculated in hours, days and months. If suspects were identified, remand measures could be imposed under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania in order to secure participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation, the hearing of the case, enforcement of the judgment, or the prevention of new criminal acts. Under Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the list of such measures includes detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to report periodically to a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary claims by the victim’s relatives could be brought in the criminal proceedings under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, and a person is recognised as a civil claimant by a prosecutor’s ruling or a court order under Article 110(1) of that Code. Under Article 110(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, a civil claimant has the right to submit evidence and applications, access the case file, and appeal procedural acts and decisions insofar as they relate to the civil claim. Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania may be relevant to securing the civil claim, because a ruling on the temporary restriction of property rights must specify the reasons, legal basis, property, owner, method and scope of the restriction, and the procedure for enforcement and appeal
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the forensic medical data and other procedural material confirm a causal link between the beating and the death, suspects are identified, and the proceedings continue under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. In that event, the practical risk for the suspects is imprisonment for a term of seven to fifteen years, as well as possible remand measures under Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The second scenario is that a circumstance under Article 129(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is established, for example a particularly cruel manner of commission or hooligan motives, in which case the range of liability becomes substantially more severe. The third scenario is that circumstances defined in Article 130 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania are established, as a result of which the conduct would be assessed as killing in a state of intense emotional disturbance, with a sanction of up to six years’ imprisonment. The fourth scenario is that the pre-trial investigation is discontinued under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania if, among other things, insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt in committing the criminal act. The practical significance of this investigation for the victim’s relatives lies in the possibility of participating in the compensation process under Articles 109 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania; and if the accused or the persons materially liable for the accused’s actions lack funds, damage may, in cases provided by law, be compensated from state funds under Article 118 of that Code. Accordingly, the further direction of the case will depend primarily on the medical data concerning the cause of death, the mechanism of violence and the causal link, and only thereafter on the form of guilt of the identified persons and any potential qualifying or mitigating circumstances
The legislation was initiated by Member of the Seimas Vytautas Antanas Matulevičius. It sought to increase liability for murder, particularly aggravated murder, and to restrict the possibility for convicted persons to be released after serving only part of their sentence. The principal arguments were the high number of murders in Lithuania, the public’s sense of insecurity, and allegedly overly lenient minimum sentences; the committee agreed with the objectives in part, but proposed addressing the issue by amending not the Criminal Code, but the Code on the Execution of Sentences.
Does a final conviction by the Court of Appeal under Article 170 of the Criminal Code, of itself, terminate a Member of the Seimas’s mandate where an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court remains available?
Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code criminalises public ridicule, contempt, incitement to hatred, or incitement to discrimination against a group of persons, including on grounds of nationality, origin, faith or religion. Accordingly, disparagement of Jews as a national or religious group falls within the core of this provision, provided the court establishes the elements of publicity and intent. Article 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits final judgments of first-instance and appellate courts to be challenged by cassation, so the mere filing of a cassation appeal does not negate the fact that the Court of Appeal’s judgment is currently final and enforceable.
However, Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that the Supreme Court may not only dismiss a cassation appeal, but also quash the judgment and discontinue the case or remit it for fresh examination; therefore, political consequences based solely on this judgment carry a risk of reversal.
The news report indicates that in 2024 the Constitutional Court had already found that R. Žemaitaitis, by making antisemitic statements, had breached the oath of a Member of the Seimas and grossly violated the Constitution. This strengthens not only the argument concerning criminal liability, but also the argument concerning constitutional liability: the dispute is no longer merely about the assessment of political speech, because the same core conduct has already been characterised as a breach of the oath and of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the report does not show that the Constitutional Court’s conclusion automatically resulted in loss of mandate, since the politician himself relinquished the mandate before a vote on removal.
The article’s statement that, under the Statute of the Seimas, where a parliamentarian is found guilty by a final court decision in a criminal case, “his mandate is revoked”, is incomplete. It would be more accurate to say that a final conviction may constitute grounds to initiate or continue a procedure for terminating the mandate, but the mandate is not terminated automatically by the court judgment alone. On the wording of Article 63 of the Constitution as presented, the mandate is terminated by the Seimas through impeachment proceedings; the decisive act is therefore the decision of the Seimas, not the criminal court’s judgment itself.
The stronger argument now is not Žemaitaitis’s assertion that the process is merely “politicised”, but the state’s position that the protection afforded to groups under Article 170 of the Criminal Code extends to the criminal-law assessment of antisemitic statements, since that conclusion has already been upheld by the appellate court and has become final. In practice, three layers should be distinguished: criminal liability under Article 170 of the Criminal Code, cassation review under Articles 371 and 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and loss of mandate through impeachment under Article 63 of the Constitution. The most serious mistake would be to write either that an appeal to the Supreme Court means the judgment has not yet become final, or conversely that the final judgment has, by itself, terminated the mandate.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether a politician’s public statements about Jews and the Holocaust satisfy the constituent elements of the criminal offences provided for in Article 170 and Article 1702 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and under what criminal procedure such a final conviction may be reviewed in cassation. Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies to public ridicule, contempt, incitement to hatred, or incitement to discriminate against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group, inter alia, on grounds of nationality, ethnic origin, faith, religion, beliefs, or views. Article 1702(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies to public approval, denial, or gross trivialisation of genocide or other crimes against humanity or war crimes recognised by legislation of the Republic of Lithuania or the European Union, or by final judgments of Lithuanian or international courts, where this is done in a threatening, abusive, or insulting manner, or where public order has been or could have been disturbed as a result. These provisions overlap in relation to different aspects of the protected legal interest: Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania protects groups of persons from incitement to hatred and discrimination, whereas Article 1702 protects public order and the limits of non-recognition of international crimes of historical and legal significance. The Action Plan for Combating Antisemitism, Xenophobia, and Any Other Form of Incitement to Discord and for Fostering Jewish Life expressly states that Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides for liability for incitement against a national, racial, ethnic, religious, or other group of persons, while Article 1702 provides for liability for public approval, denial, or gross trivialisation of international crimes. Accordingly, the legal core of this matter is not a political dispute over the assessment of statements, but the application of criminal law to public speech to which the court attributed the characteristics of incitement to hatred and trivialisation of the Holocaust
Legal assessment. If the court found that the statements were public and directed against Jews as a national, ethnic, or religious group of persons, Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania permits the imposition of community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years. If gross trivialisation of the Holocaust was also established, what is relevant under Article 1702(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is whether the trivialisation was public, whether it related to genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, and whether its form was threatening, abusive, insulting, or capable of disturbing public order. The reported increase of the fine from EUR 5,000 to EUR 10,000 is consistent with the sanctions framework of both provisions, since a fine is one of the possible penalties under both Article 170 and Article 1702 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The competence of the appellate court to amend the judgment of the first-instance court derives from Article 328 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, under which a judgment is amended, inter alia, where the sentence imposed is incorrect, the criminal law has been improperly applied, or the findings of the judgment do not correspond to the circumstances of the case. The aim of the defence counsel and the convicted person to secure an acquittal is procedurally linked to Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, under which a new judgment may be delivered where the appellate court concludes that the accused’s participation has not been proven or that no act having the characteristics of a crime or criminal misdemeanour was committed. Since the report states that the appeals were dismissed, the appellate court in fact did not adopt any procedural decisions favourable to the defence under Articles 327 or 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The right of appeal in these proceedings complied with Article 312(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, since an appeal against a non-final judgment may be lodged by the convicted person and his or her defence counsel. The independence of defence counsel is limited by Article 312(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: defence counsel may lodge an appeal only where this is not contrary to the convicted person’s will expressed in writing. Following the appellate court’s decision, the case moves to another procedural stage, because Article 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides that cassation appeals against final judgments of courts of first instance and appellate courts are lodged with the Supreme Court of Lithuania. Article 367(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania grants the right to challenge a final judgment in cassation, inter alia, to the convicted person and his or her defence counsel, but the appeal must be based on the grounds of cassation specified in that article. At the cassation stage, the right of defence counsel is likewise not absolute: under Article 367(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the convicted person’s defence counsel may lodge a cassation appeal only where this is not contrary to the will of the person defended, expressed in writing. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania apply to the calculation of procedural time limits: time limits determine the time for the commencement, performance, or completion of acts having procedural significance, and the day on which a time limit begins is not included in its calculation. If a time limit is calculated in days, under Article 100(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania it expires at midnight on the last day, and if the act must be performed in court, at the established close of business. If the expiry of the time limit falls on a non-working day, Article 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania treats the first following working day as the final day of the time limit. The sources provided contain no case law concerning analogous instances of incitement to hatred or trivialisation of the Holocaust; therefore, the assessment is based solely on the cited provisions of criminal law and criminal procedure
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the convicted person or his defence counsel lodges a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of Lithuania pursuant to Articles 367 and 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. In that case, the practical significance for the convicted person is the opportunity to seek cassation review of the final conviction, while for the prosecution and procedural participants defending the interests of victims it is the need to respond to the cassation arguments within the procedural framework. The second scenario is that no cassation appeal is lodged, in which case the conviction upheld by the appellate court and the increased EUR 10,000 fine remain in force as criminal-law consequences. The third scenario is that, on the basis of the sources provided, cassation proceedings are not equivalent to a new appeal, because Article 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania links a cassation appeal to specific grounds of cassation, rather than to any grounds and reasons, as in an appeal under Article 312(1). From a practical perspective, the case is significant for politicians speaking publicly and for their defence counsel, because Articles 170 and 1702 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania show that the public nature of political speech does not preclude criminal liability where the statutory characteristics of incitement to hatred or gross trivialisation of genocide and other international crimes are established. It is also significant for state institutions implementing policy against antisemitism, because the action plan provided identifies these provisions of the Criminal Code as direct legal instruments against antisemitism, xenophobia, and incitement to discord. The final legal weight of the case will depend on whether the right of cassation is exercised; however, according to the sources provided, the fact that the appellate court’s judgment has become final does not in itself preclude an application to the Supreme Court of Lithuania
The specific initiators are not identified in the excerpts provided. The proposals sought to amend criminal liability for hate crimes and incitement to hatred, including the list of protected characteristics and the application of Article 170 of the Criminal Code. The principal argument in favour of the amendments was that the existing regulation was allegedly applied too broadly and could restrict freedom of expression or become a tool for persecuting ideological opponents; at the same time, the Legal Department emphasised the need to align such provisions with EU obligations to criminalise the condoning, denial or gross trivialisation of international crimes.
The specific point in dispute is whether the 31-year-old defendant’s acquisition and transportation of 11 g of cocaine and 9.5 g of cannabis proves an intent to distribute within the meaning of Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, and whether the 30-year-old defendant’s possession of a larger quantity and sale of part of it supports classification under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code. The essential dividing line here is not between “having drugs” and “not having drugs”, but between possession under Article 259 without intent to distribute and possession or sale under Article 260 with intent to distribute.
Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the unlawful acquisition, possession or transportation of narcotic substances only where there is an intent to sell or otherwise distribute them, as well as the sale or other distribution itself; the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for a term of 2 to 8 years. Article 260(2) raises the classification where analogous acts concern a large quantity, or where a large quantity is sold or otherwise distributed; the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for a term of 8 to 10 years. Article 259 of the Criminal Code provides the contrasting control provision: where acquisition, possession or transportation takes place without an intent to sell or otherwise distribute, liability is less severe.
Accordingly, in the case of the 31-year-old defendant, the mere fact that the substances were found in his underwear and transported by car does not, by itself, satisfy the full formula of Article 260(1); the intent to distribute must specifically be proved. In the case of the 30-year-old defendant, the alleged sale for EUR 1,300, if proved, directly corresponds to the distribution element under Article 260, while Article 260(2) additionally requires the element of a “large quantity”.
In practical terms, the prosecution’s position appears stronger in respect of the 30-year-old defendant, because the news report refers to a specific sale episode and to the discovery of remaining substances in his car and residence. The weaker point is the classification of the 31-year-old defendant’s conduct under Article 260(1): if the case file contains no additional evidence of an intent to sell, the most rational defence strategy is to press for reclassification under Article 259, since that provision covers the same acquisition, possession and transportation, but without intent to distribute. For the prosecution, it is critical not to rely merely on quantity, packaging and concealment, but to show why those facts specifically indicate an intent to sell or otherwise distribute.
For the 30-year-old defendant, the practical risk is different: if the “large quantity” element is not substantiated under the applicable criteria, the sale itself would still support Article 260(1), but not the 8-to-10-year sentencing range under Article 260(2).
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the actions of the two men constitute unlawful possession or handling of narcotic substances with intent to distribute them under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether the conduct of one of them should be classified as possession or handling of a large quantity under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code. Under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, criminal liability arises for the unlawful manufacture, processing, acquisition, possession, transportation or sending of narcotic or psychotropic substances with intent to sell or otherwise distribute them, as well as for their sale or other distribution. Under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code, the qualifying element is a large quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances where such substances are unlawfully manufactured, acquired, possessed, transported, sent, sold or otherwise distributed with intent to distribute. The distinction from Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code depends on the intent to distribute: that provision applies to possession or handling without intent to sell or otherwise distribute. The legal status of the substances and the significance of their quantity are linked to Article 269 of the Criminal Code: Article 269(1) refers to the lists of narcotic and psychotropic substances approved by the Ministry of Health, while Article 269(2) provides that small, large and very large quantities are determined according to recommendations approved by the Ministry
Legal assessment. According to the circumstances presented, the acts imputed to the 31-year-old man include acquisition, possession and transportation: he acquired more than 11 grams of cocaine and not less than 9.5 grams of cannabis for EUR 1,300 and transported them by car to Skuodas District, where they were found and seized. His classification under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code means that the charge must be based not merely on the fact of possession or handling, but also on intent to sell or otherwise distribute, or on an act of distribution. Broader conduct is alleged in respect of the 30-year-old resident of Kretinga: he acquired not less than 41 grams of cocaine and approximately 40 grams of cannabis from an unidentified person, sold part of it to the other accused, and the remaining part was found during searches of a car and a residence. The fact of sale falls directly within the disposition of Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, while classification under Article 260(2) additionally requires the element of a large quantity. That element of a large quantity must be assessed according to the Ministry of Health recommendations referred to in Article 269(2) of the Criminal Code. Article 259(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code would be relevant in this case only as provisions for distinction, since they cover unlawful possession or handling without intent to distribute. The exemption from liability provided for in Article 259(3) of the Criminal Code is linked to voluntarily seeking medical assistance or voluntarily surrendering the substances, whereas in the situation presented the substances were found during an inspection and searches. Article 595 of the Code of Administrative Offences indicates that, in administrative proceedings, officers may conduct a personal search, inspect items, seize items and documents, and carry out seizure. Article 598(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences permits a body search and inspection of items; Article 598(3) establishes the requirement for an officer of the same sex or a doctor where the search involves exposure of the body; and Article 598(4) requires a record to be drawn up. Since the report refers to a partial personal search and the discovery of narcotic substances in underwear, the procedure for conducting the search, its recording, and the connection between the seized items and the act under investigation are procedurally important. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that items and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence may be submitted by participants in the proceedings and other persons; accordingly, the seized substances become subject to assessment as case data. Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the indictment as a prosecutor’s document by which the pre-trial investigation is completed, the criminal act is described, the data supporting the charge are indicated, and the criminal law is specified. This explains why the transfer of the case to the Plunge Chamber of Klaipeda District Court means a transition from the pre-trial investigation to judicial examination. In court, the accused have the right to know the charges against them, receive a copy of the indictment, access the case file, have defence counsel, submit evidence, participate in its examination, ask questions, give explanations, make a final statement, and appeal the judgment and rulings. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are relevant to time limits for procedural acts: time limits are calculated in hours, days and months, and their expiry depends on the type of time limit and the rule on working days. The sources provided contain no case law directly interpreting the application of Article 260 of the Criminal Code to similar drug distribution cases. The only material of the Supreme Court of Lithuania mentioned is Review of Court Practice No. 30 of 24 March 2009 concerning Article 281 of the Criminal Code, which relates to methods of establishing intoxication in road traffic cases and therefore does not directly determine the classification of this charge under Article 260 of the Criminal Code
Consequences. If the court finds it proven that the 31-year-old man possessed or handled the substances with intent to distribute, or distributed them, Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code provides for imprisonment for a term of two to eight years. If, in the case of the 30-year-old man, the element of a large quantity is also established, Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code provides for imprisonment for a term of eight to ten years. If intent to distribute or the fact of sale is not established, the legal dispute would, in practical terms, shift to the distinction from Article 259 of the Criminal Code, which provides for more lenient liability for possession or handling without intent to distribute. The course of the case in court will be important in relation to three principal issues: the status of the narcotic substances under Article 269(1) of the Criminal Code, the significance of quantity under Article 269(2), and proof of intent to distribute or sale under Article 260(1) and (2). In practical terms, this is important for the accused because the classification determines the sentencing range, the right to defend against the scope of the charge, and the possibility of challenging individual items of evidence. It is also important for the prosecution and the police, because the court will have to be satisfied not only as to the discovery of the substances, but also as to the chain of their acquisition, possession, transportation, sale, quantity and procedural seizure. The final legal status will become clear only by judgment: under the procedural rule presented, an accused person against whom a conviction is entered becomes a convicted person, while an accused person against whom an acquittal is entered becomes an acquitted person
The regulation was initiated by the Members of the Seimas who signed the draft laws. They sought to enable persons found in possession of small quantities of narcotic or psychotropic substances for personal use to be referred for treatment or to attend harm-reduction courses, rather than being dealt with primarily through criminal sanctions. Consideration was also given to tightening liability for driving while under the influence of drugs. The main observations concerned unclear concepts and potential inconsistencies in practice: how intoxication should be defined, how alcohol testing should be distinguished from testing for narcotic substances, and how the treatment-oriented approach should be reconciled with the fact that intoxication may constitute an aggravating circumstance for liability.
Can a very large online platform be regarded as having fulfilled its obligations under the Digital Services Act merely by having declared rules and notice-and-removal mechanisms, where the regulator finds that the availability of counterfeit goods, dangerous cosmetics and unsafe toys has not in fact been effectively reduced?
Article 16 of the Law on Information Society Services imposes on providers of very large online platforms an obligation to “assess and mitigate” the systemic risks referred to in Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. This means not merely having procedures in place, but ensuring that they operate so as to reduce risk. Article 15 is also relevant, because a provider’s knowledge of illegal activity or content may arise not only from notices submitted by users or rights holders, but also from an investigation carried out on the provider’s own initiative and from facts from which illegality is apparent.
Accordingly, AliExpress’s argument concerning proactive improvements is not legally irrelevant, but it is effective only if those improvements demonstrate an actual reduction in risk, rather than merely the existence of a compliance programme. Article 42 links the proportionality of a fine to the nature and gravity of the infringement, the number of persons affected, the extent of the damage, the level of danger, duration, mitigating circumstances and the revenue obtained by the infringer; the scale of 193 million European consumers strengthens the regulator’s position as regards potential harm and risk.
