May the contracting authority withdraw the selection of a tender due to doubts concerning the financial situation of a subcontractor responsible for approximately 90% of the scope of works, where the contractor itself (Texom) remains credible, and does the substitution of a subcontractor prior to the conclusion of the contract justify continuing the proceedings rather than their annulment?
The database contains no direct source, so I rely on the general principle arising from the Public Procurement Law: pursuant to Article 112 and Article 118(2) of the PPL, the contracting authority assesses the economic or financial capacity of the contractor only, unless the contractor relies in that respect on the resources of a third party; in the case of construction works, however, the authority may require that part or all of the works be performed by entities with specified experience and potential, in which case their financial situation may be subject to examination. The withdrawal of the selection of the most advantageous tender without annulment of the proceedings is permissible only where the findings of the committee to date do not allow for a proper evaluation of the tenders — the mere existence of explanatory proceedings conducted by the President of the Public Procurement Office (pursuant to Article 511(2) of the PPL in conjunction with Article 381(1)(1) of the PPL) does not, in itself, suspend the conclusion of the contract, although in practice contracting authorities treat it as justification for withholding a decision.
The case law of the KIO (National Appeals Chamber) is inconsistent on this issue, but the dominant line (including KIO judgments in cases concerning the substitution of subcontractors prior to the conclusion of the contract) indicates that replacing a subcontractor with an entity of comparable resources does not violate the terms of the tender, provided it does not enhance the attractiveness of the tender as assessed during the proceedings and the contractor did not rely on the subcontractor's resources in respect of the conditions of participation. A contracting authority that withdraws its selection solely because of doubts as to the finances of a subcontractor responsible for 90% of the works exposes itself to the objection that, in examining the financial situation of a third party, it applied a criterion to an entity that is not a contractor, which may result in a finding of a breach of public finance discipline or in an appeal being upheld.
Texom's decision to replace Mostostal Warszawa with BPBP before signing the contract is the strongest argument against the annulment of the proceedings: the contracting authority has before it a tender with a subcontractor of confirmed experience (the stadium in Sosnowiec), so maintaining its doubts requires demonstrating that the new entity also fails to meet the conditions, rather than that former doubts "prolong the discussion". The extension of the tender binding period by 60 days with the consent of Texom and Budimex is legally necessary for the contracting authority to be able to make a selection at all after that date — once it has expired, a contractor's appeal against being bound by its tender would prevent the contract from being validly concluded. The risk for MOSiR: if, despite a complete set of documents and an active subcontractor, the contracting authority continues to delay the selection, Texom may successfully pursue claims through the appeal procedure and (in proceedings before the President of the PPO arising from a closed market) argue that successive shifts in financing and deadlines indicate conduct by the contracting authority contrary to the principle of equality and fair competition.
Under Article 6(1), a coercive measure must be selected in proportion to the degree of threat, choosing the measure of the least possible severity; firearms may be used only where coercive measures have proved insufficient or their use is impossible owing to the circumstances of the incident.
The dispute surrounding the police intervention on Marszałkowska Street and the tent camp in front of the Constitutional Tribunal boils down to a single question: whether the use of direct coercive measures against protesters fell within the limits set by the Act of 24 May 2013 on Direct Coercive Measures and Firearms (Journal of Laws of 2026, item 244). Pursuant to Article 11 of that Act, coercive measures may be used or applied, inter alia, to enforce conduct required by law in accordance with the order of an authorised official, to repel a direct, unlawful attack on life, health or liberty, and to prevent a breach of public order or security. It is therefore crucial to establish whether the conduct of the detained man — who, according to the police statement, assaulted a female officer — satisfied any of these premises and, if so, whether the measures selected were proportionate. A second, parallel thread concerns the status of Maciej Berek: the Constitution of the Republic of Poland requires a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal to take the oath of office before the President, and the Act on the Status of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal requires demonstration of at least ten years of actual practice as an advocate, legal counsel or notary, which — as reported — Berek failed to demonstrate.
Police officers are authorised to use and apply direct coercive measures under Article 2(1)(9) of the Act on Direct Coercive Measures, and the principles governing their use are set out in Articles 6 and 7 of that Act. Article 7(1) requires that measures be used in a manner causing the least possible harm, and Article 7(2) requires that their use be discontinued once the objective has been achieved. Where the use of coercive measures results in injury to a person, Article 10(1) imposes on the superior a duty to promptly provide the affected person with assistance, in particular psychological or legal assistance. Documentation is also a mandatory element: Articles 54 and 55 of the Act require the preparation of a record documenting the use of coercive measures, and Article 56 additionally — where measures are used by a formed unit — requires information on the authority that granted approval and a description of the conduct preceding their use. In the Berek matter, the President and the President of the Constitutional Tribunal submit that the absence of an oath taken before the President and the failure to demonstrate the ten-year practice requirement preclude his adjudication; the oath taken in the Marshal of the Sejm's office does not satisfy the constitutional requirements. Among the sources provided there is no judicial or Tribunal case law resolving analogous situations, so no precedent can be cited.
