Crucially, forcing his partner to hand over an ATM card under the threat of deprivation of life using a knife fulfils the elements of Article 282 § 1 of the Criminal Code (extortion by robbery — imprisonment from 1 to 10 years) and Article 280 § 2 of the Criminal Code (armed robbery with a knife — from 3 to 20 years).
Since the theft concerned a person closest to the offender, prosecution of that act proceeds upon the motion of the injured party (Article 278 § 4 of the Criminal Code).
The 46-year-old man from Tomaszów Lubelski will primarily answer not for a "domestic dispute," but for armed robbery committed with a knife — he faces a penalty of 3 to 20 years' imprisonment, not 15 years as stated in the police communiqué. The mere taking of another person's card entitling the holder to withdraw money from a bank machine constitutes a separate offence under Article 278 § 1a of the Criminal Code (from 3 months to 5 years). The further charges — psychological and physical abuse causing bodily injury, as well as assault on and insult of officers — fall within the catalogue of offences against the family and against the performance of official duties.
The secured knife and ATM card carry evidentiary significance: the knife confirms the qualification under Article 280 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which expressly lists "a knife or other similarly dangerous object" as an aggravating circumstance. The taking of the card "with the intent of appropriation" corresponds precisely to the wording of Article 278 § 1a of the Criminal Code, and its subsequent use for payment in a store may be assessed as particularly brazen theft under Article 278 § 3a in conjunction with Article 115 § 9a of the Criminal Code. The fact that the man acted in circumstances of recidivism opens for the court the possibility of imposing a penalty above the statutory maximum pursuant to the provisions on recidivism. The three-month pre-trial detention is a preventive measure, not a punishment. Prosecution of some of the acts depends on the motion of the injured party, which gives her real influence over the scope of the charges in this respect.
The most realistic scenario is an indictment combining robbery with a knife, extortion by robbery, theft of the card, abuse, and assault on officers, with the qualification under Article 280 § 2 determining the penalty range of 3 to 20 years. For the injured party, the practical significance lies in the motion for prosecution under Article 278 § 4 of the Criminal Code — its filing or withdrawal affects the scope of her partner's liability for taking the card. For the man, the key risks extend beyond imprisonment: recidivism may raise the upper limit of the penalty, and the secured items may be subject to rulings concluding the proceedings.
Correction. The report imprecisely states that Romanowski "will be able to answer the charges at liberty and, upon a potential return to Poland, faces no risk of detention." This omits an essential condition: under Art. 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, liberty is guaranteed only if the accused appears when summoned by the court, does not leave the chosen place of residence without permission, and does not obstruct the proceedings; in the event of a breach of these obligations, the letter of safe conduct may be revoked (Art. 282 § 3 of the Code), and pre-trial detention may be re-imposed on the suspect. Moreover, the report fails to note that, under Art. 281 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the lifting of pre-trial detention becomes enforceable only on the date on which the order issuing the letter of safe conduct becomes final — since the decision of the Regional Court in Warsaw is not final and the prosecution has announced an appeal (Art. 284 § 2 of the Code), the detention formally remains in force until the second-instance court rules. It would be more accurate to state that only a final (prawomocne) issuance of the letter of safe conduct lifts the detention, and that even then, remaining at liberty is conditional and revocable upon the prosecutor's motion.
Under Article 45 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the court orders forfeiture of benefits obtained, even indirectly, from the commission of an offence, or their equivalent, and benefits are also deemed to include the proceeds from things or rights constituting such benefit.
Article 291 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the securing of property subject to forfeiture or restitution under Art. 44 of the Criminal Code, including by suspending transactions or freezing an account.
The practical consequence of Marcin Romanowski's return to Poland will not be automatic deprivation of liberty, but the resumption of the investigation, in which the real financial dimension is the forfeiture of property benefits derived from the crime. 45 § 1a). In the case concerning Justice Fund resources, the issue to be decided will be the forfeiture of property under Articles 44 and 45 of the Criminal Code, not the question of espionage.