In practice, the regulator’s “outcome and risk management” argument appears stronger than the platform’s formal compliance argument: if recurring counterfeits and unsafe products continue to be found on the platform after procedures have been introduced, rules and a reporting channel alone are insufficient. In challenging a EUR 550 million fine, AliExpress’s most rational approach would be to rely not on an abstract claim of “disproportionality”, but on the mitigating circumstances under Article 42: specific data on the voluntary cessation of infringements, measures that reduced harm, cooperation, and an actual reduction in the availability of high-risk product categories. For platforms, the key mistake would be to treat DSA compliance as a set of documents; the evidential file must be a metrics-based file concerning seller verification, blocking repeat infringers, controlling high-risk categories, speed of removal and the genuinely reduced availability of illegal goods.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether an online marketplace service designated as a very large online platform has in practice assessed and mitigated systemic risks related to the dissemination of counterfeits, dangerous products, and other illegal offers. This question is primarily to be assessed under Article 16(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Information Society Services, which imposes on providers of very large online platforms the obligation to assess and mitigate the systemic risks referred to in Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 of that Regulation. Article 23 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Information Society Services is also relevant, as it provides that the Communications Regulatory Authority performs the functions assigned to the Digital Services Coordinator under Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, examines complaints, and cooperates with European Union institutions. The proportionality of the fine must be assessed under Article 42(1)–(3) of the Law Amending Law No. X-614 of the Republic of Lithuania on Information Society Services, as those provisions establish the criteria for differentiating fines and for mitigating circumstances
Legal assessment. If “AliExpress” has approximately 193 million users in Europe, that scale is legally significant when assessing the number of affected recipients of the service and other persons under Article 42(1)(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Information Society Services. The stated availability of counterfeits, risky cosmetics, and unsafe toys is also linked to the dangerousness of the infringement for recipients of the service and for society under Article 42(1)(2). The assertion that the systems for detecting and removing illegal goods were insufficiently effective is directly connected with the obligation not merely to have rules in place, but to mitigate systemic risks under Article 16(1) of the Law on Information Society Services and Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. The platform’s argument concerning significant proactive improvements may be legally relevant only to the amount of the fine: Article 42(2)(1), (3), (4), and (6) treat voluntary prevention of harmful consequences, measures to reduce harm, termination of the infringement, and cooperation with the competent authority as mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, under Article 42(1), the fine also depends on the nature, gravity, duration, and revenue associated with the infringement, so the mere existence of improvements does not in itself negate liability. The product-safety dimension is confirmed by Article 19(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Product Safety, which provides for liability of an online marketplace service provider that presents information containing an offer of a dangerous product, or that fails to comply with other obligations laid down in Regulation (EU) 2023/988 or in that law. Article 2(3) of the Law Amending Law No. XII-1428 of the Republic of Lithuania on Cybersecurity defines an online marketplace service as a service enabling consumers or traders to conclude online sales or service contracts with traders. That definition permits the business model at issue to be legally characterised as the operation of an online marketplace where the dispute concerns not an individual contract, but the management of risks across the system as a whole. From an institutional perspective, in Lithuania the Communications Regulatory Authority, under Article 23(3) and (4) of the Law on Information Society Services, cooperates with coordinators of other Member States and European Union institutions and examines complaints concerning infringements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. Under Article 16(2) of the same law, the Communications Regulatory Authority and the State Data Protection Inspectorate analyse systemic risks arising in Lithuania, relying also on information submitted by the European Commission and other entities or publicly available information. From a data-access perspective, Article 7(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Information Society Services links the obligations of very large online platforms to Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, while Article 7(2) provides for the granting of vetted researcher status within three months of receipt of a properly prepared request. This is important because assessment of systemic risks usually depends on access to data concerning the operation of sellers, offers, notices, and removal mechanisms. The basis for liability in the national system is established in Article 45 of the Law Amending the Law on Information Society Services, under which service providers and other persons that infringe the requirements of that law are liable in accordance with the procedure and conditions laid down in that law and in the Code of Administrative Offences
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the decision remains in force and the platform, in practical terms, bears not only the financial burden but also the obligation to demonstrate that its risk-assessment and risk-mitigation measures under Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 operate at a factual, not merely declaratory, level. The second scenario is a dispute over the amount of the fine, in which the main focus would be the criteria in Article 42(1) and the mitigating circumstances in Article 42(2)–(3), particularly the proactive improvements cited by the platform. The third scenario is intensified supervision and data analysis, since Article 16(2) and Article 23 of the Law on Information Society Services provide for the participation of Lithuanian authorities in systemic-risk assessment and cooperation mechanisms. For consumers, this is practically important because offers of dangerous products are not merely a matter of conduct by a private seller: Article 19 of the Law on Product Safety also links liability to the actions of the online marketplace service provider. For rights holders and market-surveillance authorities, the decision is important as a set of criteria indicating that accepting notices and removing individual listings may be insufficient if recurring risk is not brought under control. For other very large online platforms, the practical conclusion is narrow but strict: under Article 16(1) of the Law on Information Society Services, the entire risk-management system is assessed, while under Article 42 the amount of the fine is affected by scale, duration, dangerousness, harm, revenue, and actual corrective measures
The regulation was initiated by EU legislation through the adoption of the Digital Services Regulation, while Lithuania sought to designate the competent authorities and grant them powers of supervision, complaint handling and the imposition of fines. The objective was to ensure oversight of intermediary services and very large online platforms, including e-commerce services. The principal argument was that the previous rules on electronic commerce and self-regulation were regarded as insufficient; no clear objections are apparent from the excerpts provided.
Whether the acquisition by the 31-year-old accused of more than 11 g of cocaine and at least 9.5 g of cannabis for EUR 1,300 establishes the intent to distribute required under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, and, in the case of the 30-year-old accused, the possession of a large quantity with intent to distribute, or the distribution of a large quantity, required under Article 260(2).
Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises not any acquisition, possession or transportation as such, but possession or control of narcotic substances where there is an intent to sell or otherwise distribute them, as well as the sale or other distribution itself. Accordingly, the central issue in the liability of the 31-year-old resident of Skuodas under this provision is not merely the discovery of bags containing cocaine and cannabis in the BMW, but proof that he acquired and transported those substances not for personal use, but for distribution. Article 259 of the Criminal Code indicates the opposite qualifying threshold: where there is no intent to distribute, possession or control of narcotic substances falls under a more lenient regime, carrying a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment rather than two to eight years.
Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code raises an even narrower evidential issue in respect of the 30-year-old resident of Kretinga: it requires not only unlawful acquisition, possession or transportation, but also a large quantity and an intent to distribute, or the sale or other distribution of a large quantity itself.
In practice, on the facts presented, the prosecution’s position is stronger in relation to the 30-year-old resident of Kretinga, because the report refers not only to his possession or control of at least 41 g of cocaine and approximately 40 g of cannabis, but also to the specific sale of part of those substances for EUR 1,300. Nevertheless, the risk point under Article 260(2) remains the classification of the quantity as “large”: the evidence presented does not disclose quantity-threshold tables or an expert basis, so for a professional this would be the first element to verify in the case file. For the defence of the 31-year-old accused, the most significant issue is not to dispute possession or control as such, if the substances were found in clothing, but whether the prosecution has independent indicia of intent to distribute, since acquisition, possession and transportation alone do not bring the case under Article 260(1) rather than Article 259.
A practical error would be to explain the difference in penalties by quantity alone: under the text of Article 260 presented, the decisive qualifying element is the combination of quantity and distribution-related indicia, not the abstract dangerousness of the drugs.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the acts of the two accused should be classified as unlawful possession of narcotic substances with intent to distribute them under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or as possession of a large quantity with intent to distribute, or distribution of such a quantity, under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code. This issue is determined by three groups of elements: unlawful acts involving the substances, intent to distribute or the act of distribution itself, and the legal significance of the quantity. Under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, liability arises for a person who unlawfully manufactured, processed, acquired, stored, transported or sent narcotic or psychotropic substances with intent to sell or otherwise distribute them, or who sold or otherwise distributed them. Under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code, the classification becomes more serious where such acts involve a large quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances and an intent to distribute, or the sale or other distribution of a large quantity. Article 269(1) of the Criminal Code provides that the narcotic and psychotropic substances referred to in this chapter are those included in the lists approved by the Ministry of Health, while Article 269(2) links quantity thresholds to the recommendations approved by that Ministry. The dividing line from less serious liability is Article 259 of the Criminal Code, because it regulates unlawful possession without intent to sell or otherwise distribute
Legal assessment. The situation imputed to the resident of Skuodas, according to the factual description provided, includes acquisition, storage and transportation: for EUR 1,300 he acquired more than 11 grams of cocaine and at least 9.5 grams of cannabis, transported them by car to the Skuodas district, and police officers found and seized the substances. If the court confirms an intent to sell or otherwise distribute, this chain of conduct falls within the disposition of Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, because that provision expressly covers acquisition, storage and transportation with intent to distribute. The essential distinction from Article 259 of the Criminal Code is not the mere fact of possession, but the intent to distribute: without it, possession would be assessed under Article 259, whereas with it the matter falls within the scope of Article 260. The resident of Kretinga is charged with broader conduct: at least 41 grams of cocaine and approximately 40 grams of cannabis were acquired from an unidentified person, part of which was allegedly sold to the other accused, while the remaining part was found in a car and at the place of residence. For such a person, Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code becomes relevant because it covers the acquisition, storage or transportation of a large quantity with intent to distribute, as well as the sale or other distribution of a large quantity. Quantity is not determined solely by the ordinary meaning of the word “large”: under Article 269(2) of the Criminal Code, the recommendations approved by the Ministry of Health must be applied. Accordingly, in the court’s assessment, the classification of the quantity is an independent element determining whether Article 260(1) or Article 260(2) applies. From a procedural perspective, the bags found, the substances seized during the search, and the items found in the car and at the place of residence are objects relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal act, and Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits participants in the proceedings and other persons to submit such objects and documents. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that procedural time limits denote the time of commencement, performance or completion of acts having procedural significance, and that, in cases provided by law, they may be set by a pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, judge or court. Under Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, time limits are calculated in hours, days and months, excluding the day or hour on which the time limit begins, and therefore procedural acts in the examination of the case will have to be carried out in compliance with these calculation rules. If it were necessary to secure the accused persons’ participation in the proceedings, the unobstructed examination of the case, or the execution of the judgment, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the purpose of coercive measures, while Article 120 lists their types, including detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, registration with the police, and a written undertaking not to leave. The sources provided do not establish grounds for applying Article 2601 of the Criminal Code concerning smuggling of narcotic or psychotropic substances, because the information does not indicate transportation across the state border of the Republic of Lithuania. Nor are the elements of Article 261 of the Criminal Code apparent, because distribution to minors is not indicated, or the elements of Article 266 of the Criminal Code, because the matter concerns cocaine and cannabis, not first-category precursors. Article 268 of the Criminal Code is likewise not a basis for this classification, because it concerns negligent breach of the rules on lawful possession where the substances become the object of illegal circulation
Consequences. If the court confirms the 31-year-old resident of Skuodas’s intent to distribute, he would face imprisonment for a term of two to eight years under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code. If that intent is not confirmed, the legal significance would shift to the regulation under Article 259 of the Criminal Code concerning possession without intent to distribute, because it is precisely the intent to distribute that distinguishes these offences. If the court confirms that the 30-year-old resident of Kretinga possessed a large quantity and sold part of it, he would face imprisonment for a term of eight to ten years under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code. The practical significance of the case for the accused lies in the difference between the sentencing ranges: Article 260(2) provides for a narrower but substantially more severe range of imprisonment than Article 260(1). For the prosecution and the court, the key points of proof will be the nature of the substances under Article 269(1) of the Criminal Code, the classification of the quantity under Article 269(2), and the substantiation of the intent to distribute or the fact of sale under Article 260(1) and (2). For the defence, it is practically significant that the dispute may focus not only on the fact that the substances were found, but also on their legal quantity category and whether the intent to distribute has been proved. The referral of the case to court means that the further course of the case moves to trial, where the time limits for procedural acts will be calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the accused persons’ participation may be secured by the measures provided for in Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
The specific point in dispute is not whether R. Žemaitaitis may still lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of Lithuania, but whether the Court of Appeal’s final conviction in itself terminates his mandate as a member of the Seimas, or merely creates grounds for a political-constitutional impeachment procedure. On this point, the stronger part of R.
Žemaitaitis’s position is that the criminal judgment is not itself a “constitutional decision” on the mandate. The weaker part is the assertion that, because of cassation, the Seimas would be legally required to wait for the Supreme Court. The reported facts indicate that the Court of Appeal’s judgment became final immediately, that the fine was increased from EUR 5,000 to EUR 10,000, and that cassation is only a mechanism for reviewing that final judgment.
Article 63 of the Constitution links the termination of a member of the Seimas’s mandate to an exhaustive list of grounds, including where the Seimas revokes the mandate through impeachment proceedings. That provision contains no ground under which a member’s mandate would terminate automatically solely because of a final conviction or an imposed monetary fine. Accordingly, any legal consequence for the mandate must proceed through impeachment, not through the operative part of the criminal judgment.
Article 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confirms another important rule: what is challenged in cassation is precisely a final judgment or ruling. The right to apply to the Supreme Court therefore does not negate the fact that the Court of Appeal’s judgment is currently final. Article 62 of the Constitution is additionally relevant only insofar as the case also involved speech in the Seimas: a member of the Seimas generally may not be prosecuted for speeches delivered in the Seimas.
However, the report states that the courts assessed both Facebook posts and a speech in the Seimas, and the evidence provided does not allow a broader conclusion as to the extent to which the conviction was based on each of those episodes.
In practice, the Seimas and the parties to the proceedings should distinguish between two arguments: cassation before the Supreme Court strengthens the case for procedural caution, but it does not suspend the legal status of the Court of Appeal’s final judgment. Therefore, on the basis of the provisions provided, the primary provision to cite is not merely Article 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on cassation, but first and foremost Article 63 of the Constitution: the mandate terminates only when the Seimas revokes it through impeachment proceedings. R.
Žemaitaitis’s references to the Gražulis and Gapšys cases operate in this material more as an argument about political consistency than as an argument based on a binding rule of law, because the evidence provided does not show case law requiring the Seimas to wait for the Supreme Court. The main practical risk is confusing the finality of the criminal conviction with automatic loss of mandate: the former already exists; the latter, under the provided Article 63 of the Constitution, requires a separate act by the Seimas in impeachment proceedings.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether, in R. Žemaitaitis’s view, the decision is “politicised”, but whether his public statements legally fall within the constituent elements of incitement to hatred and related offences, and what procedural consequences follow from a final appellate judgment. The principal substantive provision is Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which criminalises public ridicule, contempt, promotion of hatred, or incitement to discriminate against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group, inter alia on grounds of nationality, origin, ethnic origin, religion, convictions, or views. If a call to violence or physical reprisal is also being assessed, Article 170(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies, as set out in Article 6 of the Law Amending Articles 60, 129, 135, 138, 169, 170, 170-1 and 170-2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. According to the sources provided, the aspect of trivialising the Holocaust is linked to Article 170-2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, since the Action Plan for Combating Antisemitism, Xenophobia or Any Other Form of Incitement to Discord and for Fostering Jewish Life states that this provision establishes liability for public approval of, denial of, or gross trivialisation of international crimes, crimes of the USSR, or crimes of Nazi Germany. Procedurally, Articles 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania are material: the court of cassation is the Supreme Court of Lithuania, and a cassation appeal is lodged against a final judgment or ruling
Legal assessment. According to the circumstances set out in the report, the appellate court dismissed the appeals seeking acquittal and increased the fine; its decision therefore accords with the logic of Article 328 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, under which a first-instance judgment may be amended where the sentence imposed was incorrect or other issues in the judgment were improperly resolved. At the same time, this means that the appellate court did not take the course provided for in Article 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, namely to quash the conviction and discontinue the case. Nor did it adopt a new acquittal decision on the grounds provided for in Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which are relevant where it has not been proven that the accused participated in the commission of the act, or where no act bearing the elements of a criminal offence or misdemeanour has been committed. The axis of criminal liability here is publicity and the protected-group characteristic: Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania protects a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group, inter alia on grounds of nationality, ethnic origin, religion, convictions, or views. The legal sources provided further explain that the object of these criminal offences is the rights, freedoms, security, and equality of such groups and of persons belonging to them. Accordingly, the court’s finding that public statements on a social network and in parliament exceeded the limits of freedom of expression is legally significant both for the element of publicity and for the element of degrading a protected group or promoting hatred. Article 60(1)(12) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as amended by Article 1 of the aforementioned amending law, is also relevant to the individualisation of the sentence, since an aggravating circumstance is an act committed with the aim of expressing hatred towards a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group on grounds of nationality, ethnic origin, religion, convictions, or views. R. Žemaitaitis’s right to challenge the decision by cassation is based on Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which grants the accused the right to appeal a court judgment and rulings, and on Articles 24-25, which define the competence of the Supreme Court of Lithuania. However, under the definition in Article 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided, a cassation appeal is an appeal against an already final judgment or ruling; therefore, the mere possibility of cassation does not negate the finality of the appellate decision. Article 18 of the Law on the Status of a Deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, as provided, reflects the principles of parliamentary immunity and non-prosecution for speeches in parliament, but that provision refers to a deputy of the Supreme Council. It can therefore be used only to assess the general rule reflected in the source provided: that speeches by a holder of a parliamentary mandate, and criminal prosecution in respect of them, may be specially protected by law
Consequences. The nearest legal scenario is cassation proceedings before the Supreme Court of Lithuania, because under Article 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania it is that court which hears cases on appeals against final judgments or rulings. If a cassation appeal is lodged, R. Žemaitaitis will procedurally become a cassator within the meaning of Article 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The practical significance of this step is that the dispute moves from factual assessment of evidence and modification of sentence on appeal to cassational review of a final decision. For as long as the appellate decision remains in force, the legal position is that of a convicted person, because Article 16(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides that an accused in respect of whom a conviction has been entered becomes a convicted person. In the criminal case, the practical consequence is an increased monetary fine, since Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania includes a fine among the available sanctions. The issue of political responsibility is raised in the report in connection with possible impeachment, but the legal sources provided do not set out rules governing impeachment procedure; accordingly, on the basis of those sources, only the consequences of criminal liability and of a cassation appeal can be assessed in a substantiated manner. From a practical perspective, the case is important for the Seimas because a final conviction becomes a factual basis for political institutions to decide on further steps within the limits of their competence. It is also important for the boundaries of public speech, because Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania criminalises not the holding of views, but specific public acts: ridicule, contempt, promotion of hatred, or incitement to discriminate against a protected group of persons
Can the use of official EU icons be regarded as sufficient compliance with the AI Act’s transparency obligation where AI-generated or AI-modified content falls within a category requiring mandatory disclosure?
The amendment to the Lithuanian Law on Information Society Services adds Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 to the annex, while Article 2(12) provides that the terms used in that Law are to be understood as defined, inter alia, in that Regulation. This means that, within the Lithuanian chain of application, the concepts of the AI Act are not merely recommendatory context, but become part of the interpretation of national regulation of information society services. The body of rules provided does not itself reproduce the text of the AI Act’s transparency provision; accordingly, the specific scope of the obligation is inferred here from the requirement described in the news item: in certain cases, the use of AI must be clearly disclosed, while the use of icons remains voluntary.
In practice, the stronger argument is not “we used the Commission’s icon”, but “the user clearly understood from the first point of contact that the content was AI-generated or materially modified”. An icon therefore operates as evidential support and as a standardisation tool, but not as an automatic compliance safe harbour. For newsrooms and platforms, the key issue is to document whether the text was reviewed by a human and whether a legal or natural person assumed editorial responsibility, because under the rule described in the news item that may determine whether mandatory labelling arises at all for AI-generated text on matters of public interest.
A risky error would be to label, or not label, all AI content mechanically under a single rule: the assessment must differ as between deepfake content, public-interest texts without editorial responsibility, and artistic, satirical or fictional works.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether every item of AI-generated content must be marked with a specific European Commission icon, but what legal significance such icons have in Lithuanian law when implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. This question is determined by Article 14 of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 5, 8 and 9 of the law amending that law, and the amendment to the annex to the Law on Information Society Services of the Republic of Lithuania made by Article 4 of the amending law. Article 8 of the law amending the Law on Technology and Innovation expressly includes Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, namely the Artificial Intelligence Act, in the annex to the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania as an implemented act of European Union law. Article 4 of the law amending the Law on Information Society Services also includes the same Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 in the annex to the Law on Information Society Services. Accordingly, the icon regime should legally be assessed as a measure for implementing and applying in practice the broader EU artificial intelligence regulatory framework, rather than as an autonomous labelling system established by Lithuanian law. The model in Article 12(7) GDPR is also relevant: information provided to data subjects may be presented in combination with standardised icons where the intended processing is summarised in an easily visible, intelligible and clearly legible manner. Although this GDPR provision regulates the provision of information concerning personal data, it demonstrates the function of icons recognised in legislation: they may serve as a form of presenting information, but their legal significance depends on the underlying substantive obligation
Legal assessment. Article 14(2) of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania sets out the functions of the institution implementing state technology and innovation policy, including the provision of information and consultation services in the field of technology and innovation under Article 14(2)(7). This is practically important in the context of AI labelling, because the competence of such an institution enables businesses and other entities to obtain methodological information on the application of technology and innovation regulation. Under Article 5(4) of the law amending the Law on Technology and Innovation, Article 14(2) is supplemented by point 12², under which that institution, pursuant to Articles 28(1) and 70(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, performs the functions of the national competent authority, namely the notifying authority. These functions relate to the assessment, designation, notification and monitoring of conformity assessment bodies, and not directly to the approval of an icon for each item of publicly disseminated AI content. The procedures for exercising that competence must be established by the procedures for the assessment, designation, notification and monitoring of conformity assessment bodies approved by the Minister of the Economy and Innovation, as provided in the same Article 14(2)(12²). Under Article 9(2) of the amending law, this notifying-authority function entered into force on 2 August 2025, and under Article 9(5), the Minister of the Economy and Innovation was required to adopt the legal acts necessary for its implementation by 1 August 2025. Since today is 23 July 2026, these national institutional provisions are already applicable according to the stated entry-into-force dates. Article 14(1) of the Law on Technology and Innovation ceased to have effect as of 1 April 2025, so the current competence must be read through the functions listed in Article 14(2). The significance of a code of good practice may be assessed by analogy with the regulatory structure in Article 40(1) GDPR: codes are encouraged in order to contribute to the proper application of the regulation, taking account of the specific features of sectors and the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. Article 41(2) GDPR also shows that monitoring compliance with codes may be linked to independence, expert knowledge, complaint-handling procedures and the absence of conflicts of interest. Therefore, from a practical perspective, the use of icons may help demonstrate the organisation of transparent information provision, but the mark itself does not replace the obligation to comply with the applicable regime under Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and the national implementing procedures. The criteria set for icons in Article 12(7) GDPR, namely intelligibility, visibility, clear legibility and machine-readability in electronic form, constitute an important legislative example when assessing what type of informational labelling is considered to be of appropriate quality
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that content creators, platforms and distributors will voluntarily use European Commission icons as a practical transparency measure, particularly where content is connected with AI generation or modification. In that case, the practical risk shifts from the question of whether the official icon specifically was chosen to the question of whether the information provided to the user is clear, visible and intelligible according to the logic of information provision embedded in legislation. The second scenario is that entities will rely on icons as an element of a code of good practice, but will have to separately ensure that their activities comply with the mandatory rules of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, because Lithuanian legal sources do not in themselves equate icons with complete proof of compliance. The third scenario is that the activities of the national authority will focus primarily on the implementation architecture of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689: the functions of the notifying authority, and the designation and monitoring of conformity assessment bodies under Article 14(2)(12²) of the Law on Technology and Innovation. This is practically important for providers and deployers of AI systems, who may require conformity assessment procedures rather than merely a content mark visible to the user. For providers of information society services, it is significant that Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 is also included in the annex to the Law on Information Society Services, meaning that AI content transparency also becomes part of digital services regulation. For consumers, the most important practical consequence is not a new right to an icon of a specific design, but a clearer ability to identify the use of AI where such information must be disclosed under the applicable regime. For businesses, the most important consequence is to document not only the placement of the icon, but also the decision as to why the content is labelled, what information is provided, and who assumes responsibility for publication. For the State, it is relevant that by 23 July 2026 the main entry-into-force deadlines specified in Article 9 of the amending law have already passed, so implementation of the AI Act is no longer merely a matter of future legislation
Whether, following the ECtHR’s finding of a violation of the right of access to a court, a national court may not only examine Eimutis Misiūnas’s claim concerning the lawfulness of the President’s refusal to appoint him as a judge, but also apply a positive restitutory remedy: ordering the President to appoint him and awarding lost salary.
