Concluding insurance guarantee agreements, their performance, risk assessment, and the conduct of recourse proceedings are insurance activities within the meaning of Article 4(7)(1) and Article 4(8)(1) and (5) of the Act on Insurance and Reinsurance Activity.
Interpretation 0111-KDIB2-1.4010.79.2026.1.BJ clarifies that a guarantee is not a contract of insurance within the meaning of Article 805 § 1 of the Civil Code — the guarantor does not assume responsibility for the performance of the contract, but merely undertakes to pay a sum of money where the principal fails to render the performance.
Entrepreneurs who secure investments with insurance guarantees operate on the basis of an instrument not governed by a separate statute — its foundation is the Act of 11 September 2015 on Insurance and Reinsurance Activity and the Civil Code, not banking law. The consequence is that an insurance guarantee does not exhaust credit limits at a bank, which makes it a genuine alternative to cash bid security and bank guarantees in tenders, advance payment guarantees, and contract performance guarantees. The scale is already significant: premium written on insurance guarantees grew from PLN 356.7 million in 2015 to nearly PLN 750 million in 2025. The legal issue reduces to the classification of the insurer's activities and to the payout mechanism. The guarantor undertakes to pay the beneficiary a specified amount up to the guarantee sum where the principal fails to perform its obligation — a construction similar to the bank guarantee under Article 81(1) of the Banking Act, though not directly subject to that regulation.
The parties' arrangement of rights and obligations is as follows:
Individual interpretation 0111-KDIB2-1.4010.19.2026.1.AJ confirms that concluding guarantee agreements and entrusting their conclusion to authorised intermediaries within the meaning of the Act of 15 December 2017 on Insurance Distribution constitutes insurance activity within the meaning of Article 4(1) of that Act. Responsibility for the proper execution of the works remains with the contractor. The value of the guarantee document for the beneficiary is further reinforced by Article 15(5) of the Act on Insurance and Reinsurance Activity: provisions of contract templates formulated ambiguously are interpreted in favour of the policyholder, the insured, or the person entitled under the contract.
For contractors, the practical effect is twofold: they may pursue public procurement and private contracts without freezing cash for bid security or advance payment, but every payout by the guarantor gives rise to a full recourse claim against them — the insurer seeks reimbursement of the amount paid in recourse and debt-collection proceedings. For beneficiaries, it is significant that unconditional guarantees allow the security to be drawn on first demand, without litigation over non-performance of the contract. In large investments, the risk may be shared among several guarantors — banks and insurance undertakings — making it possible to secure projects of very large scale, including for subcontractors. Further development of the market will depend on the scale of infrastructure, energy, and transport projects; the sources do not indicate any specific date for legislative changes or for a decision that should be awaited. The point to monitor remains the interpretative practice of the tax and supervisory authorities regarding the classification of guarantee fees — further individual interpretations concerning insurance guarantees will refine the status of this instrument.
[ESMĖGYMAS] Situation under assessment: On 15 May 2025, President of the Republic of Lithuania Gitanas Nausėda, relying on Article 89(2) of the Constitution and the Constitutional Court (CC) ruling of 13 October 2004, decreed the appointment of 11 judges to the Constitutional Court — among them former Minister of Justice E. Stankūnaitė. The ruling majority in the Seimas (the factions of the "immortal coalition") refused to recognise the appointments; by a Seimas resolution it terminated E. Stankūnaitė's judicial mandate, and the President responded by warning that he might initiate impeachment of the Seimas under Article 74 of the Constitution. [PAGRINDINĖS IŠVADOS] 1. The constitutional conflict is real and multifaceted: it involves all three branches of power — the legal force of presidential decrees, the Seimas's authority to terminate judges' mandates, and the Constitutional Court as the final arbiter of constitutional disputes. 2. The core legal tension concerns whether the President may appoint judges where the Seimas has already initiated the appointment procedure under Article 67 of the Constitution, and whether the Seimas may undo the outcome of an appointment. 3. The mechanism of Article 74 of the Constitution (removal of members of the Seimas) is exceptionally demanding: it is subject to the procedure set out in Article 72 of the Constitution. 