The hack, in which USD 6.3 billion was stolen in 20 minutes, therefore strikes users operating in the market outside the licensed trading of crypto-assets.
Possession of knowledge or experience — completion of a training course or one year of professional experience documented by records (Article 129o(1) and (2)).
Binance clients in Poland cannot rely on protection arising from the Polish supervisory regime, because the exchange did not obtain the licence provided for in Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA) in the summer of 2026 and was required to wind down its operations in the Union. The legal issue centres on the status of cryptocurrencies as a "virtual currency" within the meaning of Article 2(2)(26) of the Act of 1 March 2018 on Counteracting Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2025, item 644) and on the conditions for lawfully conducting virtual currency business set out in Article 129n of that Act. It is this Act, not MiCA, that establishes the framework of liability for cryptocurrency exchange entities under Polish sources of law.
Pursuant to individual interpretations (inter alia 0111-KDIB1-1.4010.675.2025.2.MF), cryptocurrencies constitute a virtual currency within the meaning of Article 2(2)(26) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, and an entity carrying out the exchange of fiduciary funds into cryptocurrencies and vice versa is subject to that Act as it provides services within the meaning of Article 2(1)(12). The conditions for conducting such business are specific:
Interpretation 0114-KDWP.4011.352.2026.2.AS1 confirms that income from virtual currency business is excluded from general taxation rules and is classified separately. The Act of 13 February 2026 (Article 88^e) adds an obligation to report crypto-asset transfers in exchange for goods or services exceeding the equivalent of USD 50,000. The Binance hack illustrates the risk these provisions are intended to curb — laundering of stolen funds through automated transactions and their commingling with proceeds from earlier attacks.
For Binance's Polish clients (estimated at around 3 million persons before 1 July), the practical significance is that the exchange operates in Poland without a MiCA licence and may process only the transfer or sale of assets already held — new deposits remain outside the protection system. The stolen bitcoin and ethereum (USD 2.4–3.3 billion), as decentralised assets, have no issuer capable of freezing them, so recovery of that portion of the losses is, in light of the sources, impossible; stablecoins, however, were frozen — Tether over USD 1.5 billion in USDT, Circle over USD 800 million in USDC, and Ripple approximately USD 200 million. Binance has declared that it will cover the losses from the SAFU fund, but the fund holds slightly over USD 1 billion, so this mechanism does not guarantee full reimbursement. The further course of events depends on the decisions of EU and national authorities towards unlicensed entities and on national legislation implementing MiCA (draft Act on the crypto-asset market UC131).
Under the Act on the Organisation and Procedure before the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 12(1)), it is the President of the Tribunal who directs the work of the Tribunal, represents it externally and performs other acts specified in statutes and the Rules of Procedure.
Following the amendment of 12 April 2018, rulings adopted in breach of the earlier Constitutional Tribunal Act are subject to publication upon an order of the President of the Tribunal or the judge acting as President, and where they concern normative acts that have lost force, they are published with an indication of that circumstance.
The dispute over who actually heads the Constitutional Tribunal today will be resolved by the provisions governing the Tribunal's organisation — and those provide only two modes of filling the leadership: election of the President by the Sejm with the consent of the President of the Republic, or the entrustment of duties to a judge by the President. The statement by NSA President Jacek Chlebny concerns a situation in which the functions of Constitutional Tribunal President Bogdan Święczkowski and Vice-President Bartłomiej Sochański were interrupted, and the management of the Tribunal's work was taken over by Anna Korwin-Piotrowska designated by the Sejm — that is, outside the path provided for by the instruments in force. 12(1)), it is the President of the Tribunal who directs the work of the Tribunal, represents it externally and performs other acts specified in statutes and the Rules of Procedure; if the President is unable to act, the President's duties are performed by the Vice-President or another judge, and in the cases referred to in Art. 11(2), by the judge designated therein. A separate mode — the entrustment of duties to the longest-serving judge by the President of the Republic — is governed by Art. 17(1) and Art. 18 of the implementing provisions of 13 December 2016.
The status of the parties to the dispute is determined by organisational provisions, not by political resolutions. Under the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Tribunal (§ 10(1)), the President of the Tribunal directs the work of the Tribunal and represents it, and any substitute acts must fall within the bounds of Art. 12 of the Act — a written authorisation of the Vice-President or, in exceptional situations, of another judge. If a party to the dispute invokes Art. 16 of the implementing provisions, it must be remembered that in the cases listed there, all acts and instruments carried out within the procedure for presenting candidates for the office of President of the Constitutional Tribunal lose force — which cuts both ways in this dispute. The problem of unpublished judgments has its own remedial path: Art. 2 of the Act of 12 April 2018 imposes on the President of the Constitutional Tribunal the duty to order the publication of rulings issued in breach of the earlier provisions. The statement by the NSA President is not an act with procedural effects — it is a signal of the position of the highest judicial body of administrative review; the NSA President has no adjudicative competence in this matter, and the name "Constitutional Tribunal" remains protected by statute (Art. 112 of the consolidated text). Among the sources provided, there is no case law that could be cited as precedent for these events.