Article 112 of the Constitution, according to the wording provided, establishes a boundary of competences: judges of the Supreme Court are appointed and dismissed by the Seimas upon submission by the President of the Republic, and therefore the President’s role depends on the particular level of court. This means that a claim seeking to “order the President to appoint a person as a judge” cannot be assessed in the abstract as a matter solely of presidential discretion. It is first necessary to determine the position for which the person applied and whether, at that stage, the President has the competence to make the final appointment or only to submit a nomination.
The wording provided for Article 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, concerning defects in a claim, indicates a procedural rule: the court must set a time limit for remedying the defects, requiring the claimant either to substantiate the claims with admissible written evidence or to pay the additional stamp duty. Accordingly, an argument based on formal defects is procedurally strong only where it is clear that a time limit was set, the defects were specifically identified, and the applicant failed to remedy them within that time limit.
The news report indicates that the national courts initially refused to accept E. Misiūnas’s claim, treating some of the claims as not amenable to judicial determination and others as affected by unremedied formal defects. However, the subsequent ECtHR judgment, which awarded the former minister EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, changed the procedural position: the proceedings were reopened on the instruction of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, meaning that the earlier “not amenable to judicial determination” barrier is no longer sufficient to close the case without a substantive assessment.
The direction of the case law in this particular case therefore shifts from an emphasis on institutional immunity or discretion towards the issue of effective judicial review.
The statement in the article concerning claims not accepted because of formal defects is incomplete, because under the wording provided for Article 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decisive issue is not the mere existence of a defect, but whether the court set a time limit for remedying the defects and whether the claimant failed to remedy them within that period. It would be more accurate to say that an obstacle to accepting a claim may arise after the court has procedurally identified the defects and granted a time limit for remedying them. The statement that the President may appoint and reinstate a person to judicial office is also incomplete: Article 112 of the Constitution clearly distinguishes judges of the Supreme Court, who are appointed and dismissed by the Seimas upon submission by the President.
Any precise statement must therefore be linked to the specific court and the specific presidential function: appointment or submission.
At present, the stronger argument appears to be not one of absolute presidential discretion, but of judicial review: the ECtHR’s finding of a violation and the reopening of the proceedings ordered by the Supreme Court of Lithuania mean that the dispute must be translated into the language of reviewable legal criteria, rather than left solely within the sphere of political assessment. In practice, the greatest risk for the President’s side is the insufficient legal certainty of the reason described as “political cooling-off”, if it is treated as a basis for restricting a judicial career. The weaker point for E.
Misiūnas’s side is the remedy sought: even if the refusal is found to have been unfounded, an order requiring appointment as a judge can rest only on a scheme of competences that does not contradict the division of roles between the Seimas and the President established in Article 112 of the Constitution. For practitioners, the key point in this case is to distinguish between two issues: the right to judicial review of the President’s actions, and the court’s ability to replace or positively constrain the constitutional appointment procedure.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the President of the Republic’s refusal to appoint Eimutis Misiūnas as a judge may be found unfounded and whether a court may determine the legal consequences of such refusal, including an order to appoint him and an award of lost average remuneration. This question must first be assessed under Article 112 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that judges of district, regional and specialised courts are appointed by the President of the Republic, and that a special judicial institution provided for by law advises the President on judicial appointments. If a mechanism for the return or appointment of a former judge applies, Article 60 of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant: paragraph 1 provides for the right of certain former judges of the highest and international courts to be appointed as judges without an examination or selection procedure, while paragraphs 2 to 4 link appointment to the assessment of reputation, authorisation to work with classified information, a medical certificate and the reasoned advice of the Judicial Council. The ground for reopening the proceedings arises from Article 366(1)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, because where the ECtHR has found a violation of the Convention in a civil case, national proceedings may be reopened. The President’s constitutional status must also be assessed under Article 86 of the Constitution, but that provision directly concerns the prohibition of arrest and criminal or administrative liability, not the examination of a civil case concerning legal consequences
Legal assessment. Article 112 of the Constitution confers appointment competence on the President, but that competence is not isolated from procedural conditions: a special judicial institution must advise on the appointment of a judge. Article 60(3) of the Law on Courts specifies the role of that institution, the Judicial Council: it must provide reasoned advice to the President and assess the person’s suitability for appointment as a judge of the relevant level and jurisdiction. Paragraph 4 of that article means that appointment is possible only after the Judicial Council has received and assessed the information referred to in Article 60(2). Accordingly, the essential issue in the case is not only the President’s discretion, but also whether the statutory chain of assessment was completed: reputation, authorisation requirements, medical certificate, the Judicial Council’s reasoned advice and the President’s final decision. The source concerning draft amendment No. XIIP-3305 to Articles 109, 110, 112, 113 and 114 of the Constitution states that the advice of the special judicial institution produces legal effects: without it, the President cannot adopt a decision on the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of a judge. The same source emphasises that such advice must be rationally argued, clearly reasoned and based on established facts, professional preparedness, personal qualities and other circumstances determining suitability, rather than on assumptions or subjective attitudes. This rule is also important for assessing the President’s decision: if the refusal is based not on suitability criteria specified in legal acts, but on a political motive, the question arises whether such a motive is compatible with the purpose of the judicial appointment procedure. The “political cooling” mentioned in the report is not identified in the sources provided as an independent criterion capable of replacing the elements of suitability assessment set out in Article 60 of the Law on Courts. At the same time, the court will have to distinguish the obligation to comply with the legally prescribed procedure from the President’s constitutional competence to adopt the appointment act himself under Article 112 of the Constitution. From the perspective of civil procedure, the case returned to the national process not as a new political dispute, but as a reopened case under Article 366(1)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure following the ECtHR’s finding of a violation of the Convention. This means that the scope of examination before Vilnius Regional Court is linked to the legal assessment of earlier procedural decisions and the claims brought after the reopening of the proceedings. The claim for lost average remuneration must be assessed separately from the claim for appointment: Article 772 of the Code of Civil Procedure regulates the consequences of non-enforcement of judgments ordering reinstatement or changing the wording of dismissal, but it is directly linked to a court judgment not implemented by the employer. That provision is therefore relevant only insofar as the dispute would legally be equated with the enforcement of a judgment concerning restoration to employment or office; the appointment of a judge under Article 112 of the Constitution is an act of public authority, not an ordinary employer action. Article 63 of the Law on Courts, concerning the transfer of a judge to another court of the same level, shows that judicial career decisions may be based on the judge’s preference, but they nevertheless remain linked to the selection or appointment procedure prescribed by law. The special procedure for appointing judges of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania formerly contained in Article 2 of the amendment to the Law on the Establishment of Administrative Courts of the Republic of Lithuania is not a direct basis for the present dispute, because the source itself states that that article ceased to be in force on 1 May 2002
Consequences. If the court were to find the refusal unfounded, the most practically important question would be the form of restoration of rights: whether it would suffice to declare the unlawfulness, whether an obligation would be formulated to carry out steps in the appointment procedure, or whether there would be a direct order to appoint the person as a judge. A direct order to appoint would be the most sensitive from the perspective of Article 112 of the Constitution, because the appointment itself is assigned to the President of the Republic, and the advice of the Judicial Council is a necessary condition for that decision. Based on the provisions provided, a more realistic procedural scenario would be a court ruling on the validity of the refusal and on the duty to reconsider the matter in accordance with Article 112 of the Constitution and the criteria set out in Article 60 of the Law on Courts. If lost remuneration were awarded, this would be practically significant not only for the applicant but also for the State, because a monetary consequence of a public authority decision would arise. If the claim were dismissed, the outcome of the President’s decision would remain in place, but following the application of Article 366(1)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the national court would in any event have had to examine the dispute in light of the violation found by the ECtHR. The decision of 21 August will therefore be significant for the limits of the judicial appointment procedure: it will show the extent to which a court may review the reasons for the President’s refusal where the appointment competence is constitutional, but the procedure and suitability assessment are regulated by statute
Can a person serving a seven-year custodial sentence for sexual offences against children qualify for conditional release solely on the basis of a low risk of reoffending, where the applicable provision creates an exception to conditional release for such offences?
The wording of Article 83 of the submitted Law Amending the Code on the Execution of Sentences states the opposite of what is reported as news: “Conditional release from a custodial institution shall not apply” to persons serving sentences for offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and inviolability. This means that low risk and other conditions become legally relevant only where the person falls within the scope of conditional release in the first place. Article 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court is also relevant because a ruling of the Constitutional Court must specify precisely which part of a legal act has been found contrary to the Constitution; absent such a specific finding concerning the prohibition, it cannot be asserted that the prohibition itself no longer applies.
The article’s assertion that, following the Constitutional Court’s decision, convicted persons who sexually abused children may be released conditionally if their risk is low is too broad on the basis of the source provided. It would be more accurate to say that the possibility of conditional release depends not only on the risk assessment, but first and foremost on whether the specific criminal offence is subject to the prohibition set out in Article 83 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences. If the person is serving a sentence specifically for offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and inviolability, the wording of Article 83 provided indicates not a conditional possibility, but non-application.
On the evidence provided, the stronger argument is not “low risk permits release”, but rather “it must first be shown that the Constitutional Court’s ruling removed or narrowed the prohibition in Article 83 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences specifically for this category of offences”. For a professional audience, the key point is not to reproduce a political conclusion about K. Bartoševičius’s “hope” without applying the primary legal filter: what is the Criminal Code classification, does it fall within the prohibition in Article 83(2) of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, and what exactly did the Constitutional Court find to be contrary to the Constitution under Article 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court?
Until that is shown, the practical risk is that conditional release will be wrongly presented as a matter of individual risk assessment, whereas under the provision provided it is first and foremost a matter of statutory non-application.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether a person convicted of sexual offences against children should be released early, but whether he is eligible to seek conditional release under Article 82 of the Code of Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania. If a seven-year custodial sentence has been imposed, the relevant rule is Article 82(1)(2) of the Code: a convicted person whose sentence exceeds four years but does not exceed ten years may be conditionally released after serving half of the sentence imposed, provided that the risk of his criminal conduct is low or that he has made evident progress in reducing that risk. This provision is framed as a possibility, not as a right to automatic release. The purpose of the sentence-execution regime is defined in Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Law Amending the Code of Execution of Sentences: the Code establishes the procedure, conditions, and principles for the execution and serving of sentences so that, after serving their sentences, convicted persons pursue their life objectives by lawful means and methods. The binding force of the judgment derives from Article 346(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: a final judgment is binding on all institutions and must be enforced throughout the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. In the case of a seven-year custodial sentence, the formal minimum threshold would be half of the sentence, as this directly corresponds to Article 82(1)(2) of the Code of Execution of Sentences. However, the mere fact that half of the sentence has been served is insufficient: it must also be established that the risk of criminal conduct is low or that evident progress has been made in reducing it. The earlier regulatory analysis in the sources provided also emphasizes that conditional release is an institution that “may be” applied, not one that “must be” applied: this is stated in the opinion on Draft Law No. XP-792(2) amending Article 157 of the Code of Execution of Sentences. The same opinion identifies two grounds: a formal ground, where the minimum part of the sentence has been served, and a substantive ground, where it is assessed whether the convicted person can continue to be corrected while not isolated from society but subject to supervision. The opinion on Draft Law No. XIP-1446 supplementing and amending Article 158 of the Code of Execution of Sentences also notes that a complete exclusion of conditional release for offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination or inviolability would be linked not to individual risk, but to the category of the criminal offence. The same source emphasizes the importance of supervision: a conditionally released person remains under supervision, receives social assistance, and is subject to resocialisation measures. Procedurally, Article 87(1) of the Code of Execution of Sentences provides that a custodial institution releases a convicted person upon receipt of a copy of the decision of the conditional release commission or a court order together with a copy of the court ruling. Under Article 87(2) of the Code, these documents are submitted to the Probation Service. Under Article 87(4), it must be ensured that intensive supervision and probation begin from the moment of release. The issue of the release date is further specified in Article 94(1) of the Law Amending the Code of Execution of Sentences: on grounds other than the expiry of the sentence term, the convicted person is released on the day the institution receives the required documents. On the day of release, under Article 94(4) of the same law, the person is issued his identity documents, belongings, money held in his account, and documents certifying the serving of the sentence. The prosecutor’s role remains one of supervising the enforcement of the judgment, since Article 346(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the submission of the judgment for enforcement and its enforcement are supervised by the prosecutor
Consequences. The realistic first scenario is that, after serving the half of the seven-year sentence required by Article 82(1)(2) of the Code of Execution of Sentences, the convicted person may seek conditional release if he satisfies the risk or progress condition. The second scenario is that, even after the formal half-sentence threshold has been reached, conditional release is not applied if there is no substantive basis to consider that the person can be corrected while not isolated from society and while under supervision. The third scenario is that, once a favourable decision has been adopted, the duty of the custodial institution is not to reassess the judgment, but to execute the documents received in accordance with Articles 87 and 94 of the Code of Execution of Sentences. The practical significance of this for the convicted person is the possibility of moving earlier from isolation to a regime of probation and intensive supervision. For the custodial institution, it is relevant to risk assessment, execution of documents, and organisation of the release date. For the Probation Service, it is relevant because its supervision must begin from the very moment of release, not later. For society and for the interest in protecting victims, the significance is that the sources provided link conditional release not to an uncontrolled “shortening” of the sentence, but to a supervised continuation of sentence execution in the community. On the basis of the sources provided, the issue of political return is not part of the institution of conditional release; legally, therefore, these provisions permit assessment only of sentence execution, release conditions, and supervision
The regulation was initiated by the drafters of the bill in response to the Constitutional Court’s interpretation concerning restrictions on the rights of convicted persons. The aim was to amend the Code for the Enforcement of Sentences so that certain rights or privileges would not be categorically denied solely on the basis of the type of sentence, where it is possible to assess individually the convicted person’s conduct, personality and risk. The principal argument was the constitutional requirement of proportionality and equality of persons; objections emphasised that the proposed amendments could unsettle the penal system and excessively reduce the distinctions between sanctions for very serious offences.
Whether the finding of a blood alcohol concentration of 2.89 per mille while driving a Skoda Octavia, where the news report does not indicate a traffic accident or injured persons, should be classified under Article 281 of the Criminal Code, or under the special provision in Article 2811 of the Criminal Code.
Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code directly criminalises the driving of a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. In this situation, the reported concentration of 2.89 per mille substantially exceeds the threshold for criminal liability, so the mere fact of driving is already sufficient as an initial basis for applying Article 2811. By contrast, Article 281(1)-(2) of the Criminal Code links liability to a traffic accident and specific consequences, such as minor bodily injury or substantial property damage.
Since the news report does not indicate any such consequences, on the facts provided the stronger classification is under Article 2811 rather than Article 281. Article 72 of the Criminal Code also raises the risk of confiscation of the vehicle if the Skoda Octavia were recognised as an instrumentality of the criminal offence and belonged to the offender; if it belonged to another person, confiscation would require one of the conditions set out in Article 72(4).
The article’s statement that drivers are considered intoxicated only once they exceed 0.4 per mille is incomplete: the wording of the Law on Road Traffic Safety cited indicates that the general permitted limit is 0.4 per mille, but novice drivers and drivers of certain categories of vehicles are subject to a limit of more than 0 per mille. It would be more accurate to say that 0.4 per mille is the general limit, but not a universal limit applicable to all drivers. The statement that driving while intoxicated carries a fine and deprivation of the right to drive is also too broad: according to the cited review of Article 422 of the Code of Administrative Offences, in some cases involving 0-0.4 per mille only a fine is mentioned, and deprivation of the right to drive is not a universal consequence.
Moreover, this particular case involving 2.89 per mille should not be presented as ordinary administrative “drink-driving”, because Article 2811 of the Criminal Code provides for criminal liability from 1.51 per mille.
In practice, the key issue here is not whether the person “was intoxicated”, but whether the proceedings are correctly directed towards the elements of the offence under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, which do not require proof of a traffic accident or damage. For the defence, an argument that there were no consequences would be weaker, because Article 2811 penalises the act of driving itself with a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more; stronger points of dispute would be the reliability of the measurement, proof of the fact of driving, and ownership of the vehicle for confiscation purposes. For prosecutors and journalists, it is more accurate to cite Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, and to mention Article 281 only if information emerges concerning a traffic accident, bodily injury, or substantial property damage.
For the vehicle owner, the practical risk lies in Article 72 of the Criminal Code: if the vehicle belongs to the driver himself, the confiscation argument under the cited provision becomes direct, whereas in the case of third-party ownership the additional statutory conditions would have to be proven.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not merely whether the driver was “intoxicated”, but whether a blood alcohol level of 2.89 per mille while driving a motor vehicle constitutes an independent criminal offence under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or whether the act should be classified under Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more has been established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Article 281(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code links liability to a breach of road traffic safety rules or vehicle operation rules and to a traffic accident causing injury to human health or substantial property damage. Since the report states only that a man born in 1972 drove a Škoda Octavia in Rokiškis and was found to have a blood alcohol level of 2.89 per mille, the principal provision on the facts presented is Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code further means that intoxication by alcohol as such does not exempt a person from criminal liability. Under the cited versions of Articles 427 and 423 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the administrative-offence threshold is linked to intoxication of more than 0.4 but not more than 1.5 per mille; therefore, 2.89 per mille falls within the sphere of criminal, and not merely administrative, liability
Legal assessment. The actual level of 2.89 per mille is almost twice the 1.51 per mille threshold established in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore, for criminal liability under this provision, it is sufficient to establish the fact of driving, the nature of the vehicle, and the degree of intoxication. According to the description in the report, a Škoda Octavia is a car and therefore a motor vehicle within the meaning of Article 2811 of the Criminal Code. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code also permits liability where the act provided for in paragraph 1 of that article was committed through negligence; accordingly, the form of guilt should not preclude liability merely because the driver might claim to have inaccurately assessed his condition. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code prevents an argument that alcohol intoxication in itself excludes liability. The exception in Article 19(2) of the Criminal Code concerning intoxication against a person’s will would be relevant only if its conditions were met, but the report provides no such facts. The competence of the police to test a driver suspected of intoxication derives from paragraph 3 of the Rules for Determining Intoxication or Impairment of Persons Driving Vehicles and Other Persons, under which police officers test a vehicle driver suspected of being intoxicated. Under the same version of paragraph 3 of the Rules, where an ethyl alcohol concentration exceeding 1.5 per mille is detected in exhaled air, the person is taken to a healthcare institution for a medical examination. This is important for evidentiary purposes, because the 2.89 per mille reading is not only a liability threshold but also a procedurally significant basis for a medical examination under the Rules. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a suspect, defence counsel, victim, and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence; therefore, data concerning the intoxication test, medical examination, or circumstances of driving may be submitted in the investigation. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that procedural time limits define the commencement, performance, or completion of acts having procedural significance, and that, in cases provided for by law, they may be set by a pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, judge, or court. Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, and that the hour and day on which the time limit begins are not included in the calculation. If an expert examination were ordered, under the cited extract from the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor, upon receiving the expert report, must notify the suspect, defence counsel, and other relevant participants in the proceedings in writing where and when they may access it. Article 281 of the Criminal Code could become relevant in this situation only if a traffic accident and the consequences specified in Article 281 were established, for example minor or serious injury to another person’s health or substantial property damage. The driving at a blood alcohol level of 2.89 per mille described in the report, without consequences of a traffic accident, more precisely corresponds under the cited provisions to Article 2811 of the Criminal Code rather than to the structure of Article 281(1)–(4). The cited versions of Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences refer to repeated driving while intoxicated at more than 0.4 but not more than 1.5 per mille; therefore, this administrative offence does not cover a condition of 2.89 per mille as the principal basis for classification. The cited version of Article 423(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences is likewise linked to intoxication of more than 0.4 but not more than 1.5 per mille and to certain minor consequences, and therefore it is not the principal provision in light of the per mille level stated in the report. The sources provided contain no case law, so the assessment is based on the text of the statute and subordinate rules
Consequences. The most realistic subsequent course is for the pre-trial investigation to focus on the elements of Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code: the fact of driving, the vehicle, and intoxication exceeding the 1.51 per mille threshold. If the investigation produced no data concerning a traffic accident, injury to health, or substantial property damage, the basis for applying Article 281(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code would weaken under the cited provisions. If such consequences were established, the classification issue could be reconsidered under the relevant paragraph of Article 281 of the Criminal Code. For the suspect, the practical significance is that the sanction under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code includes a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. For investigators and the prosecutor, paragraph 3 of the Rules is practically important because a reading exceeding 1.5 per mille determines the course toward a medical examination and the later assessment of the reliability of evidence. For participants in the proceedings, Articles 98, 99, and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are important because they define the submission of documents and objects and the calculation of procedural time limits. A pre-trial investigation may be discontinued only on the grounds specified in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt in committing the criminal offence. The practical significance of this report for drivers is clear: the threshold of more than 0.4 per mille in the cited administrative sources denotes intoxication, but intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code moves the situation into the sphere of criminal liability
The regulation was initiated by the legislature and the drafters of the bills, who sought to tighten liability for drink-driving. The aim was to improve road safety and prevent dangerous offences where a person drives with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 1.5 per mille, evades testing, or consumes alcohol after a traffic accident. It was argued that a narrower form of liability, for example applying only to persons without the right to drive, would not solve the problem; the observations also addressed the assessment of the form of culpability and case law rejecting the defence that the driver “felt sober”.