Forfeiture of items derived directly from the offence is mandatory (Art. 44 § 1 of the Criminal Code), whereas forfeiture of items that served or were intended to commit the offence is discretionary (Art. 44 § 2). Key limitations and modifications:
Securing a future ruling already occurs at the procedural stage: Article 291 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the securing of property subject to forfeiture or restitution under Art. 44 of the Criminal Code, including by suspending transactions or freezing an account, and ex officio also the securing on the accused's property of court costs, if without such measures the enforcement of the ruling would be impossible or significantly hindered (Art. 291 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). A third party claiming rights to items subject to forfeiture may pursue its claims only in civil proceedings (Art. 340 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as worded in the Act of 23 March 2017, Art. 24 point 12 lit. c), and an appeal lies against an order on forfeiture (Art. 340 § 2a of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
For Romanowski himself, the practical significance is that even without arrest, his assets may be subject to securing measures — an account freeze or suspension of transactions under Art. 291 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may occur ex officio and precedes any potential judgment. For the State Treasury as the injured party, the restitution route under Art. 44 § 5 of the Criminal Code, which precludes forfeiture, is significant; for potential third parties holding assets connected with the accused — the restriction to the civil route after a forfeiture ruling. The further course of the case depends on the second-instance court's decision on the European Arrest Warrant immunity issue; beyond that, a securing order on property in the Justice Fund investigation should be expected, and the final financial settlement will occur only by judgment, from which the effect of the transfer of items to the ownership of the State Treasury is counted.
Are the causes of the disappearance of cooperative agricultural holdings in Poland legally significant — that is, do unadapted provisions (the Cooperative Law of 1982 and the regime of non-transferability of membership shares) constitute a barrier to succession and the transfer of members' assets, rather than merely an economic issue?
The legal source provided — Article 10^c of the consolidated text of the Act on the functioning of cooperative banks, their affiliation and affiliating banks (Announcement of the Marshal of the Sejm of 30 April 2026) — states expressly that "Membership shares in a cooperative bank are non-transferable." The norm contained in this provision excludes any circulation of membership shares, and therefore also their inheritance in the form of disposal or sale on market terms. With respect to cooperative agricultural holdings themselves, the sources provided contain no directly applicable provision, so the assessment of succession barriers rests on the general principle of cooperative law: membership is a personal relationship, tied to the person of the member rather than constituting a transferable property right, which makes it difficult for a third party who is not a member to take over the holding. The analysis by IERiGŻ-PIB indicates that over 60% of the causes of liquidation are non-economic in nature (39% — lack of successors; 22% — unfavourable legal and organisational conditions), which corresponds to this legal construction.
The article (or the caveat attached to it) suggests that "the possibility of transferring membership shares in cooperatives is limited," which is an imprecise formulation and substantively incorrect in relation to the operative text of the provision. Under Article 10^c of the consolidated text of the Act on the functioning of cooperative banks (Announcement of the Marshal of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 30 April 2026), membership shares in a cooperative bank are non-transferable — the point is therefore not a "limitation" on transfer (which would suggest some permissible, albeit regulated, circulation), but a complete prohibition on disposal. The correct formulation should read: "membership shares in a cooperative bank are non-transferable, which entirely excludes their circulation and hinders succession." Moreover, the article overlooks the fact that the legal barrier has a twofold source: directly, in the provision on the non-transferability of shares, and, in the personal character of membership in an agricultural cooperative arising from the Cooperative Law of 1982 — whose lack of adaptation it illustrates with no concrete example of a norm.
The argument about "legal and tax barriers" in disputes and analyses concerning the liquidation of agricultural cooperatives becomes stronger, because it is grounded in a specific statutory provision: the non-transferability of membership shares (Article 10^c of the Act on cooperative banks) prevents the smooth transfer of membership rights, and, combined with the personal character of membership in an agricultural cooperative, blocks classic business succession. In practice, when planning the continuation of a cooperative, one should — instead of relying on the disposal of shares — build succession through the prior admission of a successor to membership (entry in the National Court Register, a resolution on admission) and secure the reconstitution of assets — the econometric model indicates that each additional person in the membership reduces the risk of liquidation by approximately 8.4%, and an increase in area of 1 ha per member by approximately 8.8%. Risk of error: treating a membership share as if it were a share in a joint-stock company or a limited liability company and attempting to "transfer" it — such an act is legally impossible, which in itself may determine the extinction of the holding in the absence of a successor.