For the detained man, the realistic avenues are a defence in any criminal proceedings (a charge of assaulting a female officer) and — if he considers the use of force excessive — pursuing the matter through the avenues of officer liability, in which the records under Articles 54–56 and the body-camera footage, which the police have not yet released, will be crucial. For the protesters outside the Constitutional Tribunal, it is significant that each subsequent use of force must be individually justified by a premise under Article 11 and proportionate within the meaning of Articles 6–7; any escalation against a crowd without such premises would be objectively verifiable in the police records. For the government and the opposition, the dispute over Berek will be resolved only once the question of his status undergoes a binding assessment — the sources do not indicate the date or procedure for such a resolution, so it should be monitored through the forthcoming actions of the Tribunal and the President. Procedurally, the nearest observable step is the publication by the police of the footage and the record documenting Friday's use of coercive measures — with no deadline indicated in the sources — as well as any further interventions ahead of tomorrow's demonstration, which will test the boundaries of Article 11 and Article 6 of the Act on Direct Coercive Measures and Firearms.
For acts punishable by both a fine and imprisonment, Article 33 of the Criminal Code sets the minimum amount of the fine in daily-rate units: 50 units for an act punishable by up to one year of imprisonment, and 100 units for an act punishable by up to 2 years.
The period of actual deprivation of liberty is credited towards the imposed penalty, and the same period may not be credited towards different penalties (Article 80b § 4 of the Executive Penal Code).
Persons who in recent weeks threatened schools, spread false alarms, or incited criminal offences have entered the criminal justice system and face a path from apprehension through the serving of penalties, and in the case of minors — through the family court. The scale is concrete: 106 initiated proceedings, 192 apprehensions, 68 case files referred to family courts, and 155 dangerous items secured. The legal issues will be the classification of the acts — predominantly criminal threats, public incitement to offences, false alarms, and reporting non-existent threats — followed by the determination of penalties under the principles of Article 53 of the Criminal Code and the recording of convictions in the National Criminal Register under the Act on the National Criminal Register.
A court adjudicating against adult perpetrators will be bound by the principles of Article 53 § 1 of the Criminal Code: it imposes a penalty at its discretion within the statutory limits, taking into account the degree of social harm caused by the act, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and preventive aims, with the proviso that the severity of the penalty may not exceed the degree of culpability. Where the perpetrator committed more than one act — which is realistic in the case of a series of threats or false alarms — Article 60 of the Criminal Code applies, governing the rules for determining an aggregate penalty, including the requirement of a term of imprisonment of not less than one third of the lower limit of the statutory penalty for a felony. For persons placed in pre-trial detention, the execution of the judgment is settled under Article 80b § 4 of the Executive Penal Code — the period of actual deprivation of liberty is credited towards the imposed penalty, and the same period may not be credited towards different penalties. Convicted persons may also serve their sentence outside a prison under the electronic monitoring system, based on Article 43a § 1 of the Executive Penal Code. Every conviction and execution of a penalty is entered in the National Criminal Register — the register includes, inter alia, information on the commencement, termination, and place of serving of the penalty, as well as on the revocation of protective measures referred to in Article 93a § 1 of the Criminal Code. Minors are not subject to penalties under the Criminal Code, but rather to educational and corrective measures. Where an act constituting a petty offence simultaneously fulfils the elements of a criminal offence, Article 10 § 1 of the Petty Offences Code requires adjudication for both the offence and the petty offence, executing the more severe penalty, and for crediting purposes one day of arrest is equated to one day of imprisonment, and a fine of PLN 20 to 150 (Article 10 § 2 of the Petty Offences Code).
Adult perpetrators: following a final judgment, they face entry in the National Criminal Register, and the penalty may be served under a programmed or therapeutic intervention regime or electronic monitoring.
As of 2026, the cost limit for a passenger car under lease is PLN 100,000 for a vehicle emitting at least 50 g CO₂/km, PLN 150,000 below that threshold, and PLN 225,000 for an electric or hydrogen-powered vehicle.
For a car costing PLN 150,000 net, this is PLN 34,500, of which PLN 17,250 may be deducted in the case of mixed use.