4. The Constitutional Court's ruling of 13 October 2004 is the legal basis on which the President relies; its application to the contested case is a matter of interpretation. [KONSTITUCINĖS NORMOS IR JŲ TAISKYMAS] Article 89(2) of the Constitution: the President has the power to appoint officials unless the laws provide otherwise. Article 67 of the Constitution: the procedure for appointing judges to the Constitutional Court falls within the competence of the Seimas. Article 74 of the Constitution: the mandate of a member of the Seimas may be terminated only under the procedure laid down in Article 72 of the Constitution. Article 72 of the Constitution: the procedure is initiated by no fewer than one quarter of the members of the Seimas, and the decision requires no fewer than three fifths of all the votes of the members of the Seimas. [TEISINĖS ĮTAMPOS TAŠKAI] 1. Whether a presidential decree adopted under Article 89(2) of the Constitution is final where the Seimas has not enacted a law establishing a different procedure. 2. Whether the Seimas may terminate the result of an already implemented decree — this raises questions concerning the independence of judges and the limits of application of Article 74 of the Constitution. 3. Whether the Constitutional Court's ruling of 13 October 2004 is directly applicable to the contested situation, or whether its application requires further interpretation by the CC. [KONSTITUCINĖS RIZIKOS] 1. The constitutional crisis is deep: the Seimas and the President are disputing the legitimacy of the composition of the CC, which affects the legitimacy of all CC decisions, including future ones on the application of Article 74 of the Constitution. 2. The threatened initiation of Article 74 proceedings would be unprecedented: if the President were to initiate the removal of members of the Seimas over decisions related to the appointment of CC judges, this would set a precedent that would alter the balance of relations among the branches of power. 3. Applying the Article 72 procedure to the contested case would require interpretation by the Constitutional Court, yet the CC itself — whose composition is under dispute — may be a biased adjudicator. [NEAPIBRĖŽTYS KLAUSIMAI] 1. There is no clear Constitutional Court decision directly resolving the lawfulness of these appointments. 2. There is no established practice on how to apply Article 74 of the Constitution where the dispute concerns the very formation of the CC's composition. 3. There are no clearly defined limits on the application of the Constitutional Court's ruling of 13 October 2004 to the contested case. [IŠVADA] The constitutional crisis is structural: it exposes the uncertainty in the interrelation between the application of Articles 67, 89, 72 and 74 of the Constitution, where the President's decree power, the Seimas's authority to shape the CC, and the CC's own power to adjudicate disputes become entangled. The application of the Constitutional Court's ruling of 13 October 2004 to the contested case constitutes an essential but insufficiently clear legal basis. [PASTABA DĖL ŠALTINIŲ] The sources provided do not include documents directly analysing this constitutional dispute — they cover legal acts of a different nature. Accordingly, the analysis rests on general constitutional provisions and known circumstances; confirmation of the specific conclusions would require the Constitutional Court's rulings and Seimas documents.
The money laundering thread involving PLN 3 million falls under Article 299 § 1 of the Penal Code as amended in 2015, which covers the acceptance, transfer, conversion and other activities capable of frustrating the determination of the criminal origin of property.
If the allegations are confirmed, the possible consequences include the full range of measures under Article 20 § 2 of the FPC: forfeiture of items and pecuniary benefits, recovery of their monetary equivalent, a ban on conducting a specific type of business activity or holding a specific position, deprivation of public rights, and publication of the judgment.
The transfer of the investigation from the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Gdańsk to the National Prosecutor's Office indicates that the case has been classified as multi-faceted and of significance extending beyond the local region. For Radosław Piesiewicz, the real legal stakes arise from the catalogue of alleged acts: suspicions of issuing unreliable VAT invoices for approximately PLN 9.3 million, tax shortfalls of approximately PLN 1.3 million, financing inconsistent with the PKOL statute in the amount of at least PLN 1 million, and money laundering of PLN 3 million. The legal issues will be resolved on the basis of the provisions of the Fiscal Penal Code (acts against foreign exchange turnover and tax obligations specified, inter alia, in Articles 77–83, 85–95 and 97–106j, as referred to in the Act of 28 July 2005 amending the FPC, Art. 16), and the Penal Code — including Article 299 of the Penal Code as amended by the Act of 9 October 2015 amending the Penal Code (Art. 1), which provides for a penalty of imprisonment from 6 months to 8 years for money laundering, and Article 303 of the Penal Code (unreliable or untruthful documentation — up to 5 years in the event of substantial damage). The "upper" limit of 25 years mentioned in the media refers to the classification under Article 286 of the Penal Code in the case of concurrence of offences — the Act of 23 March 2017 (Art. 2) covers concurrence in cases of fraud and offences against economic turnover under Articles 296–297, 299 and 305 of the Penal Code, where the legislator provided for penalties of "imprisonment for a period of not less than 5 years or 25 years' imprisonment" for the most serious threads.