Can a consumer terminate a contract for the sale and purchase of a car and claim a refund of the full price where, after a car of proper quality had been delivered, it was damaged by a service employee during a test drive, or should such a situation be characterised solely as a claim for damages against the service provider.
The directly applicable provision is Article 6.292(1) of the Civil Code: a producer or service provider must compensate damage caused by defective services, while paragraph 5 links this regime to consumer, non-business purposes. What follows from this provision in the present situation is not an automatic right to return the car to the seller, but an obligation to compensate the damage caused by the actions of the service provider. Article 6.721 of the Civil Code regulates unilateral termination of a services contract, but paragraph 1 concerns the adjustment of the service price and reasonable expenses, not the annulment of an already performed contract for the sale and purchase of a car because of a subsequent traffic accident.
The stronger legal basis is therefore not a warranty claim or withdrawal from the sale contract, but a claim for full compensation for damage based on the logic of Article 6.292 of the Civil Code.
The ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania referred to in the news item drew precisely this distinction between two situations: a defect in the quality of the item sold and damage caused later, after delivery to the buyer, by the actions of the service provider. The courts found that the car had been delivered to the buyer in proper quality, and that the damage resulted not from a manufacturing defect or warranty defect, but from a traffic accident during a test drive. The consumer’s claim to terminate the sale and purchase contract and recover the full price was therefore dismissed.
The practical rule from the ruling is that the context of warranty servicing does not, in itself, turn every subsequent instance of damage to a car into a dispute over the quality of the item sold.
For a professional, the key point is to formulate the basis of the claim correctly: in this factual situation, the stronger argument is not “the car is under warranty, therefore refund the full price”, but “the service provider, through the actions of its employee, caused damage to the consumer’s property”. The scope of the claim should not be limited to the repair estimate, since the news item also indicates other compensable heads of loss: diminution in market value, replacement car costs, and other actual losses. The most serious procedural mistake would be to sign a document stating that there are no further claims against the service provider or the insurer before the full extent of the damage has been assessed, not merely the obvious repair costs.
In practical terms, this ruling narrows the consumer’s ability to use termination of the sale and purchase contract as leverage, while at the same time strengthening the value of a precisely calculated damages claim.
Core issue. The legal issue is not merely “who is at fault for the damage to the car,” but which remedy the consumer may choose: rescission of the sale-purchase contract due to a defective item, or compensation for damage to property caused after delivery. It is to be assessed under Article 6.320 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania on the risk of accidental loss of or damage to an item, Article 6.379 of the Civil Code on unilateral termination of a contract, Article 6.153 of the Civil Code on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Article 13 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compulsory Motor Third Party Liability Insurance concerning a claim against the responsible insurer, as well as paragraph 16 of the Rules on the Administration of Damage Caused in a Road Traffic Accident and Payment of Insurance Benefits. The consumer’s right, under paragraphs 27.3-27.5 of the Retail Trade Rules, to require replacement of the goods, a price reduction, free remedy of defects, unilateral termination of the contract, and refund of the price is linked to the sale of defective goods. Accordingly, the principal dividing line in this situation lies between the seller’s liability for the quality of the car sold and the liability of the service provider or the person at fault for the road traffic accident for subsequent damage to the consumer’s property
Legal assessment. If the car was delivered to the buyer in proper quality, Article 6.320(1) of the Civil Code means that the risk of accidental loss of or damage to the item passes to the buyer from the moment of proper delivery. Article 6.320(4) of the Civil Code further provides that if, after delivery, the item is lost or damaged through no fault of the seller, the buyer must pay the price to the seller. This weakens a claim for refund of the full price of the car under the sale-purchase contract where the damage arose not from a defect existing at the time of sale, but from a subsequent road traffic accident during a service test drive. Article 6.379(1) of the Civil Code permits the buyer to terminate the contract unilaterally only where the seller has committed a fundamental breach. Article 6.379(2)(1) treats as a fundamental breach a situation where the items delivered are of improper quality and their defects cannot be remedied within a period acceptable to the buyer. If it is established in the case that the car was delivered in proper quality, its subsequent damage at the service centre does not, in itself, transform the original sale into a sale of defective goods. The consumer rights concerning defects in goods set out in paragraphs 27.3-27.5 of the Retail Trade Rules apply where the dispute concerns goods of improper quality, not separate damage to property after delivery. Therefore, the consumer’s legal route should be directed toward compensation for damage, rather than annulment of the sale-purchase contract solely because an accident occurred during warranty servicing. The amount of damage must be supported by objective evidence: in its ruling of 24 October 2024 in civil case No. e3K-3-200-1120/2024, the Supreme Court of Lithuania stated that pecuniary damage must be real and proven by objective data. If non-pecuniary damage were claimed, under the Supreme Court of Lithuania’s ruling of 1 July 2020 in civil case No. 3K-3-205-313/2020 and its ruling of 23 February 2018 in civil case No. 3K-3-55-248/2018, the mere fact of an infringement is insufficient, because all conditions of civil liability are required: unlawful acts, causal link, fault, and damage. If the service provider’s or insurer’s offer covered only repairs, paragraph 16 of the Rules on the Administration of Damage Caused in a Road Traffic Accident indicates that damage arising from the inability to use the damaged vehicle may also be assessed separately, taking into account the nature of the damage, the actual repair period, repair possibilities, the type of vehicle, average rental rates for a replacement vehicle, and other circumstances supported by evidence. Under Article 13(1) of the Law on Compulsory Motor Third Party Liability Insurance, an injured third party seeking payment must submit a claim directly to the responsible insurer, its representative, or, in the cases provided by law, the Bureau. If the consumer seeks compensation both from the insurer or the Bureau and directly from the wrongdoer or the person liable for the damage, Article 13(1) requires the consumer to notify the insurer or the Bureau in writing no later than within 3 business days from the date of approaching the wrongdoer. Under Article 13(2), if the insurance benefit does not compensate all damage because the damage exceeds the insured amounts, the injured person may claim the remaining part from the wrongdoer. The service provider also may not rely on a standard consumer contract term that would exclude or limit its liability for damage caused to the consumer’s property, because such a term is deemed unfair under Article 6.153(2)(1) of the Civil Code. Article 4(2)(1) and (2) of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Civil Code expresses the same consumer protection rationale by prohibiting terms that limit the trader’s liability for damage to the consumer’s property or improperly restrict the consumer’s rights where the trader improperly performs contractual obligations
Consequences. The most realistic route in the dispute is a claim for compensation for damage actually suffered: repair costs, substantiated damage arising from the inability to use the car, and other losses confirmed by objective evidence. If the insurer pays only part of the damage, Article 13(2) of the Law on Compulsory Motor Third Party Liability Insurance is of practical importance to the consumer, as it allows the remaining part to be claimed from the wrongdoer. If the service provider proposes that the consumer sign a statement that they have no further claims, the control of consumer contract terms under Article 6.153 of the Civil Code becomes relevant, especially where such a term would in effect limit liability for damage caused to the consumer’s property. Termination of the contract and refund of the full price of the car would be justified only where the conditions set out in Article 6.379 of the Civil Code concerning a fundamental breach by the seller are satisfied; in the situation presented, the legal centre of gravity is not a defect in the sale, but subsequent damage. This matters to the consumer because an improperly chosen claim may be dismissed, even though the substantive basis for the right to compensation may remain. It also matters to service providers and insurers because their offer must be assessed not as a “closure” of the warranty, but as a mechanism for compensating real and proven damage
Whether a joint investment by residents in a solar or wind power plant may be regarded as a citizens’ energy community merely because the chosen legal form is a “cooperative” or another legal entity, or whether non-profit legal-person status and the formal acquisition of citizens’ energy community status are required.
Article 22²(1) of the Law on Electricity defines a citizens’ energy community not as any joint investment project, but as a non-profit legal person which, under its founding documents, may consume or share electricity, carry out generation, supply, demand aggregation, storage and other specified activities, excluding distribution, and which has acquired the legal status of a citizens’ energy community. This means that the decisive criterion is not merely democratic governance or member participation, but the non-profit nature of the legal person, the inclusion of the relevant activities in its founding documents, and acquisition of the status in the manner prescribed by law. Article 46¹ of the Law on Electricity separately regulates power purchase agreements for electricity from renewable sources: the producer must provide the consumer with a draft agreement within 10 days or inform the consumer that the agreement cannot be concluded, while the contractual terms are negotiated by agreement between the parties.
Accordingly, a community model may legally rely on different instruments: community status, contracts between consumers and the producer, or the accounting model for a prosumer, but these instruments must not be conflated.
The article’s statement that remote prosumers and energy communities provide a basis for participants to “record generated energy in their bills” is overly simplified. According to the wording of Article 20¹ of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources, where the grid connection point of the power plant does not coincide with the connection point of the place of consumption, the entire generated quantity, or the share allocated to a specific prosumer, is deemed to have been supplied to the electricity grid. A more precise formulation would refer not to the direct “recording” of energy in a bill, but to a legal accounting fiction: the share of energy generated in a remote power plant and allocated to the consumer is deemed to have been supplied to the grid and is subsequently offset under the applicable settlement mechanism.
The article also insufficiently distinguishes a citizens’ energy community under Article 22² of the Law on Electricity from a general commercial project or a mere choice of legal form.
In practice, the stronger argument is that an “energy cooperative” is not an independent legal privilege: the rights to share energy and operate in the electricity sector depend on the specific status, contracts and accounting regime. When drafting founding documents, it is necessary not only to provide for members’ contributions, voting and withdrawal, but also to expressly include the activities permitted under Article 22² of the Law on Electricity and to verify whether the chosen legal form can qualify as a non-profit person. The greatest risk is marketing a project to residents as a “community” or “energy sharing” when, in substance, it is merely an investment in a generation asset or an electricity purchase-and-sale scheme under Article 46¹.
For a professional audience, it is worth citing specifically the status requirement in Article 22² and the accounting logic in Article 20¹, because they most precisely distinguish a lawful community energy model from a marketing generalisation.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether residents may “cooperate” in an informal, practical sense, but what legally recognised status such a joint renewable electricity project must acquire in order to share electricity, allocate power plant capacity, or supply electricity to participants. This is determined under Article 22²(1)–(2) of the Law on Electricity of the Republic of Lithuania concerning citizens’ energy communities and Article 20²(1) of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources of the Republic of Lithuania concerning renewable energy communities. Also relevant is supply under a renewable electricity purchase and sale agreement, regulated by Article 46¹(1)–(2) of the Law on Electricity. Article 2(1) of the Law on Electricity defines the essence of such an agreement as the direct purchase and sale of electricity from a renewable energy producer. Accordingly, the “energy cooperative” described in the notice must be assessed legally not by its name, but by whether it is a non-profit legal person and whether it acquires the status of a citizens’ energy community or a renewable energy community
Legal assessment. Under Article 22²(1) of the Law on Electricity, a citizens’ energy community may be a public institution, association, apartment building owners’ association, gardeners’ association, or a non-profit legal person of another legal form, provided that its founding documents permit the consumption or sharing of electricity and the conduct of generation, supply, demand aggregation, storage, energy efficiency, or electric vehicle charging activities, excluding distribution. This provision directly limits the choice referred to in the notice between a “cooperative company, small partnership, or another form”: the selected form must be compatible with the requirement that the entity be non-profit if citizens’ energy community status is sought. Article 22²(2) of the Law on Electricity also requires voluntary and open participation by shareholders, members, or participants; therefore, internal rules on contributions, withdrawal, and transfer of interests may not negate that principle. Article 20²(1) of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources similarly provides that renewable energy community status is granted to a non-profit legal person whose activities are based on open and voluntary participation by its participants. In the electricity sector, this status is generally acquired when a permit to develop electricity generation capacity or a permit to generate electricity is issued; where a permit is already held, a declaration of compliance with the requirements of Article 20²(2) is submitted to the National Energy Regulatory Council. Where neither a permit to develop capacity nor a permit to generate electricity is required, Article 20²(1) of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources provides that the status is granted in accordance with the procedure established by the National Energy Regulatory Council. This means that it is not sufficient for an initiative group merely to agree on the financing of a power plant: it must properly formalise the legal person, its purpose, the rights of participants, and the procedure for acquiring the relevant status. The possibility mentioned in the notice of owning a power plant elsewhere and allocating the benefit to participants is consistent with the regulatory logic indicated in the source: according to the Government’s position on the draft Article 20-1 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources, consumers may establish a renewable energy community under Article 20²(1) and (6) of that Law or a citizens’ energy community under Article 22²(1) and (5) of the Law on Electricity, and electricity generated in their installations may be sold at a price set in contracts, including zero, or the power plant capacity may be allocated to community participants. If the direct sale model is chosen, Article 46¹(1) of the Law on Electricity establishes a clear deadline: at the consumer’s request, the renewable energy producer must, within 10 days, submit a draft contract or inform the consumer that it cannot conclude the contract. Under paragraph 2 of the same article, contract terms are agreed by mutual consent, and contracts concluded with household consumers must comply with the standard terms for electricity purchase and sale contracts approved by the Ministry of Energy. The producer is not obliged to conclude a contract or supply electricity if the consumer does not agree to the supply terms specified by the producer; therefore, the economic benefit for a community member also depends on the contractual structure. The network issue is not merely technical: under the provision of the Law Amending the Law on Electricity concerning the description of the procedure for use of electricity networks, the principles and criteria established by the Council must ensure efficient use of the network and create conditions for achieving renewable energy objectives. Article 8(3)–(5) of the Law Amending the Law on Electricity, which entered into force on 1 November 2024, is also relevant to transitional situations, because applications for permits submitted and network procedures commenced before entry into force are completed under the previous rules. The supervisory authority is the National Energy Regulatory Council: under Article 24¹(1) of the Law on Energy, it supervises regulated activities, energy facilities, and installations, and during inspections may obtain documents, data, explanations, and information from state and municipal authorities, financial institutions, and other persons. The sources provided contain no case law; therefore, the dispute-resolution aspect here is based on the statutory framework governing status, permits, contracts, and supervision
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is proper formalisation of the community: residents choose a non-profit legal form, provide in the articles of association for electricity generation, sharing, or supply activities, apply for the required status, and only then allocate power plant capacity or conclude contracts. The second scenario is contractual supply, where the renewable energy producer and consumers operate under Article 46¹ of the Law on Electricity; however, under such an arrangement, the consumer does not acquire governance rights as a community member merely by entering into an electricity purchase agreement. The third scenario is a procedural obstacle concerning permits, status, or network capacity, because without the relevant decision of the National Energy Regulatory Council or the applicable permitting procedure, a community project cannot be regarded as fully legally implemented. The fourth scenario concerns municipal participation: under the proposal submitted regarding Article 39(21)(1) of the Law on Electricity, priority could be linked to renewable energy communities or citizens’ energy communities in which a municipality, its institutions, or its undertakings participate, and where at least 20 percent of the installed capacity of the power plants would, within 6 months from receipt of the generation permit, be allocated to reducing energy poverty or supporting vulnerable consumers. For residents, this matters because of the right actually to receive the benefit of electricity, rather than merely becoming financiers without a clear legal position. For project organisers, it matters because of the risks associated with founding documents, permits, contracts, and Council supervision. For municipalities and vulnerable consumers, it matters insofar as the community model can be linked to local public benefit, rather than solely to reducing members’ bills
The regulation was initiated by the drafters of the legislative bills and refined in the Seimas by the Committee on Economics. Its purpose was to provide a legal basis for renewable energy communities in which natural persons, SMEs and municipalities would participate voluntarily through a public institution and jointly generate renewable electricity. The principal arguments were legal certainty and the alignment of the Law on Electricity and the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources; no substantive political objections are apparent from the excerpts provided, with the proposals consisting mainly of technical clarifications.
Does the prosecutor’s public-interest claim concerning a council member’s allegedly unjustified receipt of funds still have an independent subject matter where the amount claimed has been returned to the municipal budget and the prosecutor himself reduced the claim after evidence of activities was submitted.
Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office links prosecutorial intervention not merely to a breach of law, but also to the infringement of state or municipal rights and to the competent authority’s failure to take measures to remedy the breach. Article 49(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the prosecutor the procedural right to bring a claim in defence of the public interest, but that right depends on a substantive need to protect the public interest. Accordingly, the fact that L.
Meilutė-Datkūnienė returned the amount claimed, and that the prosecutor withdrew the claim once the basis for it had fallen away, is legally more significant than the general “receipt scandal” context: the prosecutor’s function here is compensatory, not the maintenance of an abstract political assessment.
In practice, the stronger argument in cases of this kind is not merely to deny that the expenditure was improper, but to reduce the amount claimed on the basis of documentary evidence and to return the funds in good time, since this directly extinguishes the remaining interest protected under Article 19 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. For a lawyer or municipal representative, it is important to distinguish two points: discontinuance of the case following withdrawal of the claim is not a judicial finding that no breach occurred, but it is a strong procedural fact showing that the civil restitutionary claim no longer has an object. In public communications, the risk arises from an overly broad retelling of the prosecutor’s announcement: if the claim had already been withdrawn on 14 July, and in a 15 July announcement the person is still presented as the addressee of a live claim, what requires correction is not political reputation but the specific procedural status and the amount claimed.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the prosecutor, in protecting the public interest in relation to the possible unjustified receipt or saving of municipal budget funds, had grounds to bring a civil claim, and what consequences arise where the amount claimed is repaid before the conclusion of the proceedings. This issue is to be assessed under Article 19(1)–(3) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 49(1)–(5) and Article 50(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office allows a prosecutor to defend the public interest where a breach of a legal act is established that infringes the rights and legitimate interests of a person, society or the State, and the competent municipal institution has failed to take measures to eliminate the breach, or no such institution exists. Article 49(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure grants the prosecutor the right to bring a claim in defence of the public interest in the cases provided for in the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and other laws. Article 50(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a prosecutor who has brought a claim in defence of the public interest has all the procedural rights and duties of a claimant, unless other laws provide otherwise
Legal assessment. In this situation, the basis of the prosecutor’s competence is linked not to a private dispute concerning a politician’s reputation or the accuracy of explanations, but to the protection of municipal budget funds as a matter of public interest. Article 19(3)(1)–(3) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office explains why the prosecutor was entitled to collect documents and information, request inspections and invite persons to provide explanations: these are precisely the powers used to examine a possible breach of the public interest. The report states that the amount was reduced after evidence of activity was submitted, so the situation appears to correspond to the investigative logic described in Article 19(3) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office: the prosecutor’s claim may be based on the data collected and adjusted in light of the documents and explanations submitted. Article 3(2) of the Law Amending the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office is relevant in that the prosecutor adopts decisions independently and individually, acting in accordance with the law and the principle of reasonableness; therefore, the bringing, adjustment or withdrawal of a claim must be linked to a legal basis, not to a political assessment. Paragraph 3 of the same article means that lawful prosecutorial requests to provide documents or information are binding on natural and legal persons, municipal institutions and their employees. If the prosecutor, having brought the claim, had grounds to believe that municipal institutions were improperly performing their duties, Article 19(2) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office required the prosecutor to inform the institution exercising the owner’s rights and duties and allowed the prosecutor to take other measures provided for by law. Article 49(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure is important because a public-interest case connected with the rights of a specific natural person must involve that person in the proceedings in the appropriate procedural capacity. Article 50(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the prosecutor’s procedural conduct to be assessed as the exercise of the claimant’s procedural rights: by bringing the claim, the prosecutor also assumes the claimant’s duties. In its ruling of 4 January 2017 in administrative case No. eAS-65-492/2017, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania emphasised that an applicant defending the public interest is not defending a subjective right belonging to that applicant, but an interest protected by the Constitution and belonging to society or a part of it. In its ruling of 27 October 2014 in civil case No. 3K-7-414/2014, the Supreme Court of Lithuania stated that procedural measures for the protection of the public interest in civil proceedings are a procedural guarantee that the exception to the principle of party disposition will not be extended either as to the persons entitled to invoke it or as to the methods of protection. These cases show that a prosecutor’s claim is not an ordinary creditor’s claim: it must remain within the statutory limits of public-interest protection. At the same time, they confirm that the disappearance of the basis for the claim as a result of voluntary repayment of funds may alter the purpose of the proceedings, since the aim of protecting the public interest is to eliminate the breach, not to continue the dispute in the abstract
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the conclusion of the case in respect of the particular council member if the court adopted a procedural decision to terminate the civil proceedings after the prosecutor no longer had grounds to maintain the claim. The second scenario is an internal municipal assessment, since Article 19(2) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office allows the prosecutor to respond also to possible improper performance of duties by institutions. The third scenario is the continuation of analogous claims against other persons if, in their cases, the breach has not been eliminated and the basis for protecting the public interest under Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office remains. For the defendant, the practical significance is that, once the amount claimed has been repaid and the prosecutor has withdrawn the claim, there is no longer a civil claim on the basis of which this particular case would be examined on the merits. For the municipality, the key point is that the budget funds have been returned, although the very emergence of the dispute may indicate a need to examine whether the institutions took timely measures to eliminate breaches. For the Prosecutor’s Office, this sequence is significant as an example of the proportionality of public-interest protection measures: after data are collected, a claim is brought; after additional evidence is received, it is adjusted; and once the basis has been eliminated, the proceedings are not continued merely for the sake of their formal progression. Article 96¹(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, concerning litigation costs from the budgetary funds allocated to the Prosecutor’s Office, would be relevant if the prosecutor’s claim in defence of the public interest were dismissed in whole or in part. The situation described in this report is not one of dismissal of the claim, but of the disappearance of the basis for the claim and termination of the proceedings; accordingly, the principal legal consequence is not a substantive court ruling on enrichment, but the conclusion of the proceedings in respect of the particular defendant
The contentious point is not the prohibition on non-tobacco-flavoured electronic cigarettes itself, but whether SCRPA decisions concerning the placing of such products on the market can be based on a sufficiently precisely identified infringement regime and evidentiary methodology, where businesses challenge laboratory methods, accreditation and procedures in court. This is particularly important because, since 2022, the amount of unpaid fines has exceeded EUR 103,000, and almost all SCRPA decisions are appealed.
