Pursuant to the Act on the Tribunal of State (Art. 2(1)), the President may be held liable for violation of the Constitution or a statute, or for the commission of a criminal or fiscal offence.
A resolution of the Assembly on indictment — as of the date of its adoption, the President's exercise of office is suspended (Art. 10(1a)).
Karol Nawrocki, as the incumbent President, will not answer for the incident before the Tribunal of State in ordinary criminal proceedings — his responsibility is exclusively constitutional in nature and is triggered only by a resolution of the National Assembly. Żurek confirmed that no investigation has been opened and that only several notifications have been received, which prosecutors are to assess. The key legal issue therefore concerns two planes: the potential criminal responsibility of the President before the Tribunal of State, and the question of whether any act fulfilling the elements of an offence occurred at all. The power to indict the President belongs exclusively to the National Assembly (Art. 4 of the Act on the Tribunal of State), and a preliminary motion may be filed by at least 140 members of the Assembly (Art. 6(1)).
At the notification stage, the prosecution examines only whether the conduct described by Żurek — grabbing and forcefully pushing aside a judge — could constitute a prohibited act; in ordinary circumstances, similar conduct towards another person would be assessed in terms of a violation of bodily inviolability. The obstacle here is the immunity of the office: proceedings against the President are possible only under the Act on the Tribunal of State, not under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The path proceeds in stages:
10(1a));
Constitutional responsibility covers acts committed in connection with the office or within the scope of its exercise, even if they unintentionally violate the Constitution or a statute (Art. 3 of the Act on the Tribunal of State). During the term of office, the limitation period for offences for which the President has not been indicted does not run (Art. 2(2)). The case law of the Constitutional Tribunal confirms that the President's competences constitute powers exercised personally, without binding interpretation by other bodies — as follows from the competence dispute examined in the Constitutional Tribunal's order of 2 June 2023, case no. Kpt 1/17, concerning the scope of the President's prerogative under Art. 139 in conjunction with Art. 144(3)(18) of the Constitution; this case shows that the Constitutional Tribunal resolves disputes over the limits of the head of state's powers through the competence dispute procedure, not criminal proceedings.
The most realistic scenario is that the matter will remain at the stage of assessing the notifications: prosecutors may refuse to open an investigation against a person enjoying presidential immunity, and any liability would require the will of at least 140 members of the National Assembly — a condition that is politically difficult to meet given the current parliamentary composition. If, however, a resolution on indictment were adopted, the President would immediately lose the ability to exercise the office until the conclusion of proceedings before the Tribunal of State. Practical significance also attaches to the circumstances described by Żurek: bringing the President into the police cordon places State Protection Service officers in a situation where their protective duties may conflict with the prohibition on using coercion against the head of state. For citizens filing notifications, this means their cases will reach prosecutors but will not automatically trigger proceedings.
Does the backlog of 1,171 cases before the Constitutional Tribunal, including 706 proceedings at the preliminary review stage, affect the legal position of complainants in constitutional complaints — in particular the running of time limits and the effectiveness of constitutional protection following the Constitutional Tribunal's judgment of 13 December 2017 (K 34/17) concerning the status of Constitutional Tribunal judges?
The sources provided contain no specific statutory provision or judgment, so I rely on a general principle of law: Article 79 of the Polish Constitution grants every person whose constitutional freedoms or rights have been violated the right to lodge a constitutional complaint, and Article 195 of the Constitution requires the Constitutional Tribunal to examine cases without undue delay. The norm derived from these provisions in this situation amounts to the following: the constitutional complaint remains an admissible remedy irrespective of the organisational crisis within the Tribunal, but the Tribunal's actual capacity to perform its statutory duty to examine cases within a reasonable time is currently seriously impaired. At the same time, the context of the dispute over who lawfully heads the Tribunal and sits on its bench is linked to the judgment of 13 December 2017 (K 34/17) and to the dispute, ongoing since 2023, over the lawfulness of the election of some judges — which in itself creates a risk that the binding force of future rulings may be called into question.
In practice, the argument of "excessive delay" in the examination of a constitutional complaint becomes stronger — complainants may rely on the disclosed scale of the backlog (1,171 cases, including more than 700 not yet set down for examination) when assessing whether constitutional protection is genuinely available, which is also relevant for proceedings before the ECtHR (Articles 6 and 13 ECHR in conjunction with a violation of Article 6 ECHR by reason of excessive length of proceedings). At the same time, a practitioner should avoid the error of assuming that every ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal issued by the current bench will be beyond challenge — in disputes concerning the status of judges, the lawfulness of the composition of a given ruling should be examined separately, because the case backlog and the dispute over the leadership of the Tribunal (the assumption of leadership by Judge Korwin-Piotrowska, restrictions on access to the Tribunal's seat from Aleja Szucha) increase the risk that the binding force of judgments will be contested. In urgent matters (e.g. statutory time limits dependent on a ruling of the Tribunal), the safer course is to secure the client's interests in parallel under ordinary legislation, rather than waiting for a Tribunal decision whose timing cannot at present be reliably predicted.