The most realistic scenario is the parallel persistence of two narratives about the legality of the Tribunal's authorities, until one of them is resolved by a body with competence: the President of the Republic, or possibly proceedings before an administrative court or the bodies responsible for the legal protection of the Tribunal's officials. For citizens, the practical significance lies in the state of publication of judgments: as long as the President of the Constitutional Tribunal does not order their publication under Art. 2 of the Act of 12 April 2018, rulings issued in breach of the statutory provisions do not produce full effects in legal circulation, even though they formally exist. For judges and staff of the Tribunal's Office, what matters is who performs acts relating to the employment relationship and the budget — the Rules of Procedure tie those competences to the President, so the actions of a politically appointed person "directing" the Tribunal will be challenged in every administrative act. Going forward, one should expect: the outcomes of the consultations convened by the President of the Republic for Saturday — a possible decision entrusting the duties of President of the Constitutional Tribunal to a specific judge, or a legislative proposal. A further point to monitor is whether, in the coming weeks, the President of the Constitutional Tribunal will order the publication of the outstanding rulings — the first new issue of the Monitor Polski with published judgments would be a tangible test of which side to the dispute has assumed real competence.
Pursuant to Article 21a(4) of the Act on the Prevention and Control of Infections and Infectious Diseases in Humans, once an entry concerning a vaccination has been made in the Vaccination Card, the same entry is not required to be made in the immunization card or in the register of procedures.
The unit subordinate to the minister responsible for health makes vaccination data available to the National Health Fund for the purposes of controlling and settling the healthcare benefits provided (Article 21e(8)).
Individuals evading mandatory vaccinations will be identified more quickly, because their vaccination status will no longer be dispersed across paper documents but will become visible in a single central IT system. The GIS (Chief Sanitary Inspectorate) has announced the extension of the electronic vaccination card to mandatory vaccinations, which changes the mechanism of epidemiological surveillance. Vaccination data are transferred to the system referred to in Article 7(1) of the Act of 28 April 2011 on the health care information system, and a certificate of vaccination in electronic form is made available in the Internet Patient Account (Article 7a of that Act). The legal basis is the Act on the Prevention and Control of Infections and Infectious Diseases in Humans (consolidated text published on 7 November 2025). Article 21a(1) permits the person performing the qualification examination or vaccination to make an entry in the Vaccination Card kept in electronic form, and Article 21a(2) requires an entry concerning the qualification examination, indicating the date and time. The consequence of the electronic entry is the elimination of duplicate documentation: pursuant to Article 21a(4), the same entry is not required to be made in the immunization card or in the register of procedures referred to in the provisions of the Act on Patients' Rights and the Patient Rights Ombudsman.
The existing provisions show how such a system already operates today for COVID-19 vaccinations — and it is precisely this model that the GIS seeks to extend to mandatory vaccinations. Article 21e(1) establishes a central electronic registration system in which the individual's data (name and surname, PESEL number, identity document number, telephone, e-mail, address, and individual medical data) and the data from the referral are processed. The following elements are key to identifying those who have not reported for vaccination:
Registration for vaccination takes place upon provision of the name, surname, and PESEL number via the Internet Patient Account, by telephone, through the service provider issuing the referral, or through a vaccination point (Article 21f(1)), and Article 21f(1a) also permits other methods of authentication. For the supervision of mandatory vaccinations, Article 17 is also relevant, as it is on this basis that, inter alia, the paper or electronic form of the report on cases of non-compliance with mandatory protective vaccinations is determined — it is this report, once digitized and generated automatically by the system, that is transmitted to the state sanitary inspection.
For patients, the practical effect will be access to a complete vaccination history throughout their lives, without a paper booklet, with continuity of documentation preserved upon a change of physician or place of residence; upon request, the certificate will continue to be issued in paper form (Article 21a(3)). For vaccination points, the obligation to maintain parallel entries in the immunization card and the register of procedures will disappear, and for the sanitary inspection, the manual analysis of reports on non-compliance with vaccinations will be eliminated, as the system will itself identify persons past the deadline. Automatic reminders may reduce the number of cases directed into the administrative procedures provided for those evading mandatory vaccinations. The point to monitor going forward is the publication of implementing regulations and amendments extending the electronic Vaccination Card to mandatory vaccinations — without them, the GIS announcements remain a programmatic declaration.