The Act of 10 July 2008 (Art. 1) authorised the President of the Republic of Poland only to recognise the Court's jurisdiction under Art. 35(2) TEU, i.e. in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, not the common commercial policy.
Pursuant to Art. 8(1) of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, a party that considers that another party has failed to comply with a judgment of the Court may seek financial penalties of up to 0.1% of GDP.
The dismissal of the action means that the Polish government will obtain no judicial block on the EU–Mercosur agreement, and the agreement remains in legal circulation to the extent it has been adopted. Central to assessing the situation is the fact that judicial review of a Member State's action before the Court of Justice of the European Union requires an express treaty basis — and the Act of 10 July 2008 (Art. 35(2) TEU, i.e. Poland's mere initiation of a dispute concerning a trade agreement therefore had to encounter a jurisdictional barrier or lack of a basis for the action, irrespective of the quality of the arguments. None of the sources provided contains provisions on the EU–Mercosur agreement or on the procedure for its conclusion, so the question of the European Parliament's omission cannot be verified here.
The sources provided show what a properly constructed judicial route before the CJEU looks like in matters concerning EU decisions:
Among the sources there is no judgment concerning trade agreements or actions by Member States in this field, so no precedent can be cited. What is apparent, however, is that the CJEU in sanctions matters has "unlimited jurisdiction" only where a treaty or regulation so provides — e.g. Art. 8 of Regulation 2015/1589 (Commission fines) and Art. 41a of Regulation 806/2014 (Single Resolution Board penalties). The Court's jurisdiction is not presumed.
The practical effect for Polish farmers and businesses importing from South America is that the dismissed action does not suspend the application of the agreement and creates no basis for domestic protective measures. For the government, this means the need to act at the political level (Council, European Council) or to bring a new action with a properly indicated basis — e.g. challenging a specific implementing decision under Art. 263 TFEU. Pursuant to Art. 8(1) of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, a party that considers that another party has failed to comply with a judgment of the Court may seek financial penalties of up to 0.1% of GDP — which shows that disputes between states under EU instruments follow a closed, treaty-based procedure. The reasoning of the Court's decision requires further monitoring: only from it will it emerge whether the action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for substantive defects, and whether the government intends to bring a new action.
The Constitutional Tribunal judgment of 22 October 2020, Case No. K 1/20, struck down Article 4a(1)(2) of the Act of 7 January 1993 on Family Planning, Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions Permitting the Termination of Pregnancy (termination of pregnancy due to severe and irreversible foetal impairment or an incurable illness threatening its life), holding it incompatible with Article 38 in conjunction with Article 31(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
The Council of Ministers annually, by 31 July, submits to the Sejm a report on the effects of the Act's application (Art. 5), which is the only systematic mechanism for monitoring its operation.
Ten years after Black Monday, the legal status of abortion in Poland is more restrictive than in 2016, and any change would require new legislation, not protest. The dispute Marta Lempart refers to therefore concerns not the criminalisation of a social movement, but the shape of the grounds for legal abortion — and whether the governing coalition will enact legislation amending those grounds.
The consolidated text of the Act promulgated by the Marshal of the Sejm's announcement of 7 July 2022 incorporates the K 1/20 judgment as an effective amendment (footnote 7, Journal of Laws 2021, item 175), confirming that the embryopathological ground formally no longer applies. Following the judgment, termination of pregnancy remains lawful where:
Realistically: absent a statutory amendment to Article 4a, the scope of legal abortion will remain limited to the health and criminal grounds, and Poland will retain its second-to-last position in the EU in the "European Abortion Policies Atlas 2025" ranking. For women, this means the obligation to undergo the confirmation and consultation procedure set out in Art. 4a(5)–(6); for physicians, criminal liability outside those grounds; for the governing coalition, the political risk that Lempart links to successive elections. The further course of events depends on whether a bill amending the 1993 Act reaches the Sejm and is enacted.