Article 26(1) of the Law on Tobacco Control defines economic sanctions not only as monetary fines, but also as non-monetary sanctions, namely suspension or revocation of a licence. This means that, in the context of repeated infringements, an analysis limited to the amount of the fine is too narrow: the legal risk may also concern the right to continue operating. According to the factual-check source provided, an infringement of the prohibition on the sale of electronic cigarettes and refill containers is linked to Article 16¹(1) of the Law, and the sanction threshold for a repeated infringement is up to EUR 2,896, not EUR 8,000.
Separately, Article 26(11) provides for a fine of EUR 1,500 to EUR 3,000 for breaches of requirements concerning the composition, quality and labelling of electronic cigarettes; therefore, infringements of the sales prohibition and breaches relating to composition or labelling cannot be mechanically merged into a single sanctions category.
The article’s statement that, from 2022 until November 2024, fines amounted to up to EUR 2,000, and that a fine of EUR 8,000 may currently be imposed for a repeated infringement, contradicts the source according to the verification provided. A more accurate formulation would be: for a repeated infringement of the prohibition on the sale of electronic cigarettes and refill containers laid down in Article 16¹(1) of the Law, the applicable fine may amount to up to EUR 2,896, and the sources provided do not contain a specific EUR 8,000 threshold. In addition, if the issue concerns requirements relating to composition, quality or labelling, Article 26(11), with its EUR 1,500 to EUR 3,000 sanction, would be relevant, but that is not the same as an infringement of the sales prohibition.
In practice, the stronger argument for SCRPA will not be a moral claim about an “unfair market”, but the precise legal classification of the infringement under a specific provision of the Law on Tobacco Control and substantiation of the chain of laboratory determination. For businesses, the most promising line of defence, as indicated by the disputes identified by SCRPA itself, remains the reliability of the evidence: the method, accreditation, sampling and procedural shortcomings. For professionals, the key point is not to repeat the EUR 8,000 sanction as an established legal norm when relying on these sources; it is more accurate to cite the sales-prohibition regime under Article 16¹ and the structure of economic sanctions under Article 26, while distinguishing infringements of the sales prohibition from breaches relating to composition, quality and labelling.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the placing on the market of electronic cigarettes and refill containers with prohibited flavours or scents infringes the requirements of Article 9-2 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, the amendment to which entered into force on 1 July 2022 pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Law amending Article 9-2 of Law No. I-1143. This issue is also assessed under Article 26(11) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, which provides for fines for breaches of the composition, quality and labelling requirements applicable to electronic cigarettes. Supervisory competence derives from Article 97(1) of the same law, under which the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority supervises whether the labelling, composition and quality of electronic cigarettes and refill containers comply with statutory requirements. These provisions are to be interpreted systemically in light of Article 1(3) of the law, according to which tobacco products and related products are special products subject to particular state legal regulation. Article 3(2), (6) and (9) of the law show that the purpose of the regulation is to reduce the accessibility of tobacco products and related products, prohibit the promotion of their use, and carry out control and monitoring
Legal assessment. According to the legal material provided, the prohibition is directed at placing products on the market: the assessment of Draft Law No. XIIIP-3849 stated that it was proposed to prohibit the placing on the market of electronic cigarettes and refill containers containing liquid where that liquid contains prohibited additives, including a restriction on flavouring substances, except for tobacco flavour. Since the amendment to Article 9-2 entered into force on 1 July 2022, from that date business operators were required to organise trade so that products with prohibited characteristics would not be supplied to the market. Under Article 97(2) of the law, manufacturers, importers and distributors must collect and retain information on suspected adverse effects of electronic cigarettes and refill containers on human health. Under Article 97(3), they must immediately take corrective action to bring the product into conformity with the requirements of the law, remove it, or recall it from the market. The same provision requires them to inform the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority without delay of any risk to human health and safety, the corrective action taken, and the results of such action. The provisions amending Government Resolution No. 200 supplement this competence: the authorised institution may request additional information from manufacturers, importers and distributors, and also performs functions relating to notifications concerning electronic cigarettes and refill containers placed, or intended to be placed, on the market. If it is established, or there are reasonable grounds to believe, that specific products may pose a serious risk to human health, under Article 98 of the law the authorised institution may temporarily prohibit their placing on the market or apply other market-restriction measures provided for in the Law on Product Safety. In such a case, under Article 98 it must also immediately inform the European Commission and the competent authorities of the parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. For breaches of the composition, quality and labelling requirements applicable to electronic cigarettes, legal persons and branches of foreign legal persons are subject, under Article 26(11), to a fine ranging from EUR 1,500 to EUR 3,000. For a repeated breach within one year of the imposition of the fine, the same paragraph provides for a fine ranging from EUR 4,000 to EUR 8,000. This directly explains the EUR 8,000 threshold mentioned in the report: it is not the general fine for any breach, but the upper limit of the sanction for a repeated breach. The right of economic operators to challenge decisions derives from Article 33(1) of the law, under which a decision imposing an economic sanction may be appealed to a court within one month of its service. Under Article 33(2), bringing proceedings before a court suspends enforcement of the decision imposing the economic sanction. Accordingly, the issue of unpaid fines mentioned in the report is legally connected not only with payment discipline, but also with the statutory suspension of enforcement where a decision is appealed. Under Article 33(3), the court may impose a monetary fine lower than the minimum fine laid down in Article 26 if, having regard to the nature and scale of the breach, mitigating circumstances and other relevant factors, the minimum fine would be manifestly excessive and unjust
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the continuation of administrative supervision: the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority inspects composition, quality and labelling, adopts decisions on sanctions, and business operators appeal them within the one-month time limit. The second scenario is market restriction, where, in addition to a fine, the temporary measures provided for in Article 98 of the law are applied in respect of the placing on the market of specific electronic cigarettes or refill containers. The third scenario is the repetition of breaches within one year of the imposition of a fine, as a result of which the sanction moves into the EUR 4,000 to EUR 8,000 range under Article 26(11). The fourth scenario is the court’s review of the proportionality of the sanction under Article 33(3), which may result in a fine lower than the statutory minimum. For businesses, this is practically important because of the obligation not only to refrain from trading in prohibited products, but also to have an operational procedure for information collection, corrective action, removal or recall from the market under Article 97. For consumers, this is important because the statutory model is based not only on monetary sanctions, but also on the possibility of physically restricting the entry into the market of electronic cigarettes and refill containers that pose a risk. For authorities, this is important because frequent appeals against decisions under Article 33 shift the centre of the dispute to the assessment, by the court, of evidence, investigation procedures and the proportionality of the sanction
The regulation was initiated by the drafters of a bill considered in the Seimas, who sought to exercise stricter control over the market for electronic cigarettes and refill containers, including licensing and flavour restrictions. The objective was to reduce access to products harmful to health and to ensure that the requirements applied not only to trade but also to manufacturing. Supporters relied on the health risks posed by e-cigarettes and the need to regulate the entire supply chain, while objections emphasised that a ban on flavours would in substance affect almost the entire market and that the impact on the rights of the regulated entities would need to be assessed.
Does a consumer’s failure to retain a cash register receipt extinguish their substantive rights in respect of defective goods or improperly supplied services, or does it merely weaken their evidential position in a dispute with the seller?
Article 3 of the Law on Consumer Protection grants consumers the right to goods and services of proper quality, to the protection of infringed rights, to compensation for damage, and to apply to dispute-resolution bodies or the courts. The text provided does not indicate any rule making the receipt a precondition for the very existence of the right. The stronger conclusion is therefore that a purchase document is primarily evidence, not the source of the consumer’s right.
Article 12(1)(5) of the Law on Consumer Protection gives the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority the function of resolving consumer-seller disputes out of court, while Article 44(1) allows the authority, once examination of an infringement has begun, to contact the seller and request a reasoned explanation together with supporting evidence. This means that a dispute is not automatically closed merely because there is no receipt, but the consumer has a weaker initial factual basis for proving the transaction, its date, the price, and the specific seller.
In practice, the stronger argument in the consumer’s favour is not that “without a receipt, the rights do not exist”, but that “the rights exist, although their enforcement depends on proof of the purchase”. It is risky for a seller or its representative to refuse categorically to examine a complaint solely because there is no paper receipt, if the consumer can provide other evidence of purchase, such as an invoice or another document confirming the purchase, as indicated in the news item itself. For the consumer’s representative, the most important step is to record immediately not only the defect in the goods, but also the identifiers of the transaction: the date, payment method, store, product, price, and any electronic or accounting trace.
The position of the State Tax Inspectorate in the news item regarding the seller’s duty to issue a purchase document strengthens not the consumer’s defect claim as such, but an additional line of risk for the business: a failure to issue a receipt may become not only a consumer dispute issue, but also a matter of transparency and regulatory control.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether a consumer who has not retained a cash register receipt or another document confirming the purchase can effectively exercise rights in respect of defective goods, a commercial guarantee, or a consumer dispute. This issue is determined primarily under Article 6.3641, Article 6.3644, and Article 6.22814 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and Articles 3 and 23 of the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania. The significance of the purchase document is directly specified in paragraph 21 of the Retail Trade Rules, under which, when submitting a request for the exchange or return of goods, the consumer must provide a cash register receipt, a sale-purchase receipt, or another document confirming the purchase from that seller. Such a document may also be a VAT invoice, an invoice, a payment card account statement, or a payment card terminal receipt. The issuance of a cash register receipt is not a matter of the seller’s discretion, since paragraph 32.7 of the Rules on the Use of Cash Registers provides for an obligation to hand a new receipt to the person, and paragraph 33 provides for an obligation, at the buyer’s request, additionally to issue an invoice or VAT invoice in the cases established by law. Accordingly, the practical significance of taking the receipt concerns evidence, not the creation of the consumer’s rights themselves
Legal assessment. Article 3(1)(2), (5), and (6) of the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania grants the consumer the right to acquire goods or services of proper quality, to defend infringed rights, and to apply to dispute-resolution authorities or to a court. Article 6.3641(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that, in the case of goods of improper quality, the consumer may require that the proper quality of the goods be ensured, that the price be reduced proportionately, or that the sale-purchase contract be terminated unilaterally. Under Article 6.3641(2) of the Civil Code, the consumer’s primary choice for ensuring proper quality is repair or replacement of the goods, unless such a requirement is impossible or would impose disproportionate costs on the seller. Article 6.3641(3) of the Civil Code gives the seller the right to refuse repair or replacement if the goods cannot be repaired or replaced or if this would entail disproportionate costs. Where the seller does not repair or replace the goods, or reasonably refuses to do so, Article 6.3641(4) of the Civil Code allows the consumer to proceed to a price reduction or termination of the contract. Paragraph 26.8 of the Retail Trade Rules obliges the seller, in the cases established in Articles 6.3641 and 6.3642 of the Civil Code, to replace the goods and to comply with other lawful consumer demands. Paragraph 26.9 of the Retail Trade Rules provides that, where the consumer returns goods of improper quality, the seller must refund the money paid immediately after accepting the goods, and, if the seller does not have the required amount at that time, no later than within 14 calendar days from the date of return of the goods. However, paragraph 21 of the Retail Trade Rules links the consumer’s request for exchange or return to the obligation to provide a document confirming the purchase from the specific seller. If the consumer does not provide such a document, paragraph 22 of the Retail Trade Rules permits the goods to be exchanged, or the other demands stated in the request to be satisfied, only with the seller’s consent. This means that a receipt left behind or lost may in practice weaken the consumer’s position, although alternative documents, such as a card account statement or card terminal receipt, may also confirm the purchase under the Rules. In the case of a commercial guarantee, Article 6.3644(1) of the Civil Code defines it as an additional undertaking by the seller or producer to the consumer to refund the price, replace or repair the goods, or provide maintenance services for them. Article 6.22814(2) of the Civil Code provides that a quality guarantee may not restrict the consumer’s rights established in Article 6.3641 of the Civil Code. Article 6.22814(3) of the Civil Code requires that a commercial guarantee be provided in the state language and clearly indicate the guarantor, the terms, duration, territory, and the information necessary for submitting claims. If the dispute with the seller is not resolved, Article 23(1) of the Law on Consumer Protection allows the consumer to apply in writing or electronically to an authority handling consumer disputes. Under Article 23(2) of the same Law, such application may be made no later than within one year from the date of applying to the seller or service provider. Article 23(3) of the Law on Consumer Protection requires the application to be accompanied by the seller’s response or a copy of the consumer’s complaint, a copy of the consumer contract if it was concluded in writing, and copies of documents confirming the circumstances stated in the application. Accordingly, the receipt or other purchase document becomes important not only in the store, but also in subsequent out-of-court dispute resolution proceedings
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the consumer retains the cash register receipt, invoice, or card document and, upon identifying a defect in the goods, can directly rely on the remedies established in Article 6.3641 of the Civil Code. The second scenario is that the consumer does not retain the receipt but has another document listed in paragraph 21 of the Retail Trade Rules, and therefore can still substantiate the fact of purchase from the specific seller. The third scenario is that the consumer provides no document confirming the purchase, in which case, under paragraph 22 of the Retail Trade Rules, satisfaction of the demand for exchange or return depends on the seller’s consent. The fourth scenario is that the seller refuses to satisfy the demand, and the consumer, within one year from applying to the seller, uses the procedure established in Article 23 of the Law on Consumer Protection for applying to an authority handling consumer disputes. For sellers, this is practically important because of the obligation to issue a purchase document and to comply with lawful consumer demands under paragraphs 26.8 and 26.9 of the Retail Trade Rules. For consumers, this is important because a receipt is not merely an accounting slip: it is one of the principal means of linking the goods, the seller, the purchase date, and the claim subsequently asserted
Where a farm chooses “labour leasing” of third-country nationals instead of direct seasonal employment, the principal legal risk shifts from the fact of illegal work to the proper characterisation of the employment relationship and the submission of qualification or experience documents where such information is assessed in the work permit or labour market needs procedure. This issue is relevant because, as of 1 July 2026, 5,400 foreigners were working in the sector, of whom 4,600 were third-country nationals, while the news item itself indicates a practical shift from individual seasonal contracts towards labour leasing through Lithuanian or foreign companies.
Article 1 of the Law on Employment brings this area not only within the employment support system, but also within the regulation of liability for illegal work, breaches of the rules on the employment of foreigners, and undeclared work. Article 57 of the Law on Employment specifically treats as an infringement an employer’s conduct where, in the assessment of a third-country national’s qualifications or work experience, documents evidencing work-related qualifications and at least one year of experience during the previous three years are not submitted to the Migration Department or the Employment Service. Accordingly, the skills mentioned by grain producers in relation to modern machinery, GPS systems and precision farming are not merely recruitment criteria: if those skills are relied upon in support of a permit or labour market needs compliance procedure, they must be capable of documentary verification and must be submitted.
Article 30¹ of the Law on Employment further indicates that the regime for intermediation in the employment of third-country nationals under an employment contract is clearly distinguished from cases in which work is intended to be performed under a temporary agency work contract. “Labour leasing” therefore cannot be treated mechanically as ordinary intermediation.
The stronger argument in this situation is not that the use of foreign workers in itself distorts competition, but that labour leasing used at the scale of larger farms must be accurately characterised according to the actual model: who the employer is, on what basis the third-country national works in Lithuania, and whether qualification and experience information was submitted to the authority that assessed it. Labour Inspectorate data showing that no illegal work by foreigners was identified in agriculture in Q1 2026 or in 2025 weakens the argument of widespread illegality, but does not reduce the Article 57 documentation risk in respect of lawfully employed third-country nationals. In practice, the most significant mistake for a farm purchasing labour leasing services would be to assume that the agency fully assumes migration compliance risk: if the actual work is skilled, or if the permit procedure relied on experience, there must be a reliable document chain evidencing the worker’s qualifications and experience.
The competition argument for smaller farms should be framed not as an abstract complaint about “cheap labour”, but as a question of regulatory access and oversight: whether the temporary work model gives larger farms a practical advantage by bypassing the administrative complexity expressly identified in the news item.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether agriculture “needs” foreigners, but under what conditions third-country nationals may be lawfully employed in agricultural and forestry work. This issue must be assessed under Article 1(1) and (2), Article 8, Article 30¹, and Article 57 of the Law on Employment of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as under Articles 62¹, 94, and 140²⁴ of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of Aliens. Article 1(1) of the Law on Employment expressly covers liability for illegal work, breaches of the procedure for employing foreigners, and the provision of labour-market services; therefore, farms’ need to hire foreigners falls within the regulatory scope of that law. Article 8 of the Law on Employment is relevant because individual agricultural activity is linked to a natural person who has registered an agricultural holding or a farmer’s farm, or has become a partner. This makes it possible to assess not only agricultural companies but also farmers as potential employers, provided they satisfy the conditions applicable in the relevant employment procedure. The position of EU or EFTA citizens must be distinguished from that of third-country nationals, because Article 1(2) of the Law on Employment separately identifies Lithuanian, EU and EFTA citizens, as well as third-country nationals holding the relevant permit or protection status
Legal assessment. The report states that most foreigners working in the sector are third-country nationals; accordingly, the principal practical burden falls on the employer, not solely on the employee. Under Article 57(1)(1) of the Law on Employment, an employer’s failure to submit documents concerning a third-country national’s qualifications related to the work and at least one year of work experience during the preceding three years, where such qualifications and experience are assessed, constitutes an infringement. The same provision links this obligation to procedures before the Migration Department, when examining an application for a temporary residence permit, or before the Employment Service, when examining an application for a work permit or a decision on whether the work meets the needs of the labour market of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 57(1)(2) of the Law on Employment, during the period of a third-country national’s work in Lithuania, the employer must keep copies of documents granting the right to be present, reside and/or work in the Republic of Lithuania and must provide them, upon request, to the Migration Department or to the institutions specified in Article 55 of the Law on Employment. Therefore, the assertion that the “bureaucratic mechanism” for employing foreigners is complicated for farms legally denotes a specific chain of obligations relating to documents, permits, and assessment of labour-market needs. In the case of seasonal work, Article 62¹(1) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens establishes additional conditions: there must be no suitable worker available in Lithuania, the foreigner’s principal place of residence must be abroad, and the employment contract must be concluded directly with the employer. Article 62¹(1)(4) also links a seasonal work permit to suitable accommodation or an undertaking to provide such accommodation for the duration of the permit. Accordingly, an employer hiring workers for seasonal agricultural work cannot rely solely on an actual need for labour: it must have a legal basis for the work, a contractual relationship, and a documented accommodation arrangement. From the perspective of employee leasing, Article 30¹(1) of the Law on Employment is significant: employment mediation services for third-country nationals under an employment contract are provided by a legal person or its branch specified in the law, except where the intention is to work under a temporary employment contract. Under Article 30¹(2) of the Law on Employment, such a provider must satisfy at least apparent conditions of financial and legal reliability: bankruptcy proceedings must not have been instituted against it, it must not be in liquidation, no creditors’ meeting resolution on out-of-court bankruptcy proceedings must have been adopted, it must not have significant tax arrears, and it must comply with its obligations to customs. A separate regime applies to Ukrainian citizens or other persons entitled to temporary protection: Article 94(1)(4) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens grants the right to work and exempts them from the obligation to obtain a work permit. The threshold for illegal work is defined in Article 140²⁴(1) of the same law: a foreigner’s work or other activity in Lithuania is deemed illegal if the foreigner falls within the cases specified in Article 64(1)–(3), or, as an asylum applicant or a foreigner who has unlawfully crossed the border, works without a foreigner’s registration certificate confirming the right to work and/or without an employment contract. The legal sources also establish a basis of equal treatment: the report under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states that Article 3(2) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens establishes equality of foreigners before the law, irrespective, inter alia, of race, sex, language, religion, or national or social origin
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that larger farms will continue to use the labour of third-country nationals, but their legal risk will be concentrated in proving compliance with documentary, permit, labour-market need, and accommodation requirements. The second scenario is that small and family farms, being unable to administer these procedures themselves, will rely more heavily on employment mediation or temporary work models; however, the criteria in Article 30¹ of the Law on Employment applicable to providers of mediation services limit the participation of unreliable providers. The third scenario is that, in the case of seasonal work, the requirement of a direct employment contract under Article 62¹(1)(3) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens will become the practical dividing line between a mere need for labour and lawfully arranged seasonal employment. The fourth scenario is that, if an employer fails to keep copies of documents confirming the right to be present, reside or work, or fails to provide them to the competent authorities, its conduct will fall within the breach of the procedure for employing foreigners defined in Article 57(1)(2) of the Law on Employment. The fifth scenario is that the employment of Ukrainians or other persons subject to temporary protection may be simpler because of the exemption from a work permit laid down in Article 94(1)(4) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, but this does not remove the importance of documenting the employment contract and other employment-law relationships. The practical significance for farmers is that a labour shortage does not in itself create a right to employ a third-country national: that right arises only through the proper completion of the permit, decision, contract, and document-retention procedure. For the Employment Service, this situation is relevant as an area for assessing labour-market needs and administering employment policy; for the Migration Department, it is relevant as part of temporary residence permit procedures. The legal consequence for the labour market is not a prohibition on agriculture relying on foreigners, but an obligation to distinguish lawful work by third-country nationals from illegal work under Article 140²⁴ of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens
Are the purposes of data processing and the scope of data specified in the privacy policy of the Vilnius City Municipality Administration’s website sufficiently defined where visitors’ data may be used not only for enquiries and service quality, but also for direct marketing?