Does the amendment to the Labour Code, in force from 5 November 2026, impose on employers employing at least 10 persons an obligation to introduce a separate "anti-mobbing regulation", or merely an obligation to define rules and procedures for counteracting mobbing in the work regulations or a collective bargaining agreement?
I rely on the wording of the provision as cited in the source (the consolidated text of the Labour Code pursuant to the announcement of the Marshal of the Sejm of 1 September 2026), under which the employer establishes the rules and procedures for counteracting mobbing, as well as the frequency of the measures taken, in a collective bargaining agreement or in the work regulations — the obligation applies where these rules, procedures and frequency of measures are not already specified in those documents. The provision therefore does not provide for the creation of a separate document entitled an "anti-mobbing regulation", but rather for the incorporation of the relevant provisions into existing internal acts. This is an organisational norm whose breach may constitute a ground for the employer's liability for failure to perform the duty of systematically counteracting mobbing and, where mobbing has occurred, a basis for the employee's claims, including the new minimum damages amounting to six times the minimum wage.
The article states the thesis of an "anti-mobbing regulation" too narrowly and imprecisely. First, the provision does not require a separate document under that name — it requires the definition of rules and procedures for counteracting mobbing, as well as the frequency of measures, in a collective bargaining agreement or in the work regulations, and the obligation applies only where such provisions are not already contained in those acts. Second, the article overlooks that a collective bargaining agreement is also an acceptable place for such regulation, which is relevant in establishments covered by collective agreements.
A more accurate formulation would be: employers employing at least 10 persons must specify the rules and procedures for counteracting mobbing and the frequency of preventive measures in the work regulations or a collective bargaining agreement, unless such provisions are already contained therein.
In practice, the risk lies in creating a separate "anti-mobbing regulation" instead of amending the work regulations — this does not in itself constitute a breach, but it creates the risk of fragmented regulation and conflicts with the provisions of the work regulations, which a court will examine as a whole in the event of a dispute. It is safer to incorporate the procedures (the reporting channel, the person or unit responsible, deadlines for response, remedial measures, support for the victim, the frequency of preventive measures) into the work regulations under Article 104³ of the Labour Code, within the six-month adaptation period running from 5 November 2026. An employee's argument in a dispute over damages will now be stronger on two fronts: the absence of procedures in the work regulations or a collective bargaining agreement is a standalone allegation of failure to perform the organisational duty, and under the amendment the employee no longer needs to demonstrate long duration, effects or the perpetrator's intent — persistent, repeated harassment suffices, which, given the minimum threshold of six times the minimum wage (PLN 28,836 in 2026), significantly increases the employer's financial exposure.
Correction. The article inaccurately stated the legal basis and the measure of the sanction. First, under Art. 74(1a) of the consolidated text of the Gambling Act, slot machines may be installed in slot machine halls (operating on a permit), and not generally "in premises where a licence is required to operate" — slot machine gambling outside halls and casinos is, in principle, impermissible. Second, the figure of "up to PLN 600,000" understates the statutory regime: Art. 29(4)(1)(a) provides for PLN 100,000 per machine, which with 12 machines yields a potential PLN 1.2 million — the figure of PLN 600,000 may merely reflect the assumption that the fine will be attributed only to some of the devices or to a single premises. Third, the article omitted that administrative liability is also borne by the dependent holder of the premises (Art. 29(1)(3)), and not only by the organiser of the gambling, and that the charges against the 40-year-old concern a fiscal offence under Art. 107d of the Fiscal Penal Code (penalty of up to 3 years' imprisonment), and not exclusively the "Gambling Act".
In the case of machine gaming, the administrative penalty amounts to PLN 100,000 per machine, and the court will order the forfeiture of gaming devices and funds obtained from the sale of participation in the game or from stakes placed.
Whoever, contrary to statutory provisions, organises or conducts gambling is subject to a fine of up to 720 daily rates, or imprisonment for up to 3 years, or both.
