Will the government's draft amendments to PIT (shifting the tax threshold to PLN 130,000 and introducing a new 24% rate), the solidarity levy (from 4% to 5%), and CIT (from 19% to 22% for large taxpayers), planned for 2027, be enacted in their current form, and what is their legislative status?
This analysis rests on the general principles of budgetary and legislative law rather than on any specific provision supplied in the sources, as the database contains neither the texts of the amended statutes nor the draft bills. Under the principle expressed in Article 97(1) of the Polish Constitution and the legislative procedure set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, a government bill submitted to the Sejm creates no rights or obligations until the statute is enacted, signed by the President, and published in the Journal of Laws. This means the current rates remain unchanged: the second threshold of 32% still applies above PLN 120,000, the solidarity levy stands at 4% of the base pursuant to the Act on the Solidarity Levy, and the 19% CIT rate has not been raised.
The planned entry into force on 1 January 2027 remains merely a legislative declaration contained in the draft.
I have no case law material on these matters, as disputes in this area do not reach the ordinary courts — this is a purely legislative domain.
Tax practice cannot yet take these changes into account in any calculations, contracts, or individual interpretations — treating the drafts as binding law would be an error. However, the argument that CIT is planned to rise to 22% for taxpayers with revenues exceeding EUR 50 million may already now justify recommending that clients consider recognising profits still in 2026 (e.g., paying a dividend or a CIT advance at the current rate), provided there is a genuine business rationale rather than a purely avoidance-driven one — tax authorities and administrative courts assess such measures against the general anti-avoidance clause (Article 119a of the Tax Ordinance). The legislative risk, however, is that the drafts may be altered during the Sejm's work — as illustrated by the account in the related materials of PSL blocking the anti-alcohol act, which shows that the coalition cannot count on unanimity regarding the tax amendments.
Correction. MP Elżbieta Gelert's statement that "public entities already publish notices in a central register" is imprecise as to the place of publication. Pursuant to Article 340 of the Public Procurement Law, the competition notice is published in the Public Procurement Bulletin (and, for values above EU thresholds, also in the Official Journal of the European Union), not in a "central register" — the Public Procurement Bulletin is an official publication bulletin, not a register maintained in an information system on entities. The precise formulation should read: public contracting authorities publish competition notices in the Public Procurement Bulletin on the basis of Article 340 of the Public Procurement Law, whereas the proposed amendment would, for the first time, subject non-public entities with NFZ contracts to publication obligations, directing data to a central ICT system established under the Act on the Health Care Information System.
Information on unsuccessful bids is to be published for 3 months, and information on selected contractors for 12 months.
According to data from the Ministry of Health, approximately 39,000 tender proceedings are conducted and approximately 37,000 contracts with medical professionals are concluded annually.
If the bill is adopted in its current form, the obligation to publish tender announcements, bidder data, and proposed remuneration will also extend to non-public entities holding NFZ contracts. This concerns the amendment to the Act on Medical Activity and the Act on the Health Care Information System, discussed at the second reading on 20 October 2026. The parliamentary dispute does not concern the objective but rather the financing of the new tasks — PiS and Konfederacja have announced they will vote against, citing the absence of additional funds and the duplicative publication of the same data.
The bill fits within the existing informational architecture of the health care system. The Act on the Health Care Information System already provides for the transparency of registers and the sharing of data. Similarly, the Act on Medical Activity imposes informational obligations on healthcare entities towards patients, and Article 27a provides for the transmission of data to the Minister of Health or a designated entity in order to ensure equal access to benefits. The new obligation will extend the existing model: data on tenders and the financial terms of contracts are to be submitted to the central teleinformation system. The context of tender proceedings is also significant: the 2016 Act amending the Act on Medical Activity provides for tender proceedings in the case of contracts for guaranteed benefits, as well as an exception — where local government units are the founder or majority shareholder of a healthcare entity, the contract is concluded in the first instance with that entity without a tender and without applying public procurement rules. This confirms the thesis advanced by MP Zięba-Gzik that contracts for healthcare services are public in nature but remain outside the scope of the Public Procurement Law, which the amendment is intended to partially compensate for through transparency. The bill is an element of the response to the affair at Szpital Południowy (Southern Hospital); it also includes an expansion of the powers of the Agency for Health Technology Assessment and Tariff System with respect to detecting the concurrent employment of medical professionals in multiple full-time positions.
Realistic scenarios for healthcare entities:
Pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Act on the Council of Ministers, a Deputy Prime Minister designated by the Prime Minister directs the work of the Council of Ministers in the event of the Prime Minister's absence or temporary inability to perform his duties.
The costs of maintaining the premises to which entitlement arises under Article 5b(1) of the Act on the Remuneration of Persons Holding Senior State Positions are covered from the budget of the office paying the Deputy Prime Minister's remuneration.
The rejection of the vote of no confidence means that Andrzej Domański will retain the office of Minister of Finance until the resignation of the government or his own resignation, and his accountability before the Sejm has, at this stage, been defended by a vote of 204 deputies in favour of the motion against 235–236 voting for its rejection. The real change that may occur is not the loss of the mandate, but an expansion of functions: the Prime Minister has announced that he will submit a request to the President for Domański's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister, which, under the structure of the Act on the Council of Ministers, translates into the status of Deputy Prime Minister (vice-prezes Rady Ministrów). The legal issue is therefore the content of the office of Deputy Prime Minister and the manner of its appointment, to be resolved on the basis of Article 6(1) of the Act on the Council of Ministers and the provisions on the detailed scope of the Deputy Prime Minister's activities issued by way of a regulation of the Prime Minister.