Article 3 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data establishes the controller’s obligation to ensure that personal data are collected for “specified and legitimate purposes”, determined before the data are collected, and are limited to the scope necessary for the purpose of processing. The privacy policy provided indicates that the Administration identifies a broad range of data categories: IP address, browser type, number of visits, pages viewed, time spent on the website, demographic data, as well as name, age, gender, education, email address and message content. The weakest point is the direct marketing purpose: under the provision cited, merely naming the purpose does not answer which of these data are necessary specifically for that purpose, or how marketing by a public administration body differs from providing information about municipal services.
In practice, the stronger argument would not be that the municipality is altogether unable to process website visitors’ data, but that each purpose must be distinguished by reference to specific data categories and necessity. For a professional audience, it is worth citing precisely the Article 3 requirement concerning purposes defined in advance and the necessary scope of data, because the policy provided combines very different regimes: cookie analytics, data from public consultations or surveys, administration of enquiries, and direct marketing. The risk for the municipality arises where “demographic data”, “message content” or other data provided by a visitor are in fact used for a broader purpose than the visitor could have understood when submitting a specific enquiry or taking part in a consultation.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the Wooden Šnipiškės urban study itself, but how the Vilnius City Municipality Administration, when publishing and administering information on the website vilnius.lt, must process the personal data of website visitors. The issue is assessed under Article 24 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the responsibility of the controller, Article 25 on data protection by design and by default, Article 29 on processing under the authority of the controller or processor, Article 38(3)-(5) on the independence of the data protection officer and contacts by data subjects, as well as Article 14(2) on information concerning retention periods, rights and the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority. Also relevant is point 25 of Resolution No. 480 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 18 April 2003, under which the “Personal Data Protection” section of an institution’s website must publish the personal data processing rules, the procedure for exercising data subject rights, request forms and the contact details of the data protection officer. Recital 78 of the GDPR explains these obligations as a duty to have internal policies, transparent processing, data minimisation and measures enabling the data subject to monitor processing
Legal assessment. The Vilnius City Municipality Administration is identified in the privacy policy as the controller of website visitors’ personal data; therefore, under Article 24(1) of the GDPR, it must not only process data in accordance with the Regulation, but also be able to demonstrate such compliance. Since the website provides for the collection of data through cookies, electronic services, surveys, public consultations, voting and enquiries, the nature of the processing covers both automatically generated browsing data and identification and content data submitted by the visitor. Article 25(2) of the GDPR means that, by default, only data necessary for the specific purpose may be processed, including as regards the amount of data, the extent of processing, the storage period and accessibility. Accordingly, the purposes stated in the privacy policy must operate as limits: administration of enquiries, assessment, assurance and improvement of the quality of public administration and online services, as well as direct marketing. Article 14(2)(a), (c), (d) and (e) of the GDPR establish the obligation to provide the visitor with information on the retention period or the criteria used to determine it, the rights of access, rectification, erasure, restriction of processing, objection, data portability, withdrawal of consent and lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority. The statement in the privacy policy that data processed for direct marketing purposes are stored until opt-out or withdrawal of consent is consistent with the logic of withdrawal of consent embedded in Article 14(2)(d) of the GDPR. However, under Article 24(1) of the GDPR, declarations alone are not sufficient: the administration must have appropriate technical and organisational measures in place and must review and update them where necessary. This obligation is reinforced by Recital 78 of the GDPR, which emphasises internal policies, transparency, data minimisation, and data protection by design and by default. Where the administration engages information technology, data storage, telecommunications or other service providers, Article 29 of the GDPR is relevant: the processor and persons acting under its authority may not process data without instructions from the controller, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law. Therefore, the privacy policy provision stating that processors may not use data collected on the website for purposes other than providing services to the administration directly aligns with the controller-instruction principle under Article 29 of the GDPR. The role of the data protection officer is not merely formal: under Article 38(3) of the GDPR, the officer may not receive instructions regarding the performance of their tasks, may not be penalised for performing them, and reports directly to the highest management level. Under Article 38(4) of the GDPR, a visitor may contact the data protection officer on all matters relating to the processing of their personal data and the exercise of their rights. Under Article 38(5) of the GDPR, the officer must ensure secrecy or confidentiality; therefore, enquiries concerning the processing of website data must be handled without breaching that obligation. Point 25 of Government Resolution No. 480 practically supplements this framework: the municipality’s website must clearly publish the personal data processing rules, the procedure for exercising rights, request forms and the officer’s contact details. If a website visitor exercises the right to contact the administration, the procedure set out in the privacy policy covers contact in person, by post or by email where the request is signed with an electronic signature. If the person disagrees with the response of the administration or the data protection officer, according to the privacy policy provided, they may contact the State Data Protection Inspectorate, and this right corresponds to Article 14(2)(e) of the GDPR concerning complaints to a supervisory authority
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the ordinary one: the municipality publishes the results of the urban study, and website visitors’ data are processed only according to the published purposes, limited retention periods and access controls. The second scenario is relevant to a more active visitor: if they participate in a survey, public consultation or vote, or write to the administration, the data they submit become part of a specific administration or service-quality assurance process. The third scenario concerns direct marketing: once a visitor withdraws consent or opts out of notifications, processing for that purpose may no longer continue under the retention limit stated in the policy itself. The fourth scenario is the dispute pathway: the visitor first exercises their rights before the administration or contacts the data protection officer, and, if they disagree with the response, contacts the State Data Protection Inspectorate. This is practically important for residents who read the study results or participate in related municipal processes, because their name, email address, message content, survey data or information collected through cookies must be processed for a clearly defined purpose. It is also important for the municipality, because under Article 24 of the GDPR it must be able to demonstrate compliance, under Article 25 it must limit the scope of the data processed, under Article 29 it must control processors, and under Article 38 it must ensure a genuinely functioning data protection officer channel
The specific question is when a politician’s public statements on a social network and during a sitting of the Seimas cross the boundaries of freedom of expression and become public ridicule, contempt and incitement to hatred under Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code, as well as gross trivialisation of the Holocaust in an abusive or insulting manner under Article 170² of the Criminal Code.
Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code criminalises not abstractly “harsh” or politically provocative speech, but public ridicule, contempt, incitement to hatred or incitement to discrimination against a group of persons on grounds including nationality. Article 170²(1) of the Criminal Code requires an additional threshold: denial or gross trivialisation of international crimes, including the crimes of Nazi Germany, is punishable where it is committed in a threatening, abusive or insulting manner, or where public order has been or could have been disturbed as a result. Article 54 of the Criminal Code is relevant to increasing the sentence, as it permits assessment of the dangerousness of the act, motives, the offender’s personality and the harm caused; it is in this context that the Court of Appeal placed the continuity of seven episodes, aggressive rhetoric, distortion of historical facts, the politician’s status, and harm to the prestige and security interests of the State.
In criminal case No. 1A-214-626/2026, the Lithuanian Court of Appeal adopted a stricter assessment than the court of first instance: it classified not one but three Facebook texts as grossly trivialising the Holocaust, and increased fines of EUR 5,000 and EUR 4,000 to EUR 10,000 and EUR 9,000, imposing an aggregate final fine of EUR 10,000. The available information does not show whether such practice is settled at cassation level, but this case demonstrates the appellate court’s emphasis on systematic conduct and the status of a public figure as arguments for increasing the sentence.
The article’s statement that the judgment of the Court of Appeal may be appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Lithuania within three months is, according to the fact-checking note provided, incomplete, because Article 345 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides not only for a general three-month time limit, but also for a one-month exception for certain appellate rulings. A more precise formulation would be: the time limit for lodging an appeal on points of law is usually three months from the entry into force of the contested procedural decision, but the applicable time limit must be verified by reference to the specific procedural code, the type of procedural act and any special exceptions. In this context, it is particularly important not to turn an informational phrase about a deadline into a universal procedural rule, because an error as to the deadline may mean the loss of the right to cassation.
In practice, the stronger argument is becoming not “political hyperbole” or freedom of expression, but systematic conduct, dehumanising rhetoric and distortion of historical facts where speech is directed at a group identified on national grounds. For the defence in cassation, the most rational approach would be to focus not on the general right to criticise historical or political events, but on whether the specific phrases met the threshold of “gross trivialisation” and an “abusive or insulting manner” under Article 170² of the Criminal Code, and whether the criteria in Article 54 of the Criminal Code were used to increase the sentence excessively. For prosecutors and representatives of affected communities, this case provides a clear practical framework: collect not an isolated quotation, but a sequence of episodes, the audience, the status of the speaker, the nature of the rhetoric and the potential harm to State interests.
Core issue. The precise question is whether R. Žemaitaitis’s public statements on a social network and during a plenary sitting of the Seimas constitute two separate criminal offences: incitement to hatred under Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and public gross trivialisation of the crimes of Nazi Germany under Article 170²(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code applies to a person who publicly ridicules, expresses contempt for, incites hatred against, or incites discrimination against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group, inter alia on grounds of nationality, origin, ethnic origin, belief or religion. Article 170²(1) of the Criminal Code applies to a person who publicly condones, denies, or grossly trivialises genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or crimes committed by the USSR or Nazi Germany, where this is done in a threatening, abusive, or insulting manner, or where public order was or could have been disturbed as a result. These provisions restrict not views as such, but public conduct which, according to the statutory elements, develops into ridicule, contempt, incitement to hatred, or gross trivialisation of historical international crimes in an abusive or insulting form. The procedural issue of the cassation time limit must be resolved under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, as Article 99 defines the purpose of procedural time limits, while Article 100 lays down their calculation in hours, days, and months
Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the Court of Appeal of Lithuania, in criminal case No. 1A-214-626/2026, found that guilt was confirmed by the testimony of the convicted person and witnesses, expert and specialist opinions, inspection reports, photographs, and other written evidence. This is significant for the application of Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code, because the court treated both posts on a personal Facebook account and speech during a plenary sitting of the Seimas as public statements. The protected characteristic in this situation is a group of persons and persons belonging to it on grounds of Jewish nationality, and the acts established by the court consisted of public ridicule, contempt, and incitement to hatred. The court emphasised that the descriptions used, insulting labels, and dehumanising metaphors degraded the dignity and honour of a section of society distinguished on national grounds, and therefore the boundary of freedom of expression had been crossed within the meaning of criminal law. From the perspective of Article 170²(1) of the Criminal Code, it is significant that the court found not one but three consecutively published texts to have grossly trivialised the Holocaust. Under this provision, historical or political polemic is not analysed in the abstract: it is necessary to establish public condoning, denial, or gross trivialisation, and its threatening, abusive, or insulting character, or the possibility of disturbance of public order. In case No. 1A-214-626/2026, the Court of Appeal stated that the texts communicated not actual facts of the relevant period, but a fabricated “Lithuanian Holocaust”; linked the actions of Jewish partisans with systematic Soviet repressions; and created the premise that Jews themselves contributed to the deportation and destruction of Lithuanians. For the individualisation of the sentence, the court considered the following factors significant: continuity and systematic conduct; seven episodes in total; the aggressiveness of the rhetoric; the deliberate distortion of historical facts; the status of a state politician; and harm to Lithuania’s international prestige and state security interests. Accordingly, the fine of EUR 5,000 for incitement to hatred under Article 170 of the Criminal Code was increased to EUR 10,000, and, for Holocaust trivialisation under Article 170²(1) of the Criminal Code, a fine of EUR 9,000 was imposed instead of EUR 4,000. After aggregation of the penalties, the final fine was set at EUR 10,000, meaning that, at the level of the totality of penalties, the court left one final monetary sanction. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits participants in proceedings and other persons, on their own initiative, to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence, which corresponds to the nature of the case, in which posts, inspection data, photographs, and written evidence were significant. Article 100(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure mean that the three-month time limit for filing a cassation appeal is calculated excluding the day on which the time limit begins, and expires on the corresponding day of the final month
Consequences. Since the judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered on 22 July 2026 and became final on the same day, it already produces the consequences of conviction and of the imposed EUR 10,000 fine. Under Article 100(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the three-month time limit calculated from 22 July 2026 would expire on 22 October 2026; if the procedural act is performed before a court, then under Article 100(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it must be performed before the end of the established working hours. The realistic first scenario is a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of Lithuania, in which the practical significance would lie in the interpretation of the elements of Article 170(2) and Article 170²(1) of the Criminal Code in the context of public statements by a politician. The second scenario is that the judgment is left without further cassation review, or is not amended, as a result of which the boundary established by the Court of Appeal between permissible expression and criminally punishable incitement to hatred and Holocaust trivialisation would remain in practical effect. The third scenario would be an adjustment of the sentence or legal classification on cassation, but such an assessment is possible only by reference to the elements of the provisions cited and the publicity, content, continuity, abusive nature, and insulting character indicated in the case materials. This case is of practical importance for politicians speaking publicly, the media, and social media users, because it shows that the public nature of personal accounts and parliamentary speech may be assessed under Articles 170 and 170² of the Criminal Code. It is also important for prosecutors and courts, because the Court of Appeal emphasised not an isolated phrase, but a sequence of episodes, the systematic nature of the rhetoric, and the deliberate distortion of historical facts. For victimised or targeted groups, the practical significance is that criminal law protects not only against direct incitement to violence, but also against public contempt, humiliation, incitement to hatred, and the trivialisation of international crimes in an abusive or insulting manner
The specific point of dispute is whether the flow of more than 23,000 attempted unlawful entries organised by the Belarusian regime since 2021 can be characterised as a breach of the state’s obligations under the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, rather than merely as a political or border-security crisis. Russia’s intervention as a third party does not alter the principal addressee of responsibility, but shifts the emphasis to the limits of interpretation of the Protocol.
In the news item provided, the direct legal basis is the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as invoked by Lithuania. On the facts presented, Lithuania links this normative framework not to isolated acts by migrants, but to the involvement of the state apparatus: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that it has evidence that the Belarusian regime directly organised migrant flows and that Belarusian border services refused to cooperate with Lithuanian authorities. The Lithuanian administrative procedure rules cited are not applicable to this dispute, because they regulate domestic administrative disputes, representation and the rights of parties in proceedings before Lithuanian administrative courts, not an inter-state dispute before the International Court of Justice.
The conclusion must therefore rest on the treaty basis identified in the news item itself and on the general principle that the intervention of a third state in such a case is primarily an argument concerning treaty interpretation, not an independent rebuttal of Lithuania’s factual evidence.
In practice, Lithuania’s stronger argument will not be the general narrative of a “hybrid attack”, but the narrower evidential case that the actions of Belarusian authorities fall within the regulatory field protected by the Protocol: organised migrant smuggling, the involvement of state officials and refusal to cooperate. Russia’s position indicates the likely line of defence: to argue that Lithuania is stretching the Protocol too far and turning an instrument for combating organised crime into a case about geopolitical responsibility. Lithuania’s procedural risk therefore lies in framing the case too broadly; the more it relies on specific acts by Belarusian services, the flow that began in 2021 and the scale of more than 23,000 persons denied entry, the harder it will be to reduce the dispute to criticism of “lawfare”.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not an assessment of Russia’s political motives, but how, in an inter-State case initiated by Lithuania before an international judicial body, State representation, preparation of the position, and implementation of the decision must be organised. According to the sources provided, the applicable rules are points 1, 6, 7, 8, 9.1, 9.3, 14, and 19 of the Rules, approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, on Representation of the State before the European Court of Human Rights and Other International Judicial or Dispute-Resolution Institutions. In the sources provided, the model for referring a dispute to the International Court of Justice is defined by Article 38 and Article IV of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Ratification of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees: disputes concerning the interpretation or application of those international instruments which cannot be resolved by other means are referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any party to the dispute. Lithuanian domestic rules on administrative disputes may be used only as an analogous example of the definition of procedural roles: Article 13(1) of the Law on the Procedure for Pre-trial Examination of Administrative Disputes distinguishes between the applicant, the respondent, and third interested persons, while treating only the applicant and the respondent as parties to the dispute
Legal assessment. In this situation, according to the report, Lithuania is the State that initiated the case, Belarus is the respondent, and Russia’s intervention “as a third party” does not alter the principal bilateral axis of the dispute. This is confirmed by the logic of Article 13(1) of the Law on the Procedure for Pre-trial Examination of Administrative Disputes: a third interested person is a person whose rights or obligations may be affected by the decision, but the parties to the dispute remain the applicant and the respondent. In the context of an international case, Lithuania’s procedural response must first be organised under point 1 of the Rules on Representation, because those Rules regulate representation before institutions whose jurisdiction has been recognised by the Republic of Lithuania. Point 9.1 of the Rules on Representation grants the Permanent Representative or the representative in cases the right, on behalf of the State, to prepare and submit procedural documents, participate in hearings, and perform all procedural acts in inter-State cases initiated by the Republic of Lithuania. The same provision permits representatives of other competent institutions, advisers, experts, and lawyers to be invited to participate, meaning that Russia’s intervention may in practice lead to broader involvement of Lithuanian institutions and experts in the procedural defence. Point 8 of the Rules on Representation additionally allows the institution representing the State to engage Lithuanian and foreign lawyers or experts in other fields where this is necessary for the proper and effective defence of the State’s interests. The position in such a case must be coordinated under point 14 of the Rules on Representation, because that provision expressly refers to an inter-State case in which the Republic of Lithuania is the applicant or respondent, and to a case in which the Republic of Lithuania intervenes as a third party. Under point 14, the Permanent Representative coordinates the draft position in the case also with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania; accordingly, the role of the MFA here is not merely communicative but also one of procedural coordination. Point 9.3 of the Rules on Representation shows that third-party participation in an international case is recognised as a separate procedural institute, since Lithuania’s representative may submit requests to participate in a case as a third party. The sources provided contain no case law, so the application analysis is based solely on the normative framework. Articles 20 and 21 of the Law on Mediation are not directly applicable to this inter-State case as a mandatory mediation mechanism, because Article 20(1) links mandatory mediation to civil disputes, especially family disputes and other cases prescribed by law. Nevertheless, point 9.2 of the Rules on Representation shows that negotiations on a friendly settlement may be conducted in international cases where the case is against the Republic of Lithuania; in the regulatory framework provided, the friendly-settlement procedure for Lithuania as applicant is not developed in detail. The time limits in Article 33 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings concerning acceptance of a complaint before a Lithuanian administrative court are not procedural time limits for this ICJ case. A relevant time limit in the sources provided would arise later: under point 19 of the Rules on Representation, competent institutions must submit an implementation plan within one month from the date of receipt of notice of the adopted decision
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that Russia’s participation increases the procedural complexity of the case, because Lithuania will have to address not only Belarus’s objections but also the third party’s arguments concerning the interpretation of the applicable international treaties. The second scenario is that Lithuania’s position will be subject to additional coordination at institutional level, especially with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under point 14 of the Rules on Representation. The third scenario is that the institution representing the State will engage additional experts under points 8 and 9.1 of the Rules on Representation, because, according to the report, the dispute involves evidence concerning actions of State institutions and inter-State obligations. The practical significance for Lithuania is that the case becomes not only a matter of responsibility vis-à-vis Belarus, but also a dispute concerning the interpretation of international treaties, in which the third party’s position may affect the direction of the Court’s reasoning. The practical significance for State institutions would arise after the decision: under point 19 of the Rules on Representation, they would have to prepare an implementation plan and report on progress. For the public, the most important point is that, under points 6 and 7 of the Rules on Representation, the institution representing the State must publish information about cases and, by 1 March each year, publish an activity report, insofar as this does not interfere with confidentiality. Thus, Russia’s intervention does not alter Lithuania’s obligation to pursue responsibility in the case, but it strengthens the need to formulate Lithuania’s procedural position precisely and to prepare for a broader dispute concerning the interpretation of an international treaty
The specific question is whether the leaking of examination papers can be characterised as ordinary “fraud”, or whether it is necessary to prove an independent mechanism by which the examination system was compromised, the specific documents involved, and the connection between responsible persons and the leak.