In the proceedings conducted by the National Prosecutor's Office, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning preventive measures will apply, to which Article 113 § 1 of the Fiscal Penal Code (2025 consolidated text) refers, and the purpose of the proceedings is — pursuant to Article 114 of the FPC — to redress the financial loss suffered by the State Treasury and other entitled entities. The nature of the documents is decisive for the classification: unreliable invoices for commercial intermediation services that were never actually performed fall within the scope of Article 303 § 1 of the Penal Code (causing damage by maintaining unreliable documentation), and where the damage is deemed substantial — Article 303 § 2 of the Penal Code (3 months to 5 years' imprisonment). A complaint concerning the organisational structure (association, company) may also trigger the liability of collective entities — the Act of 6 December 2024 on the liability of collective entities (Art. 16) covers, inter alia, acts against tax obligations under Articles 77–83 of the FPC and against foreign exchange turnover under Articles 97–106j of the FPC, so the Polish basketball companies and PKOL, as entities, may be held liable independently, alongside the natural person. Among the sources provided there is no case law concerning analogous facts; therefore, the assessment is based solely on the literal wording of the provisions cited.
The most realistic scenario is that the National Prosecutor's Office will present charges encompassing several sets of acts — VAT invoices for PLN 9.3 million, shortfalls of PLN 1.3 million and laundering of PLN 3 million — and will file a motion for a preventive measure proportionate to the exposure under Articles 286 and 299 of the Penal Code. For the suspect himself, the financial risks are of practical significance: the obligation to repay the shortfalls, forfeiture of benefits under Article 20 § 2 of the FPC, and a potential ban on conducting business activity. For the companies — PZKosz, PLK SA and PKOL — there is the risk of proceedings concerning the liability of collective entities, and for contractors and donors to sports policy, uncertainty as to the settlement of cooperation agreements and assignments of receivables for USD 3.7 million and USD 535,000.
Can a state legal person (PAAAB – the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency) lose liquidity as a result of enforcement against route charge revenues conducted by Eurocontrol on the basis of a foreign (Belgian) judgment in a contractual dispute with Pfizer, and is a statutory loan of up to PLN 1.5 billion from the Minister of Finance an appropriate remedial instrument? [TEISINIS_PAGRUND]: The sources provided do not contain a specific statutory provision, so I rely on a general principle of law: the budget-related statute (the Act on Specific Solutions Serving the Implementation of the Budget Act) is an instrument by which the legislature may authorise the Minister of Finance to grant an interest-free loan to a public entity outside the government sector, and PAŻP, as a state legal person performing air navigation services tasks, is financed from route charges which Eurocontrol settles. The practical norm under the draft is that — once the Act enters into force — the Minister of Finance will be able to grant a loan of up to PLN 1.5 billion solely to secure liquidity, and not to finance the Pfizer claim itself; this distinction (liquidity versus satisfaction of the creditor) is the essence of the construction.
What case law says: The news item itself contains no Polish case-law material concerning enforcement against route charges or the effects of the Belgian judgment, so no uniform line of case-law can be identified; it is worth noting, however, that the Pfizer v. Poland dispute is being litigated before a Belgian court, not before a Polish court or authority, which limits the possibility of any direct influence of Polish doctrine on the course of the enforcement conducted by Eurocontrol.
Practical significance: The argument that the seizure of route charge revenues threatens the continuity of air navigation services now becomes stronger, because the legislature confirms the gravity of the threat by reserving an amount of up to PLN 1.5 billion — in negotiations with the creditor or in any potential measures against enforcement, reliance may be placed on the legislature's will to protect the agency's liquidity. Practical risk: the loan does not extinguish the underlying claim or the enforcement title, so absent an agreement with Pfizer the seizure may recur in successive settlement periods, and PLN 1.5 billion is a ceiling whose real coverage depends on the scale of the seizures; it is also necessary to monitor whether, in the course of the parliamentary work, an amendment emerges linking the loan to a specific purpose (repayment or return of funds), since the draft currently contains only clarifying and editorial amendments.
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