Under the consolidated text of the Act on the Bar (promulgation of 11 October 2024), an advocate is obliged to keep confidential everything they learn in connection with the provision of legal assistance; this duty cannot be limited in time and cannot be waived with respect to facts learned in the course of legal assistance (Art. 6(1)–(3)).
The Act of 3 July 2026 on Artificial Intelligence Systems, in Art. 54, protects communication between the inspected party and an advocate or legal counsel created for the purpose of exercising the right to legal protection — such materials remain at the place of inspection and are not subject to seizure by the inspecting authority.
The entry of Lysias AI into the Polish market means that law firms and in-house legal departments will entrust an external tool with content covered by professional secrecy, while responsibility for preserving that secrecy rests entirely with the lawyer, not with the platform provider. The key legal issue is therefore not the tool's functionality, but whether the disclosure of data to it complies with the duty of professional secrecy arising from Article 6 of the Act on the Bar (ustawa – Prawo o adwokaturze) and Article 3 of the Act on Legal Counsel (ustawa o radcach prawnych). 6(1)–(3)). The duty of a legal counsel is framed identically: Art. 3(3)–(5) of the Act on Legal Counsel, in the consolidated text of 21 March 2024, requires confidentiality as to everything learned in connection with the provision of legal assistance, without any time limitation and without the possibility of release from that duty. The duty of secrecy also extends to trainee advocates and trainee legal counsels, as indicated by tax explanations citing Art. 75(5) of the Act on the Bar and Art. 33(5) of the Act on Legal Counsel in conjunction with Art. 6 and Art. 3(4)–(6) of those Acts. The exceptions to professional secrecy are exhaustively enumerated: information disclosed under anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing legislation, and information provided under Chapter 11a of Part III of the Tax Ordinance (Art. 6(4) of the Act on the Bar; Art. 3(6) of the Act on Legal Counsel). The use of an AI platform falls within none of these exceptions, so every transmission of pleadings, contracts or templates to the tool remains an act covered by professional secrecy.
A lawyer using Lysias AI acts as the party responsible for confidentiality: it is the lawyer who must assess whether the safeguards declared by the provider — GDPR compliance, ISO 27001 and ISO 27701 certification, data storage in Europe, data processing agreements (DPAs), and non-use of data for model training — genuinely protect the data entrusted in the course of legal assistance. The duty does not expire upon the conclusion of the case, as it is non-transferable and unlimited in time, so liability persists even after the subscription has lapsed. More recent legislation confirms the direction of protection. This protection therefore also covers documents produced by the lawyer with the assistance of an AI tool, but it does not extend any rights to the platform itself. In turn, the Act of 4 September 2026 amending the Act on the Bar permits the processing of data only by persons holding written authorisation from the dean of the district bar council or the competent body of the bar, who are bound to keep the data confidential (Arts. 12 and 13 of that Act) — illustrating the standard of confidentiality the bar association demands in handling legal data. The Act of 15 May 2026 amending the Act on Legal Counsel adds to the tasks of the legal counsel self-governing body the protection of the independence of legal counsels and of professional secrecy (point 1a of Art. 52(3)), so oversight of this area is assumed by the chambers' bodies. The practical obligations of a law firm implementing the tool include:
The most realistic scenario is the disciplinary liability of a lawyer who entrusts confidential data to a tool without ensuring adequate protection — supervision over the proper practice of the profession is exercised by the district councils of the chambers of legal counsels and by the bar authorities, and breach of professional secrecy is not subject to a limitation period. For a law firm's clients, the practical significance is that the use of AI does not weaken their protection: communication with the lawyer, including documents produced with the platform's assistance, remains protected under Art. 54 of the Act on Artificial Intelligence Systems during inspections. For the market itself, the significance lies in competition with international players — a platform built on Polish legislation and case law, using its own database rather than the open internet, reduces the risk of generating answers outside the Polish legal order. The decision to implement the tool should be preceded by an audit of data entrustment agreements, not the other way around. Further developments are worth monitoring in the activities of the professional self-governing bodies: under the Act of 4 September 2026, the Polish Bar Council is to adopt regulations for the use of an IT system specifying security and integrity requirements for the data processed (point 17 of Art. 12), and analogous standards for legal counsels will be developed by the chambers' bodies — it is there that the first official guidelines on the use of AI tools in legal practice should be expected.