The cited Article 108 of the ANK links fraud to the value of stolen, acquired, appropriated or squandered property not exceeding three basic penalty and fine units. Accordingly, that provision is not, in itself, suited to covering the harm caused by the mass leaking of examination papers. The harm referred to in the news report is systemic: more than two million candidates had to retake the medical entrance examination, while another dispute affected the assessment of almost two million school pupils.
Article 98 of the BPK points to a different and more important procedural logic: objects and documents relevant to the investigation and adjudication of a criminal offence may be submitted on the initiative of participants in the proceedings and other persons. The promise of “fast-track courts” is therefore not a legal substitute for evidence; it may shorten the path of the case, but it does not remove the obligation to link, through documents, the leaked papers, their recipients, distributors, and institutional decisions on resitting the examination.
The stronger argument in this situation is not the general political claim of “fraud in examinations”, but an argument based on the evidentiary chain and special regulation: who had access to the papers, when they were leaked, how they were used, and what procedural decision resulted. Practitioners should avoid repeating an analogy with “minor fraud” of the Article 108 ANK type, because it is too narrow for harm caused to a mass examination system and may mislead as to the scale of the sanction. If fast-track courts are established in India, the main risk will be that political pressure to punish after the protests may expand liability without a clear individual link to a specific leak.
The procedural anchor to cite is the logic of Article 98 of the BPK: the success of the case will depend on the submission and assessment of relevant documents and objects, not merely on an institutional promise to “show no mercy”.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the leakage of examination tasks and conduct encouraging cheating in the process of science or studies should be assessed as a breach of academic ethics, an administrative offence, or a matter of criminal liability. It is resolved under Article 1, Article 4(2), Article 67 and Article 71 of the Law on Science and Studies of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as under the provisions on the application and entry into force of that law set out in Article 2 of the Law Amending Law No. XI-242 on Science and Studies of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 19 of the 2024 amending law. The content of academic ethics is expressly defined in Article 4(2) of the Law on Science and Studies: it is associated with transparency, integrity, fairness, responsibility, equality of persons, trust, and impartiality in the assessment of science and studies. Accordingly, under the provisions provided, the leakage of examination tasks primarily raises the issue of protecting the transparency of the study process and the impartiality of assessment. At the same time, the regulatory source concerning amendments to Article 190 of the Criminal Code and Article 50 of the Code of Administrative Offences indicates a principled boundary: fraud is regarded as essentially criminal conduct, while administrative liability applies to less dangerous acts
Legal assessment. Article 1 of the Law on Science and Studies defines the purpose of the law in a manner that covers state regulation of science and studies, quality assurance principles, institutional governance, organisation and supervision of activities, as well as the rights and duties of students and staff. This means that, under the sources provided, the reliability of examinations is not merely a technical assessment issue, because it falls within the areas of study quality, institutional organisation, and academic ethics. Article 4(2) of the Law on Science and Studies covers precisely those values that are infringed when tasks are leaked: integrity, transparency, fairness, equality, and impartiality of assessment. If an examination becomes known in advance to some candidates or students, the legal problem arises not only from the unfair result, but also from the loss of equal conditions for all participants. Article 67 of the Law on Science and Studies indicates that institutions must have the administration and staff necessary to implement study objectives, and that administrative bodies may, within their competence, issue binding instructions to subordinates. Therefore, at institutional level, the duty would be to organise the study and examination process in such a way as to implement study objectives and ensure proper order. The statute of Šiauliai State College provided additionally shows that an institution may establish internal work procedures, the rights and duties of employees, study programmes, and may also admit and expel students and auditors. The provisions of the statute of Panevėžys College clearly establish students’ duties: to comply with the Code of Academic Ethics, to implement lawful decisions of lecturers, research staff and governing bodies, and to comply with the Law on Science and Studies, the statute, other legal acts and internal rules of procedure. This provides a basis for academic measures against a student or another member of the academic community where their conduct is connected with dishonest examination practices. Paragraphs 37–38 of the statutes of the Lithuanian Institute of History and paragraph 36 of the statutes of the Lithuanian Culture Research Institute confirm that liability for breaches of academic ethics is linked to Article 71(5) of the Law on Science and Studies, although the excerpt provided does not set out the procedure under that paragraph in detail. The sources provided concerning draft Administrative Offences Code No. XIIIP-498 are important because they do not permit liability to be expanded solely on the basis of moral reprehensibility: administrative liability cannot be based solely on preparation or attempt where the code does not provide for such stages. The same source emphasises that the mere transfer of a written paper to another person, in the absence of the fact that it was submitted to a science or study institution as one’s own, is not in itself regarded as sufficiently dangerous to give rise to administrative liability. This reasoning is also applicable to examination breaches: intermediate acts alone must be distinguished from actual dishonest use or from a level of dangerousness that would justify liability. On the other hand, the source concerning amendments to Article 190 of the Criminal Code and Article 50 of the Code of Administrative Offences clearly identifies fraud as essentially criminal conduct; therefore, the organised leakage and use of tasks in order to obtain a result by deception would, under the principle provided, be closer to the sphere of criminal liability than to administrative liability alone. The competence of institutions under the sources provided is twofold: a science and study institution manages the study process, academic ethics and internal consequences, while the issue of penalties for fraud belongs to the sphere of public liability. As regards timing, it is important that the principal dates of entry into force provided in Article 2 of the Law Amending Law No. XI-242 on Science and Studies have already passed: 1 January 2017, 1 March 2017 and 1 September 2018. Likewise, the entry-into-force dates specified in Article 19 of the 2024 amending law, namely 1 September 2024 and 1 January 2025, had already passed by 23 July 2026; therefore, these provisions are to be assessed as part of the context of the applicable regulatory framework insofar as they relate to the issue presented
Consequences. The first practical scenario would be academic: the institution investigates whether academic ethics were breached, whether students and employees complied with internal procedures, and applies the measures provided for in the statutes and internal rules. The second scenario would concern public liability: if the conduct is classified as fraud, the regulatory source provided points towards the logic of criminal liability rather than merely an administrative penalty. The third scenario would be borderline: where only acts of preparation, information drafting or transfer are established, without sufficient dangerousness and without actual use within a study institution, the sources provided caution that imposing administrative liability solely for that stage would not comply with the principle of legality. For students and candidates, this is practically important because of the risks concerning the validity of results, retaking examinations, expulsion, or other internal sanctions. For science and study institutions, it is important because of their duty to ensure transparent, honest and impartial assessment under Article 1 and Article 4(2) of the Law on Science and Studies. For the State, it is important because of the boundary of liability: a breach of academic ethics may be addressed institutionally, but fraud, where it is dangerous to protected values, crosses the boundary of administrative liability under the sources provided
Does the United States’ revocation of the Iranian oil sanctions waiver and the attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz create a direct sanctions compliance obligation for Lithuanian entities, or, for the time being, merely an energy supply risk to be assessed by the competent authorities?
Article 3 of the Law on the Implementation of International Sanctions provides that Lithuania implements international sanctions imposing economic, financial, political, transport, social and other restrictions or obligations. The sanctions concept presented specifically classifies trade and economic embargoes, restrictions on financial payments, and the suspension of transport links, including maritime transport, as types of sanctions. Accordingly, the legally relevant issue is not the increase in the price of Brent crude to approximately USD 79 per barrel, but whether restrictions on Iranian oil, shipping, insurance, payments or cargo transportation fall within an international sanctions regime implemented in Lithuania.
Article 13(1) of the Law on Energy assigns to the Lithuanian Energy Agency the function of collecting and systematising data and providing analysis of the energy sector to the Ministry of Energy. A supply shock is therefore also a matter of regulatory monitoring, not merely commercial pricing.
The stronger argument at present is that, for Lithuanian entities, the mere fact that the United States has revoked a sanctions waiver is not in itself sufficient to establish a breach of Lithuanian sanctions law, unless it is shown that the restriction is implemented through an international sanctions regime applied by Lithuania. The practical risk, however, lies in the transaction chain: oil, LNG, fertiliser feedstocks, cargo transportation, vessel insurance and payments may be affected by different types of sanctions, so checking only the origin of goods is no longer sufficient. A professional should cite not the market price reaction, but the catalogue of sanctions types in Article 3 of the Law on the Implementation of International Sanctions, and verify whether the specific transaction contains an economic, financial or transport restriction element.
For participants in the energy sector, it would be a mistake to treat the situation solely as a supply price issue: under the logic of Article 13(1) of the Law on Energy, state analysis must cover sectoral data, so contracts and risk management should separately record scenarios involving sanctions, transport routes and loss of supply.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the change in the price of oil, but the obligations arising for Lithuanian natural and legal persons from transactions involving oil, liquefied natural gas, carriage of cargo, or strategic goods, where such transactions fall within the scope of international sanctions implemented in Lithuania. This issue is to be assessed under Article 2(3), Article 3(1)-(3), Article 4(1)-(4), and Article 6(1)-(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions. Issues concerning the validity and performance of transactions are to be assessed under Article 7(1)-(5) of the Law Amending Law No. IX-2160 of the Republic of Lithuania on the Implementation of Economic and Other International Sanctions. Where the activity concerns military equipment or dual-use goods, Article 2 and Article 10(1) of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Control of Strategic Goods apply. In cases of infringements of regulated activities by energy undertakings, Article 36 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Energy is relevant, and, in the most serious cases, Article 123(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. Under Article 2(3) of the Law on International Sanctions, international sanctions constitute the aggregate of restrictions and obligations established by European Union legal acts, resolutions of the United Nations, and decisions of other international organisations relevant to the Republic of Lithuania. Accordingly, the US decision mentioned in the report concerning an exception to sanctions on Iranian oil would be legally determinative for Lithuanian entities under the cited provisions only where the relevant restriction is implemented in Lithuania as an international sanction within the meaning of that statutory definition. Article 6(1) of the Law on International Sanctions provides that directly applicable European Union legal acts are implemented in full, while Article 6(2) provides that sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council resolutions are implemented in Lithuania in full and directly. Under Article 3(1) of the same law, a Government resolution determines which sanctions are implemented, their duration, conditions, possible exemptions, and the persons to whom they apply. Article 3(3) means that the specific prohibited or mandatory acts applicable to Lithuanian natural and legal persons must be defined in the sanctions implementation act. Article 4(1)-(2) of the Law on International Sanctions establishes a general obligation for all natural and legal persons to comply with sanctions implemented in Lithuania, to take mandatory actions, and to refrain from actions that would breach or circumvent the restrictions. If a transaction involving oil, LNG, fertiliser raw materials, or carriage of cargo were contrary to sanctions implemented in Lithuania, a new transaction would be null and void under Article 7(1) of the amending law. Under Article 7(2), during the sanctions period it is prohibited to perform already concluded transactions and obligations where such performance is contrary to the sanctions. Under Article 7(3), transactions that arose before the implementation of sanctions must be immediately terminated unilaterally or by agreement of the parties, or their performance must be suspended for the sanctions period. Article 7(4) protects persons from civil liability for non-performance where such non-performance results from the implementation of international sanctions, while Article 7(5) provides that losses caused by lawful acts of state or municipal authorities are not compensated. In the field of strategic goods, Article 2 of the Law Amending the Law on the Control of Strategic Goods provides that the law applies to the export, import, transit, brokering, entry, and transfer within the European Union of military equipment, as well as to the export, transfer, transit, and brokering of dual-use goods. Under Article 10(1)(1), a licence is not issued where its issuance would be contrary to sanctions, international treaties, non-proliferation agreements, foreign policy interests, or national security interests. For energy undertakings, it is relevant that Article 36(1) of the Law on Energy permits the Council to impose fines for breaches of the conditions of regulated activities, failure to comply with the Council’s obligations, or failure to provide information. The criminal threshold arises under Article 123(1)(1) of the Criminal Code where a breach of international sanctions implemented in Lithuania causes substantial damage to the interests of the Republic of Lithuania; under paragraph 2, a legal person is also liable for such an offence
Consequences. The first practical scenario is that a Lithuanian undertaking reviews contracts concerning oil, LNG, fertiliser raw materials, maritime transport, or brokering and, where performance is contrary to sanctions implemented in Lithuania, suspends or terminates the obligations under Article 7(3) of the amending law. The second scenario is that new transactions with a sanctioned person, territory, or activity are not concluded, because under Article 7(1) they would be null and void. The third scenario is that, where supply or brokering involves strategic goods, the licensing issue becomes central, because under Article 10(1)(1) of the Law Amending the Law on the Control of Strategic Goods a licence contrary to sanctions is not issued. The fourth scenario is that energy undertakings may face supervisory and sanctions risk from the Council under Article 36 of the Law on Energy if they breach the conditions of regulated activities or fail to comply with the Council’s instructions. The fifth scenario is that a breach of sanctions causing substantial damage to the interests of the Republic of Lithuania may cross into the realm of criminal liability under Article 123(1) of the Criminal Code. This is practically significant for importers, carriers, energy undertakings, financiers, and intermediaries, because their legal risk arises not from the market price itself, but from whether the specific transaction, payment, cargo, licence, or performance of services falls within the scope of prohibitions under sanctions implemented in Lithuania
The regulation was initiated by the Government, through the Ministry of Energy, with the aim of reducing the administrative burden, improving conditions for consumers, implementing EU renewable energy requirements, and regulating more clearly matters concerning energy infrastructure and nuclear safety. The main arguments were the faster development of renewable resources, clearer permitting and supervision procedures, modernisation of the energy system, and the elimination of gaps in the legal framework. The excerpts provided do not indicate any substantive political or committee objections; the emphasis is on technical and administrative refinements to the regulation.
Whether the draft Government Programme registered in the Seimas on 3 July 2026 may be regarded as a lawful submission of the Government Programme if the decree of the President of the Republic approving the composition of the XXI Government was signed only on 6 July 2026.
The provisions provided do not directly disclose any rule governing the sequence for submitting the Government Programme itself; therefore, a conclusion that the procedure was breached cannot be based on this body of material alone. However, Article 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court clearly defines the institution that “guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania” and decides whether acts adopted by the Seimas are contrary to the Constitution, as well as whether acts of the President of the Republic and the Government are contrary to the Constitution or laws. This means that the core of the dispute is not merely a technical question of registration, but a question of constitutional competence and of the moment at which the relevant constitutional subject comes into existence.
Article 21 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings links the competence of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania to the legality of regulatory administrative acts; accordingly, on the evidence provided, the stronger forum argument is an application to the Constitutional Court rather than an administrative dispute.
In practice, the stronger argument for the opposition is not that the programme was presented at a sitting of the Seimas at the wrong time, but that the act of registration on 3 July may have been attributed to a constitutional subject that had not yet been formed. The Prime Minister’s counterargument that the programme was presented only after the decree of 6 July would be material only if the legally decisive moment is considered to be the presentation at a sitting of the Seimas, rather than the submission or registration of the draft. For a professional audience, it is worth distinguishing precisely between “registration”, “submission” and “presentation”, because different legal characterisations of these concepts may lead to entirely different outcomes.
If an application to the Constitutional Court is being prepared, its axis should not be political rhetoric about a “blunder”, but the question whether, before the Presidential decree, there existed a subject capable of procedurally initiating consideration of the Government Programme.
Core issue. The precise issue is not merely political but procedural: whether the Government Programme could have been submitted to the Seimas before the President of the Republic had approved the composition of the Government. This issue is to be resolved primarily under Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that the Prime Minister, no later than 15 days after appointment, presents to the Seimas “the Government formed by him or her and approved by the President of the Republic” and submits its Programme for consideration. Also relevant is the relationship between points 1, 2 and 7 of Article 24(2) of the Law on the Government: the Prime Minister forms the Government, submits its composition to the President of the Republic, proposes ministers and submits the Government Programme to the Seimas for consideration. If more than half of the ministers have changed, Article 101 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 8(4) of the Law on the Government additionally apply, under which the Government must obtain a renewed mandate from the Seimas. The competence of the Constitutional Court to assess the conformity of acts of this kind derives from Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, under which it decides whether acts of the Seimas are contrary to the Constitution, and whether acts of the President of the Republic and the Government are contrary to the Constitution or laws
Legal assessment. Article 6 of the Law on the Government links two acts into a single constitutionally significant procedure: the Government presented to the Seimas is one that has already been formed and approved by the President of the Republic, and its Programme is submitted together with it. Accordingly, the legally decisive threshold is not the political drafting of the Programme, but its submission to the Seimas for consideration as the Programme of a specific Government. The drafting of the Programme is led by the Prime Minister, as expressly stated in paragraph 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government, while Article 6 of the Law on the Government provides for the obligation of institutions to provide the newly appointed ministers with materials for preparation of the Programme. These provisions allow preparatory steps to be distinguished from formal submission for consideration: preparation may take place under the leadership of the Prime Minister, but the wording of Article 6 of the Law on the Government links submission to a composition approved by the President. If the act of 3 July was merely registration of a draft, the sources provided contain no independent rule detailing the legal regime applicable to such registration. If that act is to be regarded as submission of the Programme to the Seimas for consideration, it should be assessed in light of the sequence established in Article 6 of the Law on the Government. Once the composition of the Government was approved by decree of the President of the Republic on 6 July, the subsequent presentation of the Programme at a sitting of the Seimas would satisfy the condition in Article 6 of the Law on the Government that the Government presented to the Seimas be one approved by the President of the Republic. In its ruling of 10 January 1998 “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania”, the Constitutional Court stated that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence, composed of the Prime Minister and ministers. This is important because, under paragraphs 36 and 41 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government, the Programme is a plan of activity binding on the relevant Government for the entire term of its powers, and not merely a personal political document of the Prime Minister. Another excerpt from the cited Constitutional Court case-law emphasises that the competence of the Seimas includes consideration of the Government Programme submitted by the Prime Minister and deciding whether to approve it. Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government likewise shows that an approved Programme subsequently becomes part of the substance of the Government’s mandate, because the Government implements it and approves a plan for implementing its provisions. Under Article 1 of the Law amending the Law on the Government, once the Seimas has approved the Programme, the Government must, within three months, approve a plan for implementing the Programme’s provisions. Ministers, in turn, under point 1 of Article 26(3), as set out in Article 4 of the Law amending Law No. I-464 on the Government, are directly responsible for carrying out the Programme and the measures in its implementation plan within the areas assigned to them
Consequences. First scenario: the Constitutional Court, acting under Article 102 of the Constitution, would assess the conformity of acts of the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Government and clarify whether early registration of the draft was legally equivalent to submission of the Programme for consideration. Second scenario: if only the presentation of the Programme at a sitting of the Seimas after the President’s decree of 6 July were considered legally material, the procedural defect under the provisions provided would be considerably narrower. Third scenario: if it were found that the Programme had been submitted to the Seimas for consideration before there was a Government approved by the President of the Republic, this would raise an issue concerning the application of Article 6 of the Law on the Government and could affect the legal assessment of the Seimas’ approval of the Programme. The practical significance for the Seimas is that it is precisely its approval of the Programme under Article 6 of the Law on the Government that grants the new Government authority to act. The practical significance for the Government is that, without a properly obtained mandate from the Seimas, it cannot rely on the Programme as a plan of activity binding for the entire term of its powers under paragraphs 36 and 41 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government. For the President of the Republic, this is important in relation to the competence to appoint ministers and approve the composition of the Government under Article 6 and points 1 and 2 of Article 24(2) of the Law on the Government. For ministers, this is important because their responsibility for implementing the Programme under point 1 of Article 26(3) of the Law on the Government is meaningfully connected with their appointment and the formation of the Government as a collegial institution. If the Seimas does not approve the Programme, Article 6 of the Law on the Government requires the Prime Minister to submit a new Programme no later than 15 days from the date of non-approval. If the Seimas twice in succession does not approve the Programme of a newly formed Government, the Government must resign under Article 101 of the Constitution. The practical essence of the dispute is therefore the sequence of the procedure: whether the Seimas’ mandate was granted to a Government that had already been formed and approved by the President of the Republic, or whether the process began earlier than formal submission of the Programme for consideration could begin under Article 6 of the Law on the Government
Can the sale by the municipal administration of a 161.35 sq. m car park be regarded as a sufficient basis for the purchaser to use the 0.0162 ha part of state-owned land required for its operation, where the land plot itself belongs to the Republic of Lithuania and the municipality is indicated only as trustee?