For a business choosing leasing, the issue is not merely the price of the installments, but who is the party entitled to depreciation, when the VAT taxable event arises, and whether the agreement will be recognized as a tax lease at all. The distinctions between operating and financial leases are resolved primarily under the Corporate Income Tax Act (Art. 17a–17h) and the Personal Income Tax Act (Art. 23a–23h), while in the VAT area — under the Goods and Services Tax Act, which treats an operating lease as a service (as a rule, at the 23% rate) and a financial lease as a supply of goods taxed at the rate applicable to the leased item. Decisive for the classification of the agreement are the conditions set out in Art. 17b(1) of the CIT Act and Art. 23b(1) of the PIT Act: a fixed-term agreement, the sum of payments net of VAT corresponding to at least the initial value of the fixed asset, and, for an operating lease, an additional minimum duration (40% of the normative depreciation period).
Under an operating lease, the initial fee and the installments are deductible as tax-deductible costs, with Art. 16(5c) of the CIT Act and, correspondingly, Art. 23(5c) of the PIT Act limiting that cost to the portion of the fee constituting repayment of the value of the passenger car. Under the financial variant, depreciation deductions are made by the lessee, which opens access to one-off depreciation of fixed assets in KŚT groups 3–8 (excluding passenger cars) up to the limit of EUR 50,000 per year as de minimis aid. The parties should bear in mind the following consequences of exiting the agreement:
Case law and tax rulings show that the tax authorities consistently tie the status of an agreement to the conditions of Art. 17b/23b — this is confirmed by individual interpretation 0111-KDIB1-1.4010.230.2026.1.SH, in which leasing services were classified through the prism of Art. 17a(1) and Art. 17b of the CIT Act. Similarly, interpretation 0112-KDIL2-2.4011.473.2026.3.KP confirms that the amended rules on the taxation of the subsequent sale apply to a car purchased out of an operating lease after 31 December 2021. For agreements shorter than 6 months, Art. 23(5d) of the PIT Act (correspondingly, Art. 16(5d) of the CIT Act) requires the value of the car to be taken as the value adopted for insurance purposes.
Under the lump-sum tax on recorded revenues, neither installments nor depreciation deductions reduce income tax, but VAT deduction remains possible under both variants. For financing companies, it is relevant that Art. 17f(1) of the CIT Act and Art. 23f(1) of the PIT Act exclude payments constituting repayment of the initial value from the lessor's revenue only where all the agreement conditions are jointly met. In the event of the lessee's insolvency, Art. 77 of the Restructuring Law is significant, as it partially ranks lease receivables arising before the date of the opening of proceedings. Companies considering a borderline variant should protect themselves by obtaining an individual tax interpretation.
pursuant to § 2(1) of the Regulation of 16 April 2019, notification must be made within 3 days of the day the damage is discovered;
a dissatisfied landowner or lessee may, within three months of service of the decision, bring an action before the court having jurisdiction over the place where the damage occurred.
Farmers in the Dębno municipality who bear the costs of fencing and electric shepherds against wild boar and deer currently receive no subsidy for protective measures — the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development's response to interpellation No. 20181 announces neither a fund, nor a programme, nor a timetable. The State does, however, provide them with a ready-made compensation system: for damage to crops and agricultural produce caused by wild boar, red deer, fallow deer and roe deer, the lessee or manager of the hunting district is, as a rule, liable, and outside hunting districts — the State Treasury. The legal issue therefore concerns two planes: obligations arising from the Act of 13 October 1995 — Hunting Law (Art. 46, Art. 46a–46e, Art. 50) and the Regulation of the Minister of the Environment of 16 April 2019 on the detailed conditions for estimating damage, while the question of preventive co-financing remains outside the applicable legislation and would require new legislation, for which the minister competent for climate and environment, not agriculture, would be responsible.
The affected farmer must act quickly and in accordance with a strictly defined procedure:
An appeal against the findings is available — to the district forest manager (nadleśniczy) in leased districts or to the director of the regional directorate of State Forests in managed districts. 46e, cited in source [15]). In areas not forming part of hunting districts, compensation for damage caused by wild boar, red deer, fallow deer and roe deer is paid by the Voivodeship Board, and for animals under year-round protection the State Treasury is liable under Art. 50 of the Hunting Law. The legislation does not shift the costs of prevention onto the lessee as a statutory obligation towards a specific farmer — hunting clubs finance them voluntarily, as confirmed by the amount of approx. PLN 10.5 million in the 2025/2026 hunting year transferred by the Polish Hunting Association.
For the farmer, the practical conclusion is that the only reliable path to recovering losses remains timely notification of every instance of damage within the 3-day time limit and participation in the estimation, while the costs of fencing must be borne at their own expense. Scenarios:
The nearest point to monitor is any response by the Minister of Climate and Environment to the issue of amending the legislation, and related legislative work.