Correction. (no source text provided for this section)
The basis for the suspension of duties is Article 130 of the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, invoked by interim President Anna Korwin-Piotrowska; review of that order is exercised by the disciplinary court under Article 131 § 1 of the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts.
The disciplinary court has 30 days to hear the case.
The President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal have been sidelined from the day-to-day management of the Tribunal not by a judgment, but by an order suspending the performance of their official duties, and their further fate will be decided by a disciplinary court composed exclusively of CT judges, selected by lot at the General Assembly. The dispute concerns the disciplinary liability of the Tribunal's judges and the effects of the suspension order, not criminal liability for the events outside the CT building — that could be triggered by separate notifications from either side of the confrontation. The rules governing the disciplinary liability of a CT judge are set out in the Act of 30 November 2016 on the Status of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, whose Chapter 3 covers immunity, personal inviolability and disciplinary liability.
An order suspending the performance of official duties is not a disciplinary penalty, but an interim measure whose justification is examined by the disciplinary court under Article 131 § 1 of the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts — the court issues a resolution after hearing the disciplinary officer and the judge, unless the hearing is not possible. Judges accused of breaching their duties face only the penalties listed in Article 29 of the Act on the Status of CT Judges:
In matters not regulated, the provisions of the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts and of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply mutatis mutandis (Article 30 of the Act on the Status of CT Judges), which refers, inter alia, to the procedure under Articles 130–131 of the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts. The first-instance disciplinary court consists of three judges, and at second instance of five, and is composed exclusively of CT judges; the panels are drawn by lot conducted by the interim President. The status of the parties to the proceedings depends on whether the service relationship exists at all — under Article 5 of the Act on the Status of CT Judges it is established upon taking the oath, and refusal to take the oath is equivalent to resignation from office (Article 4(2)). A CT judge, in the exercise of office, is independent and subject only to the Constitution (Article 6 of the Act on the Status of CT Judges). In its judgment of 7 November 2013, case No. K 31/12, the Tribunal examined the constitutionality of the provisions on the organisation of ordinary courts against Article 2, Article 10(1) and Article 173 of the Constitution, adopting as the relevant standards the independence of courts and the independence of judges — this set of criteria will serve as the reference point for assessing the legality of the panels and orders in the CT case. Doubts concerning decisions adopted in breach of the provisions on the CT are further regulated by Article 19 of the implementing provisions in the wording of 2018, referring to the Acts of 25 June 2015 and 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal.
The next step is Tuesday's General Assembly of CT Judges, expanded by an order to include the drawing of lots for the composition of the disciplinary court — its outcome will determine who will hear the case of the President and Vice-President and the application to lift the suspension of duties. If the disciplinary court is drawn, it will issue a resolution on the justification of the suspension, and ultimately also on any potential penalty — in the extreme case, removal from office, which would mean the loss of the position by Święczkowski or Sochański. In parallel, two independent criminal tracks may begin: the Chancellery of the President has announced a notification concerning the violation of the bodily inviolability of Karol Nawrocki, and Judge Korwin-Piotrowska is considering filing a similar notification; holding a judge criminally liable would require a resolution of the disciplinary court pursuant to Article 80 of the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts. This has practical significance for both sides of the conflict: for the CT judges — the preservation of their functions and the legality of the adjudicating panel; for the President and the government — control over the composition of the Tribunal.
Correction. The article imprecisely suggests that the possibility of payment in four instalments depends on the PLN 100 threshold, whereas the cited source (Article 6(7)) merely provides that tax on natural persons determined by decision is payable in instalments proportional to the duration of the tax liability by 15 March, 15 May, 15 September and 15 November — the PLN 100 threshold does not follow from the quoted provision and would require a reference to the appropriate regulation. Moreover, the provision applies only to natural persons, so the wording should read: "tax on natural persons determined by decision is payable in instalments proportional to the duration of the tax liability by 15 March, 15 May, 15 September and 15 November". Similarly, the claim that a tenant is never a taxpayer is incomplete: in the case of State Treasury real estate, the tax liability is transferred to the possessor where the possession derives from a contract concluded with the owner (general interpretation), and additionally, in the case of proprietary possession, the tax rests on the possessor in good faith, not on the owner.