The seizure of 12 slot machines worth nearly PLN 150,000 means that a 40-year-old man from Lublin will face both fiscal criminal and administrative liability — and the financial penalties may be many times higher than the value of the equipment itself. Gambling on slot machines outside casinos and gaming arcades covered by the state monopoly is prohibited in Poland. Under the Act of 19 November 2009 on Gambling, machine gaming may be organised exclusively on the basis of a casino licence (Art. 6(3)), and Art. 15j prohibits possession of slot machines by anyone other than a licensee, a state monopoly company, or a research entity. The perpetrator will face dual consequences: a fiscal offence under Art. 107 § 1 of the Fiscal Penal Code and an administrative penalty under Art. 89 of the Gambling Act.
The charges brought against the man correspond to the offence defined in Art. If the court finds that he acted with the aim of obtaining a benefit from organising collective participation in a game, Art. 107 § 3 of the Fiscal Penal Code will apply, providing for a fine of up to 720 daily rates or imprisonment without the upper limit indicated in § 1. Irrespective of the criminal proceedings, the head of the customs and tax office will impose a monetary penalty under Art. 89(1)(1) of the Gambling Act, which, in the case of machine gaming, amounts to PLN 100,000 per machine. A monetary penalty may additionally be imposed on a person holding a managerial position within an entity organising games without a licence (Art. 89(3)). The court will order the forfeiture of gaming devices and funds obtained from the sale of participation in the game or from stakes placed — including the PLN 2,700 in cash seized — pursuant to Art. 29 § 5 of the Fiscal Penal Code in conjunction with Art. 107, and these items are subject to forfeiture even if they were not owned by the perpetrator (Art. 29 § 1). The costs of examining the seized devices are borne by the entity operating the machines without a licence (Art. 68a of the Gambling Act).
The most realistic scenarios for the suspect are:
Disclosure of the victim's personal data (doxxing) — Article 267 of the Criminal Code (obtaining and disseminating information), prosecuted upon the victim's motion, and Article 190a of the Criminal Code (threats).
The penalty is imprisonment for up to 3 years, and where the content depicts a minor — 3 months to 5 years.
Persons participating in online pile-ons — even those passively supporting them — operate in an area where the Polish Criminal Code provides not one but several parallel classifications, with penalty ranges from a fine to five years' imprisonment. The study by Korean criminologists describes the motivations of the mob, but from a legal standpoint the crux of the matter is that motive — schadenfreude, the need for recognition, or an alleged "defence of values" — does not exclude liability for insult (Articles 212, 216 of the Criminal Code), defamation (Article 212 of the Criminal Code), or participation in an organised group whose purpose is to commit an offence (Article 258 § 1 of the Criminal Code), punishable by 6 months to 8 years' imprisonment. The legal issue boils down to which of these provisions covers the specific conduct of a pile-on participant: publishing accusations, name-calling, disclosing the victim's personal data, or disseminating a recording.
A typical online pile-on consists of acts that the Criminal Code classifies separately:
The jurisdictional aspect is key: Article 112a of the Criminal Code permits the application of Polish criminal law to Polish citizens and foreigners where the offence was committed using an information network and produced, or could have produced, within the territory of the Republic of Poland, an effect violating protected interests of the State. The Constitutional Tribunal, in its judgment of 19 September 2008, Case No. K 5/07, shaped the current construction of Article 212, accepting the penetration of the private life of public figures only where the accusation is connected with the public function — which narrows the scope of the "defence of a socially justified interest" as a justification for pile-ons. In parallel, the victim has a procedural instrument at their disposal: the court or prosecutor may order the removal of content, impose the obligation to comply also on the content administrator, and upon conviction for insult committed via the mass media, the court may order a monetary payment to the victim (Article 216 § 4 of the Criminal Code) and — upon motion — publication of the judgment (Article 215 of the Criminal Code).
The most realistic scenario for active participants in a pile-on is several parallel proceedings: a private prosecution for insult or defamation, the victim's motion to prosecute for doxxing (Articles 267, 190a, 191a of the Criminal Code), and potentially ex officio proceedings where the conduct meets the elements of Article 255b of the Criminal Code or where the group's activity justifies classification under Article 258 § 1 of the Criminal Code. For the victim of a pile-on, three avenues have practical significance: a motion to prosecute, a demand for a monetary payment and publication of the judgment, and an order for the removal of content — including against the platform administrator. For passive observers, merely supporting the pile-on does not constitute an offence, but moving on to publishing accusations or comments shifts them into the category of perpetrators under Article 212 or 216 of the Criminal Code. The further course of such cases should be followed through the case law of the common courts on the new Article 255b of the Criminal Code — their rulings will show whether "personal benefit" is to encompass the satisfaction derived from applause, as the legislator assumes.