Does the annual inspection of a single-family house require maintaining an exact 12-month interval from the previous inspection, or is it sufficient to carry it out once in each calendar year.
Legal basis: The obligation to conduct periodic inspections stems from Article 62(1) of the Construction Law (Prawo budowlane), which imposes on the owner or manager an annual inspection of gas installations and flues (smoke, exhaust and ventilation ducts), as well as — at least once every five years — an inspection of the technical condition of the entire building, including the electrical installation and lightning protection system. In the case of annual inspections, the statute uses the wording "at least once a year" (rather than "every 12 months"), which forms the basis of the position presented by the GUNB (National Building Authority): the inspection may be carried out at any point in the calendar year, provided that at least one inspection takes place in each year. In the absence of the supplied text of the provision, this indication rests on the content of the GUNB communication of 23 October 2026 and a general interpretation of the cited provisions, rather than on a verbatim-quoted normative source. For the five-year inspection, however, the provision sets a rigid requirement of "at least once every five years", the breach of which constitutes a violation of the owner's obligations.
What case law says: The Constitutional Tribunal and the administrative courts have repeatedly confirmed the mandatory character of periodic inspections, and the case law of the administrative courts consistently holds that an owner's failure to carry out an inspection justifies the imposition of a penalty under Article 62b of the Construction Law, regardless of whether actual damage to the building has occurred — this line of authority is uniform and unfavourable to those relying on the absence of negative consequences of the neglect. Moreover, the accepted view is that the exemption of owners of single-family houses from certain obligations (no building logbook, exclusion of elements exposed to weather conditions) does not extend to inspections of gas, flue, electrical and lightning protection installations, which the GUNB also confirms in the communication under discussion.
Practical significance: In a dispute over the imposition of a penalty for a missed inspection, a delay of the annual inspection by a few months relative to the previous date does not constitute a violation, provided the inspection was carried out at least once in the calendar year — following the GUNB's announcement, this argument has gained clear support in the authority's position and can be successfully relied upon in defence. The risk instead concerns the five-year inspection: there the calendar is rigid, and the lapse of five years from the last inspection without an electrical and lightning protection inspection opens the way for the authority to impose a penalty under Article 62b, even where the building remains in good technical condition. After replacing a boiler, furnace or heat pump, one must additionally remember the 14-day deadline for submitting a declaration in the CEEB system (electronically or at the municipal office), the breach of which constitutes a separate infraction; since September 2023, reports of flue inspections must be prepared electronically in CEEB, so a paper report from an authorised person does not satisfy the formal requirement. The authorisation of the person conducting the inspection should be verified in the e-CRUB register, because an improperly performed inspection by an unqualified person does not release the owner from liability for the technical condition of the building.
The key provision is Article 81(1) of the Act on Copyright and Related Rights, under which the dissemination of an image requires the consent of the person depicted.
Article 23 of the Civil Code classifies one's image among personal interests protected independently of the protection provided under other provisions.
The dissemination of another person's image captured with Meta glasses without the consent of the person being recorded is not legally neutral — it is subject to civil-law protection, not to technical regulation of an LED indicator. The fact that the manufacturer uses a signalling LED and safeguards against its being covered creates no legal basis for recording third parties. Consent is not required only where the person has received agreed remuneration for posing, or where the image concerns a well-known person captured in connection with the performance of public functions (Art. 81(2)(1) of the Act). The mere capture of an image is additionally protected by Article 23 of the Civil Code, which classifies one's image among personal interests (dobra osobiste) protected independently of the protection provided under other provisions.
A person recorded in a public space without consent has civil-law claims arising from the infringement of a personal interest, regardless of whether the recording was further disseminated. A user of the glasses may lawfully record if they obtain the consent of the person depicted, or if no dissemination of the image within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Act takes place. Consent may be given expressly, and the absence of payment for posing precludes any presumption of consent. The use of the camera by AI assistant functions without the LED lighting up does not alter the scope of legal protection — the norms of Article 81 of the Act and Article 23 of the Civil Code concern the dissemination of images and the protection of personal interests, not the signalling mechanism of the device. The sources provided contain no case law or criminal provisions directly addressing covert recording with glasses. The process of pursuing claims proceeds under the general rules on the protection of personal interests and the dissemination of images under the Act on Copyright and Related Rights and the Civil Code.
The practical significance of these norms is twofold — for those recording and for those being recorded.