The basis is the Act on Local Taxes and Fees, Article 6(7) of which provides that the tax on natural persons is determined by way of a decision by the tax authority competent by reference to the location of the objects of taxation, and is payable in instalments by 15 March, 15 May, 15 September and 15 November of the tax year.
In fiscal penal terms, the Fiscal Penal Code provides for a fine of up to 720 daily rates for non-payment of tax, which at the maximum rate in 2026 may mean a penalty of up to approximately PLN 64,080.
Failure to pay the fourth instalment of the property tax by 15 November 2026 exposes the taxpayer primarily to interest for late payment and administrative enforcement proceedings, and in extreme cases to fiscal penal liability. Crucially, the obligation does not expire with the passing of the deadline — the municipality's decision remains enforceable, and the arrears grow with each month of delay. The legal issue concerns the procedure for determining and paying property tax by natural persons and the consequences of late payment. Where the annual liability does not exceed PLN 100, the tax is payable in a single instalment by 15 March. The consequences of arrears are governed by the Tax Ordinance, and persistent evasion of payment may fulfil the elements of a fiscal offence under the Fiscal Penal Code.
The competent authority is the municipality in which the property is located; it is the municipality that issues the decision determining the tax, and where the tax obligation lapses during the year, it amends that decision (Article 6(8) of the Act on Local Taxes and Fees). The tenant of the premises is not the taxpayer — the obligation remains with the owner, regardless of who actually uses the property. In the case of co-ownership with legal persons (other than a housing community), the natural person settles the tax on the same terms as legal persons (Article 6(11)). The municipal council may additionally order collection of the tax by way of collection (inkaso) (Article 6(12)). In fiscal penal terms, the Fiscal Penal Code provides for a fine of up to 720 daily rates for non-payment of tax (Article 57 in conjunction with the penal provisions), which at the maximum rate in 2026 may mean a penalty of up to approximately PLN 64,080; however, this liability requires the fulfilment of the statutory conditions, and a single late payment does not in itself trigger it. By comparison, Article 77 § 1 of the Fiscal Penal Code provides for a fine of up to 720 daily rates or imprisonment for up to 3 years for a remitter or collector who fails to remit collected tax on time — § 4 of that Article allows for an extraordinary mitigation of the penalty, or even a waiver of its imposition, where the tax has been paid in full before the initiation of proceedings.
Realistic scenarios after 15 November 2026 are as follows:
Violation of the Act or of regulations issued thereunder constitutes an offence punishable by arrest or a fine (Article 18 of the Act), adjudicated under the procedure governing proceedings in cases of offences.
The municipality's expenditure on such a funeral is subject to reimbursement from the estate pursuant to Article 96(3) of the Act on Social Assistance.
Families arranging funerals, as well as funeral businesses and municipalities, are governed by a legal division of duties established by the Act of 31 January 1959 on cemeteries and the burial of the dead (consolidated text announced by the Marshal of the Sejm on 7 November 2025). The right to bury the deceased belongs to the closest surviving family members under the catalogue in Article 10(1) — in order: the surviving spouse, descendants, ascendants, collateral relatives up to the fourth degree of kinship, and relatives by affinity in the direct line up to the first degree. Where the family does not bury the deceased, the obligation to arrange the funeral passes to the municipality in which the death occurred, pursuant to Article 10(3) of that Act in conjunction with Article 17(1)(15) of the Act on Social Assistance. Contemporary forms of farewell described in the news item — secular ceremonies, QR codes on gravestones, burials in biodegradable urns — must, however, comply with the technical and sanitary requirements laid down, on the basis of Article 20(1) of the Act, in the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure of 7 March 2008 on the requirements to be met by cemeteries, graves and other places of burial of corpses and remains.