Article 7(1) of the Act on the Council of Ministers provides that a member of the Council of Ministers participates in shaping state policy and is obliged to initiate and submit draft statutory assumptions at Council meetings — Domański continues to perform this duty unchanged. Were he to become Deputy Prime Minister, his position would be strengthened at several specific points:
For the Minister of Finance and the government, the most immediate scenario is the maintenance of the status quo with a possible personal promotion. Key steps:
Correction. Note that the source text contains the markers [TEISINIS_PAGRINDAS] and [PRAKTINE_REIKSME], while the markers [PRAKTIKA] and [TIKSLINIMAS] listed in the instructions do not appear in the source text; the markers present have been preserved exactly as required.
The legal basis is the MAR Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council): the notifications were submitted pursuant to Article 19(1) MAR, and the issuer publishes them under Article 19(3) MAR, under which information on transactions by persons discharging managerial responsibilities is made available to the public.
The Authority may issue recommendations to the issuer to cease violating information obligations and may require members of management bodies to provide written or oral information and explanations without delay.
Five persons discharging managerial responsibilities at Anwim S.A. carried out transactions in the company's shares and fulfilled their notification obligation, and the issuer made these notifications public on 20 October 2026 as current report No. 5/2026. This is a standard information flow under the market surveillance regime. Distribution of the report is ensured by a news agency under Article 58(1a) of the Public Offerings Act (consolidated text of 24 March 2025).
The notification obligation rests on the person discharging managerial responsibilities personally — in this case on Paweł Grzywaczewski, Artur Krzyk, Rafał Pietrasin, Zbigniew Łapiński and Andrzej Kondys, whereby in Kondys's case the annexes contain both an initial notification and an amendment to the notification, which corresponds to the mechanism for correcting notifications provided for in Article 19 MAR. The issuer received them on 19 October 2026, and the report was drawn up on 20 October 2026, signed by two members of the management board (Artur Krzyk and Paweł Grzywaczewski), who are themselves among the notifying persons. The authority collecting the data is the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (PLKNF), and the information is tagged TRANSD. The Authority has verification tools at its disposal: under Article 68(5) and (6) of the Public Offerings Act it may issue recommendations to the issuer to cease violating information obligations and may require members of management bodies to provide written or oral information and explanations without delay, as well as copies of documents at the market participant's expense. Under Article 19c of the Public Offerings Act, the Authority may additionally require information and explanations from the issuer and from persons serving on its management bodies. For investors, the report is of informational significance: the disclosure of transactions by members of the management board is a market signal which each market participant interprets independently.
Scenarios for the further course of events depend on the content of the attached notifications and the market's reaction:
On the basis of the evidence gathered before the filing of the motion to lift immunity, does a "sufficiently justified suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence" by a judge exist where a key fact — who was driving the vehicle — is disputed and, according to the defence, the prosecution conducted no evidentiary proceedings on that point?
Legal basis: The legal basis here is Article 60 of the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts and Article 57 et seq. of the Act on the Supreme Court, which permit the Supreme Court — where there is a justified suspicion that a judge has committed a criminal offence — to lift that judge's immunity, as well as to suspend him or her from duties and reduce remuneration; not having the direct text of the provisions in the sources, I rely on the general principle that the immunity-lifting stage does not require proof of guilt, but merely a finding of sufficiently justified suspicion — a point expressly confirmed by Maria Szczepaniec, President of the Supreme Court's Chamber for Professional Liability, who stated that "the fact that a sufficiently justified suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence by the judge has arisen is not in doubt." The practical rule flowing from this construction is not obvious: at this stage the Supreme Court does not decide whether Iwaniec was driving the car — it is sufficient that the evidence (toxicological tests showing 1.85 per mille approximately three hours after the incident, and witness testimony about the vehicle leaving the road onto a pavement and striking a tree) renders that version of events probable.
What case law says: The Supreme Court's line of case law on lifting judges' immunity has in recent years been consistent: the chamber of professional liability assesses the material submitted with the prosecution's motion and lifts immunity already at the suspicion stage, without conducting full evidentiary proceedings on the disputed circumstances; however, I do not have a specific cited ruling to that effect in the sources, so this proposition cannot be reinforced with a citation.
Practical significance: The defence's argument that "the prosecution conducted no evidentiary proceedings on the question of who was driving the vehicle" is structurally weak at the immunity stage — the Supreme Court assesses the sufficiency of the suspicion, not the completeness of the investigation, so the appeal should attack the quality and credibility of the existing material (e.g. the discrepancy between the claim that the judge was a passenger and the 1.85 per mille result and the neighbours' testimony), rather than the absence of evidence that the prosecution may only gather after immunity is lifted. The practical risk for the defence is that the decision on suspension and a 50 per cent reduction of remuneration was issued together with the lifting of immunity, which means real financial and status consequences even before a final ruling in the criminal case; at the same time, statements by politicians (the Minister of Justice's reference to a "haters affair") may be invoked in the appeal as context for the allegation of a "political backdrop", though they do not undermine the suspicion-of-an-offence test itself.