Article 1 of the Law on the Management, Use and Disposal of State and Municipal Assets provides that the law governs the procedure for the management, use and disposal of state and municipal assets insofar as other special legislation does not provide otherwise. Article 8 of the same law assigns the exercise of owner functions to municipal councils, while municipal institutions, enterprises and bodies manage assets under the right of trust. Accordingly, in the sale of the car park, it is legally important to distinguish between two objects: the engineering structure owned by the municipality and the state-owned land, the lease of which constitutes a separate legal relationship.
The wording of Government Resolution No. 1178 provided indicates that, where state-owned land is not sold together with the property, the auction winner is required, within 30 days after registration of ownership, to apply for a land lease; that obligation does not automatically transfer the right to use the land together with ownership of the car park.
The wording in the news item stating that the winner must apply to Alytus City Municipality Administration for the lease of part of the land plot is incomplete: according to the source provided for fact-checking, this rule applies where the state-owned land plot is leased, rather than sold together with the immovable property. In addition, under the wording of Government Resolution No. 1178 provided, the addressee of the winner’s application concerning state-owned land is linked to the head of the National Land Service or its territorial division according to the location of the land plot, and not solely to the municipality.
It would be more accurate to state that the purchaser of the car park acquires the engineering structure sold by the municipality, but that the right to use the 0.0162 ha part of state-owned land required for its operation must be formalised through a separate state land lease procedure. If the article were to state that the EUR 30 registration fee is never refunded, that statement would also be too absolute: the source provided indicates an exception, namely that the fee is refunded within five working days where the auction organiser does not approve the registration.
The stronger argument for the purchaser or its adviser is not that the auction notice identifies a “required” part of the land, but that the lease of state-owned land is an independently formalised relationship, dependent on a procedure conducted by the competent authority. For that reason, the initial price of EUR 4,480 does not, in practical terms, cover the full risk of use: the purchaser must assess the two-year lease term and the special land-use conditions applicable to the entire 0.3309 ha plot, including protection zones relating to the aerodrome, groundwater wellfield, heating, electricity and communications networks. A lawyer should review not only the terms of auction No.
334308, but also the basis of the municipal council’s decision under Article 8 of the Law on the Management of Assets and the forthcoming state land lease procedure. The most significant practical error would be to treat registration of ownership of the car park as a sufficient basis for uninterrupted use of the entire part of the land required for its operation.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether a car parking area owned by the Alytus City Municipality may be transferred by way of a public electronic auction where the portion of land required for its operation belongs to the Republic of Lithuania and is managed by the municipality under the right of trust. This issue is to be resolved under Article 1, Article 2(1) and (5), Article 8(1)-(2), Article 11(1), and Article 20(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Management, Use and Disposal of State and Municipal Assets, as well as under Clause 1 of the Description of the Procedure for the Sale of State and Municipal Immovable Property by Public Auction, approved by Resolution No. 1178 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 28 October 2014. Article 2(1) of the Asset Management Law defines disposal as the right to sell property or otherwise change its legal status; accordingly, the sale of the parking area constitutes an act of disposal of municipal property. Under Article 2(5) of the same Law, municipal property means property owned by a municipality; therefore, the parking area in question qualifies as municipal property, while the state-owned land plot is not the object of sale but separate state property. Article 8(1)(1) of the Asset Management Law assigns the implementation of owner’s functions to the municipal council, while Article 8(1)(2) permits municipal institutions to manage property under the right of trust
Legal assessment. In the situation presented, the subject matter of the auction is not the entire 0.3309 ha state-owned land plot, but a specific other engineering structure, namely a 161.35 sq. m car parking area, the ownership of which is indicated as belonging to Alytus City Municipality. This is consistent with Clause 1 of the Description, since it regulates the sale by public auction of buildings and other immovable property owned by a municipality, including cases where the land plot is not sold together with such property. The state-owned land remains legally a separate object: under Article 11(1) of the Asset Management Law, a municipality manages, uses and disposes of state property under the right of trust in the cases established by law; therefore, the auction condition concerning the lease of a 0.0162 ha portion of land does not constitute a transfer of ownership of the parking area. Consequently, the purchaser acquires the parking area, but the practical ability to use it is linked to the obligation, within 30 days from registration of title in the Real Property Register, to apply to the Alytus City Municipality Administration for the conclusion of a lease agreement for the relevant portion of land. This obligation is essential to the economic rationale of the auction, since without the allocated portion of land the purchaser holds a structure whose operation depends on a separate legal basis for the use of state-owned land. The competence of the auction organiser is based on the fact that the sources identify municipal administrations as organisers of public auctions of municipal immovable property, except where an agreement is concluded with the manager of centrally managed state property. The electronic form of the auction is likewise consistent with the stated rule that a public auction may be organised and conducted by means of information technology. The core of participants’ rights is the opportunity to compete for the property without limitation on the number of participants, while, according to the stated concept of a public auction, the sale and purchase agreement is concluded with the participant who offers the highest price. Participants’ obligations are formal and financial: before the start of registration they must pay a EUR 30 registration fee and a EUR 448 security deposit, register during the period from 00:00 on 31 August 2026 to 23:59 on 1 September 2026, and submit the required documents concerning representation, basis of activity, or joint acquisition. The registration fee is non-refundable and is not credited against the price, while the security deposit must be returned within 5 business days after the end of the auction to persons who did not win, did not participate, or were not registered. If, after the registration deadline, it becomes apparent that a person does not meet the auction conditions, that person is not permitted to participate; if this becomes apparent after the auction has taken place, no sale and purchase agreement is concluded with that person. Article 20(5) of the Asset Management Law is also significant as a limitation: municipal property may not be transferred or otherwise linked with property on the basis of a joint activity agreement; therefore, participation by several persons is possible only under the transaction specified in the auction conditions concerning co-ownership or joint activity, but not as a linking of municipal property with their property
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the auction takes place on 3-4 September 2026, the participant who offers the highest price and meets the conditions concludes the sale and purchase agreement, registers title, and applies within 30 days for the lease of the 0.0162 ha portion of land. In that case, the municipality exercises its function of disposing of municipal property, while the purchaser’s practical risk shifts to the stage of the land lease and compliance with the special land use conditions. The second scenario is that a participant wins the bidding but does not meet the auction requirements or fails to submit the necessary documents; in that case, no sale and purchase agreement is concluded with that participant, and the transfer of the property does not take place. The third scenario is that no participants register or no higher price is offered in accordance with the established procedure, leaving the municipality with the need to reconsider disposal of this immovable property under the municipal asset management system established in Article 8 of the Asset Management Law. The fourth scenario is that the winner acquires the structure but does not apply in due time for the lease of the portion of land; this would, in practical terms, complicate operation of the parking area, since the item sold and the land required for its use are legally separate. This is important for potential purchasers because the initial price of EUR 4,480 does not include acquisition of ownership of state-owned land, and use of the parking area is linked to a two-year lease term and registered protection zones. It is also important for the municipality, since its administration must not only organise the electronic auction but also ensure that, after the sale, use of the structure is aligned with the regime applicable to the state-owned land managed under the right of trust
The excerpts provided do not identify a specific initiator. The purpose of the regulation was to define the sale of state and municipal immovable property by public auction, whereby the property is sold to the participant offering the highest price, and municipal property auctions are organised by municipal administrations. At the same time, a proposed exception was discussed that would allow certain state-owned dwellings to be sold to their occupants without a competitive procedure, on the grounds of protecting socially vulnerable residents from losing their homes; the Legal Department noted that this would constitute a departure from the general auction rule.
Can AI automation constitute a lawful ground for dismissing an employee under Article 57 of the Labour Code where the employer claims that the tasks performed by the employee have become redundant?
Article 57(1)(1) of the Labour Code permits termination of an employment contract where the employee’s job function becomes redundant due to changes in work organisation or other reasons related to the employer’s activities. However, Article 57(2) narrows this ground: the changes must be genuine and must result in the specific function performed by the employee, or by a group of employees, no longer being needed. Accordingly, a mere reference to AI being capable of performing data entry, meeting summaries, commercial proposals or customer responses is not sufficient; the employer should demonstrate that these particular functions are in fact no longer needed within the organisation, or that their volume has decreased to such an extent that the specific position has become redundant.
If the employee is offered work under changed essential or additional employment conditions, refusal may constitute a ground for dismissal under Article 57(1)(3) of the Labour Code, but only where the change is properly formulated as a change to employment conditions, rather than as an abstract expectation to “adapt to AI”.
The stronger employer argument would not be that “the employee does not use AI”, but that “following a genuine change in work organisation, the employee’s specific job function became unnecessary”. In professionally assessing such dismissals, the focus should not be on the name of the technology, but on the functional map before and after the change: which tasks were automated, what proportion of the employee’s duties they represented, and why the remaining work is insufficient to maintain the position. From the employee’s perspective, a strong point of challenge would be that the function did not disappear, but only the means of performing it changed, especially if similar work is redistributed to others after the dismissal or if people are hired again.
An additional risk for the employer arises under Article 26 of the Labour Code if the selection of “entry-level” or “non-adapting” employees in fact correlates with age, disability, health status or other protected grounds, because in that case the automation argument may no longer conceal the issue of discriminatory selection.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether artificial intelligence will “take jobs,” but under what conditions an employer may, due to automation, change an employee’s functions, working conditions, or terminate the employment contract. This must primarily be assessed under Article 29(1)–(2), Article 26(1), Article 46, Article 57(1)–(3), and Article 215 of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If artificial intelligence is introduced as a work tool or changes the organisation of the workplace, the definitions in Article 2(5)–(8) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work of the Republic of Lithuania and paragraph 11 of the Methodological Guidelines for the Investigation of Ergonomic Occupational Risk Factors are also relevant. For decisions with a collective impact, Article 13 of the Labour Code is important, as are the information and consultation provisions concerning employee representatives in Article 22(1)(6) and Article 47 of the Labour Code, as identified in the source provided
Legal assessment. Article 29(1) of the Labour Code obliges the employer to train the employee to the extent necessary for the performance of the employee’s work function. Accordingly, new artificial intelligence tools cannot simply be imposed on an employee without the necessary preparation. Under Article 29(2) of the Labour Code, the employer must also take measures to improve employees’ qualifications, professionalism, and ability to adapt to changing business, professional, or working conditions. Therefore, the automation of tasks described in the notice legally means, first and foremost, a duty to manage the process of qualification development and adaptation, rather than an automatic basis for dispensing with the employee. If the employee requests a change to working conditions, for example a move to other functions or a different training path, Article 46 of the Labour Code applies: the employer’s refusal must be reasoned in writing within five working days, and the employee may submit a repeated request no earlier than after one month. A change to working conditions under Article 46(4) of the Labour Code is deemed to have occurred only once the corresponding amendment to the employment contract has been made, where the employer agrees or the parties agree on another proposal. If, due to automation, the function performed by the employee becomes redundant, Article 57(1)(1) of the Labour Code may apply. However, Article 57(2) of the Labour Code requires that changes in work organisation or other reasons relating to the employer’s activities be genuine and result in the particular employee’s or group of employees’ function becoming unnecessary. In addition, termination of the employment contract on that basis is possible only where, from the time of notice until five working days before the expiry of the notice period, there is no vacant position at the workplace to which the employee could be transferred with the employee’s consent. If several employees perform the redundant function and only some of them are dismissed, Article 57(3) of the Labour Code requires the selection criteria to be agreed with the works council or, in its absence, with the trade union. Article 26(1) of the Labour Code prohibits decisions based on age, disability, state of health, exercise of rights provided for in the Code, or circumstances unrelated to the employee’s professional qualities. Therefore, selection based on adaptation to artificial intelligence must be linked to professional criteria. The role of employee representatives is important where automation may have a material impact on the legal position of employees. The source provided refers to the right under Article 22(1)(6) of the Labour Code to protect employees’ interests when the employer adopts decisions concerning collective redundancies, reorganisation, and other significant decisions. Under Article 13(1) of the Labour Code, procedures for information, consultation, and other forms of employee participation are governed by the law of the state in whose territory the employer or workplace is located. From an occupational safety perspective, artificial intelligence systems or robots may be assessed as work equipment used in the work process within the meaning of Article 2(6) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work. Under Article 2(5), (7), and (8) of the same law, the working environment, workplace, and working conditions include not only the physical space but also the nature of the work and other circumstances that directly affect the employee’s wellbeing, capacity for work, safety, and health. Paragraph 11 of the Methodological Guidelines for the Investigation of Ergonomic Occupational Risk Factors requires an assessment of whether work equipment, tools, the work chair, and work zones are adapted to the employee’s capabilities. Therefore, when tasks are automated, the adaptation of the new workplace to the human worker is also relevant. According to the source provided, the competence of the State Labour Inspectorate includes the prevention of violations of occupational safety and health requirements and normative labour law acts, as well as supervision of compliance with the Labour Code and legal acts regulating employment relations. Labour disputes concerning such decisions may, under Article 215(1) of the Labour Code, be examined in accordance with the procedure established by the Code where they arise from employment relations in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania or where the employer falls within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Lithuania
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a restructuring of functions without dismissal: the employee is trained, the employee’s tasks are redistributed, and the terms of the employment contract are changed only in compliance with Article 46 of the Labour Code. The second scenario is the identification of redundancy in respect of certain positions; however, the employer should substantiate genuine organisational changes, examine transfer opportunities, and, where applicable, agree the selection criteria with employee representatives under Article 57(2)–(3) of the Labour Code. The third scenario is a dispute concerning dismissal, discriminatory selection, an unjustified change to working conditions, or failure to fulfil the training obligation; such a dispute falls within the labour dispute resolution procedure referred to in Article 215 of the Labour Code. The fourth scenario concerns occupational safety: if the new tools or work organisation worsen the adaptation of the workplace to the employee, the elements of the working environment, work equipment, and working conditions defined in Article 2 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work, as well as paragraph 11 of the Methodological Guidelines for the Investigation of Ergonomic Occupational Risk Factors, become relevant. This is practically important for employees because their duties may change, but the legally significant factors become training, consent to changes in conditions, transfer opportunities, and non-discriminatory criteria. For employers, this matters because the implementation of artificial intelligence must be documented as a genuine organisational change, not as an abstract reference to technological progress. For employee representatives, this is important where automation affects groups of employees, because information and consultation procedures constitute a separate lawful condition for decision-making
Whether the use of EUR 108.5 thousand from the Kaunas mayor’s reserve to remediate the consequences of a fire complies with the purpose of the mayoral reserve established in the Law on the Budget Structure and with the limits of the municipal council’s competence, where the appropriations plan for a specific municipal programme is simultaneously increased by the same amount.
Article 15 of the Law on the Budget Structure provides that municipalities establish a mayor’s reserve, the amount of which is set annually by the municipal council when approving the budget, while the reserve funds are allocated by the mayor. The same provision permits mayoral reserve funds to be used in accordance with the procedure established by the municipal council, including for “remediating the consequences of fires, natural disasters and other events” and for partially compensating or paying for losses incurred. Accordingly, the purpose of the expenditure, as described in the news report, falls within a use of the mayor’s reserve expressly identified in the statute.
The more legally sensitive point is not the classification of the event as a fire, but the budgetary movement: the mayor’s decision to allocate the reserve is separate from the council’s decision to increase by EUR 108.5 thousand the appropriations plan for the programme “A City Sustainably Managed in Accordance with the Principles of Sustainability and the Green Deal”.
At present, the stronger argument lies with the municipality as regards the purpose of the funds: remediating the consequences of a fire is one of the clearest statutory categories for the use of the mayor’s reserve. However, in the event of scrutiny or a dispute, the issue should not be assessed by reference to the abstract label of “reserve”, but by examining two documents: the mayor’s decision allocating EUR 108.5 thousand and the procedure established by the council for the use of the mayor’s reserve. A practical risk would arise if the reserve funds were in fact used to finance general programme expenditure, disguised as a budget adjustment, rather than direct costs of fire remediation or compensation for losses.
Another point requiring verification is the limit on the size of the reserve: the law links the mayor’s reserve to 0.25-1% of approved municipal budget revenue, excluding state grants, so the remaining balance of “EUR 1 million 118.2 thousand” is insufficient to assess legality without knowing the initial size of the 2026 reserve and any previous uses.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether Kaunas City Municipality could allocate EUR 108.5 thousand from the mayor’s reserve to eliminate the consequences of the fire and, by a council decision, accordingly adjust the municipal budget appropriations. It is to be determined under Article 15 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 and Article 25, as set out in Article 2 of the Law Amending Articles 11, 25, 26, 27, 31 and 34 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430, which establish the amount of the mayor’s reserve, the authority responsible for allocating it, and the purposes for which it may be used. Also relevant is the rule in Article 13 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430, under which municipal budget appropriations are used to perform independent and state-delegated functions through the programmes of appropriation managers. If the budget adjustment is linked to received or anticipated above-plan revenue, the requirement in Article 25(2) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 also applies, namely that above-plan revenue received by the municipal budget is allocated by decision of the municipal council
Legal assessment. Under Article 15(1) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430, a mayor’s reserve must be formed in each municipality; its amount is determined by the municipal council when approving the municipal budget, while the funds are allocated by the mayor. The same provision limits the reserve to between 0.25 and 1 percent of approved municipal budget revenue, excluding state grants, except in cases of an emergency situation or state of emergency. The report states that EUR 1 million 118.2 thousand remains in the mayor’s reserve; therefore, based on the figures provided, the allocation of EUR 108.5 thousand is to be assessed as use of reserve funds, rather than as a separate reallocation of general municipal appropriations. Under Article 15(2)(2) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 and Article 25(2)(2), mayor’s reserve funds may be used to eliminate the consequences of fires and to partially compensate or pay for the losses caused by them. Accordingly, eliminating the consequences of a fire falls within a purpose expressly identified by law, and the principal condition of legality is not the political expediency of such a decision, but whether the funds were allocated in accordance with the procedure established by the municipal council and specifically to cover the consequences of the fire or the related losses. The mayor’s competence here is an individual competence to allocate funds: the statutory wording “the mayor allocates the mayor’s reserve funds” means that the council determines the amount of the reserve and the procedure for its use, but does not take over the act of allocating the reserve itself. The council’s role arises at another level, when municipal budget indicators are amended or above-plan revenue is allocated. The reported council approval to increase by EUR 108.5 thousand the appropriation plan of the programme “A City Sustainably Managed in Accordance with the Principles of Sustainability and the Green Deal for the Performance of the Municipality’s Independent Functions” is consistent with Article 13 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430, because the appropriations are linked to municipal functions and are implemented through programmes. If this increase is financed from received above-plan revenue, the decision must be taken specifically by the municipal council pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430. Pursuant to the Law on the Budget Structure, under paragraph 80 of the amendment to Government Resolution No. 543 of 14 May 2001, municipal councils themselves establish the procedure for amending municipal budget appropriations. This means that the council vote mentioned in the news report is, by itself, a necessary element of budget adjustment, but the specific procedure must comply with the appropriation amendment procedure approved by the council. Appropriation managers are subject to the general duty to use allocated appropriations for their intended purpose and to ensure legality, economy, efficiency and effectiveness, as indicated in the source concerning draft amendment No. XIP-1474 to Article 5 of the Law on the Budget Structure. On the revenue side, the local fees, income of budgetary institutions, property lease income, fines, confiscated property and other penalties mentioned in the report correspond to the types of non-tax municipal budget revenue listed in Article 28(2) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure. However, the existence of such revenue does not in itself confer a right to use it for any purpose: under the provisions cited, it must be incorporated into budget execution and appropriation programmes, and allocation of above-plan revenue requires a council decision
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is straightforward: if the mayor’s decision concerning EUR 108.5 thousand complies with the mayor’s reserve use procedure established by the council, and the council decision to increase the programme appropriations was adopted in accordance with the municipal budget amendment procedure, the use of the funds is based on a direct provision of the Law on the Budget Structure concerning elimination of the consequences of fires. The second scenario would involve procedural risk: if the funds were in fact used for purposes other than covering the consequences of the fire or the related losses, or if the amendment of appropriations did not comply with the procedure established by the council, questions would arise as to the intended use and legality of the appropriations. The third scenario concerns year-end budget execution: if Kaunas City Municipality actually receives above-plan revenue, its allocation cannot be merely an administrative act, because Article 25(2) of the Law Amending the Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 requires a council decision. This is practically important for the mayor, because he allocates the mayor’s reserve funds; for the council, because it approves the amount of the reserve, the budget and the allocation of above-plan revenue; and for appropriation managers, because they are responsible for programme implementation and the use of funds for their intended purpose. The next council meeting scheduled for 15 September may become relevant only insofar as new council decisions are required regarding budget adjustment or allocation of above-plan revenue; under the provisions provided, the legal basis for using the mayor’s reserve itself is linked not to the schedule of meetings, but to the mayor’s competence and the procedure established by the council
The regulation sought to broaden the use of reserve funds so that they could be allocated not only for emergencies, but also for eliminating the consequences of fires and natural disasters and for partially covering losses. The initiators are not expressly identified in the excerpts provided, but the Association of Local Authorities in Lithuania supported the amendment. The main argument was the practical need for municipalities to have a clear legal basis for financing the remediation of fire damage; no substantive objections are apparent from the documents provided.