The parties' obligations are distributed as follows:
Tax interpretations also distinguish two dimensions of a cemetery manager's activity: paid cemetery services documented by receipts or invoices constitute VAT-taxable transactions, whereas public tasks performed outside a business activity — such as burying persons not buried by relatives — are not subject to tax (interpretation 0112-KDIL1-1.4012.514.2026.2.EB). Local government units are not regarded as taxpayers when acting as public authorities, a status that a commercial funeral entrepreneur cannot invoke. The requirements for new forms of burial, such as the "Forest of Memory" with biodegradable urns, are set by the 2008 Regulation: in determining the burial area, account is taken of the anticipated annual number of burials, the requirements of Article 7 of the Act, and the frequency of extending the period for the re-use of a grave by further twenty-year periods (§ 8). The burial provisions apply mutatis mutandis to remains after cremation (Article 20a), which covers urn burials. Among the sources there is no case law, so the question of individualising the ceremony is assessed solely on the basis of the provisions of the Act and the Regulation.
For families, the practical significance lies in financing: the funeral allowance as of January amounts to PLN 7,000 instead of PLN 4,000, but according to the practice described it still does not cover the full costs of the funeral and cemetery fees. For municipalities, the risk is the obligation to bury without any means of reimbursement where the deceased left no estate — the expenditure then remains with the municipality. For cemetery managers, the implementation of ecological sections requires adapting the burial area to the parameters of the 2008 Regulation, and the decision to establish such a section is taken by the municipal council as the municipality's own task. Funeral businesses must separate VAT-taxable activities from services performed for the municipality, since incorrect classification results in a dispute with the tax authority. The further course of the matter in Lublin depends on the resolution of a councillor's interpellation concerning the "Forest of Memory" — one should expect a potential draft resolution of the municipal council on the expansion of the communal cemetery, preceded by the sanitary inspector's consent.
Compensation for mobbing will amount to at least six times the minimum wage, whereas previously an employee could claim damages of no less than the minimum wage (art. 94³ § 3–4 of the Labour Code in its previous wording).
An employer who has paid compensation or damages has the right to seek reimbursement from the perpetrator of the conduct for the loss incurred, to the extent corresponding to the perpetrator's degree of fault (art. 94³ § 12).
From 5 November 2026, employers in Poland will operate under an entirely new liability regime for mobbing, in which the key change is the amount of money, not the definition itself. Employers with at least 10 employees will be required to formally regulate anti-mobbing procedures in their work regulations. The legal issue resolved therefore concerns the scope of the new definition of mobbing, the employer's preventive obligations, and the amount of compensation claims under art. 94³ and art. 94³a of the Labour Code.
The new definition of mobbing covers repeated, recurrent or persistent conduct, with § 7 of the new regulation providing that conduct constitutes mobbing even if its purpose was not persistent harassment — this abolishes the previous requirement of both effect and intent. Manifestations of mobbing will include, in particular, humiliating, demeaning, intimidating, undervaluing professional performance, unjustified criticism, degradation or ridicule, obstructing an employee's functioning at work, and isolating the employee (§ 4). Ordering or encouraging such conduct is also deemed mobbing (§ 6), and the perpetrator may be the employer, a supervisor, a peer, a subordinate, another employee, as well as persons performing work on a basis other than an employment relationship (§ 8). At the same time, § 9 excludes from the concept of mobbing conduct that is justified and expressed in an appropriate form, in particular the assessment of assigned work or criticism of it. The employer's obligations are structured as follows: - systematic counteraction to mobbing through preventive measures, detection, proper response, remedial action and support for affected persons (art. 94³ § 1 as amended);
For employees, an easier path to substantial claims becomes realistic: it suffices to demonstrate repeated conduct violating dignity, without proving the perpetrator's intent or health damage, and the amount of the claim is statutorily anchored at a level of at least six times the minimum wage. For employers, the main risk is financial, and the safeguard is the effective implementation of procedures by 5 May 2027, since the effective performance of preventive obligations in cases of mobbing not originating from a supervisor may release them from civil liability. A further possible scenario is the employer's recourse against the specific perpetrator of the conduct. Supervision over compliance with the new obligations will be exercised by the State Labour Inspectorate (art. 18⁴ § 1). The further course of events should be monitored on two points: the entry into force of the provisions on 5 November 2026 and the expiry of the deadline for employers to implement anti-mobbing standards by 5 May 2027 — from that date, the Labour Inspectorate and labour courts will verify whether the work regulations and procedures are actually functioning.